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Abstract
We investigate the behaviour of individual financial investors and in-
dividual preferences about intertemporal choice. First, we estimate how the
propensity to realise a stock in the gain domain changes, as the distance in
price and the distance in time from the maximum price which realised in an in-
vestment episode change. We fit a Proportional Hazard model to estimate the
propensity to sell a stock in a specific investment and find that the propensity
to sell is highest at a short distance in time and high distance in price from the
past maximum. We relate our results to theoretical models of Regret Theory
in dynamic decisions. Second, we estimate the disposition effect from a wide
framing perspective, for a sample of frequent traders. The disposition effect is
the tendency of investors to realise gains at a higher rate than losses. We esti-
mate it for several bank account compositions, using fixed effects models. We
find that the disposition effect is higher when the percentage of stocks trading
at a gain in a bank account is lower and it is lower when the percentage of gains
is higher. We attribute the effect to a combination of anticipated regret and
the preference that investors have for realising more than a stock on a given
trading day, which we document. Third, we estimate the disposition effect
assuming that investors define gains and losses, at a psychological level, with
respect to an alternative reference point, different from the purchase price.
We test three alternative rules and find that adopting the average of the real-
isations of the last five trading days prices (Recent rule) leads to the biggest
departure of the disposition effect from the original estimate. Assuming that
investors adopt the Recent rule to define their reference point leads to a much
lower disposition effect, in particular if investors trade more and their trades
are shorter. Fourth, we estimate intertemporal discounting in a sample of
more than 50,000 individuals from 65 countries. We find that young individ-
uals discount at the same rate, independently from income. Patience declines
with age, at a faster rate, the lower the individuals rank in the income distri-
bution. High income individuals discount at the same rate, independently of
age. We develop an index of patience, defined at the country level, and find a
strong correlation of it with other indices proposed in the literature and with
country characteristics associated to economic development.
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Overview
Every day we take many decisions. Some of these decisions have very high
stakes, for example when we invest our money. Some of these decisions will
shape our future and the rate at which we discount the future will impact
our decisions today. This thesis will analyse real investment decisions in the
stock market and a non incentivised survey measure of discounting. We had
the possibility to analyse two unique datasets. First, we had access to actual
trading decisions of US citizens in the stock market, collected in the so called
Large Discount Brokerage dataset (Odean, 1998). Second, we had access to
the Gallup End of Year 2015 survey. The Gallup End of Year survey is a survey
conducted by Gallup International every year, at the international level and it
contains demographic as well as political, sociological and economic opinions
of the respondents. We analyse one question concerning time discounting,
which we were permitted to ask, along the other standard question usually
asked by Gallup. This work consists of four chapters. In Chapters 1 to 3 we
analyse the LDB dataset, while in Chapter 4 we analyse Gallup data.
In Chapter 1 we test a dynamic extension of Regret Theory (Loomes
and Sugden, 1982; Strack and Viefers, 2019) in the context of dynamic finan-
cial decisions. Regret Theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) is one of the most
successful alternatives to Expected Utility Theory (Bleichrodt and Wakker,
2015) and it departs from Expected Utility by relaxing the axiom of transitiv-
ity. In the context of static decisions, the main difference between Expected
Utility theory and Regret Theory, but also from Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), arise from the fact that
xi
a Regret agent evaluates payoffs by comparing them, under any state of the
world. A big emphasis is put on big differences between two alternative payoffs
induced by two alternative acts, under the same state of the world. Strack
and Viefers (2019) propose an extension of Regret Theory for financial deci-
sions where the regret component is captured by the price difference between
the price of a stock the investor is trading, and the past maximum price of
the stock, since the stock was purchased. We test the predictions of dynamic
regret on actual trading data. We reject the hypothesis that investors stop at
a threshold (stop on maximum or minimum day). Hence we reject Expected
Utility theory, which prescribes that the optimal strategy for a decision maker
is stopping at a threshold. We find that more sophisticated and younger in-
vestors are more likely to follow a threshold strategy. Then, we analyse the
impact of the maximum price level and the day of occurrence of the maximum
in an investment episode, on the propensity to sell a stock for a gain. We
find that investors are more likely to sell a stock in a moment closer in time
to maximum occurrence and at a price further from the running maximum
price of the investment episode. This contradicts dynamic Regret Theory and
might be rationalised through anticipated regret (Fioretti et al., 2018). Our
methodology is innovative in this field. We are among the first to fit a Pro-
portional Hazard model (Cox, 1972) to financial data. This guarantees a more
precise estimation of the probability of selling a stock, by taking into account
the entire history of the trading episode, at any point in time.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we focus on the disposition effect (Shefrin and
Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998). The disposition effect is the tendency to realise
gains at a higher rate than losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998;
Barber and Odean, 2013). This was first documented by Odean (1998) and
since then it has been extensively studied from a theoretical, experimental
and empirical perspective1. We study it from two unexplored perspectives:
variation at the bank account level (Chapter 2) and variation as the reference
1See Barber and Odean (2013) for a review.
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price changes (Chapter 3). In Chapter 2 we estimate the disposition effect from
a wide framing perspective for a set of active traders in the Large Discount
Brokerage dataset. We find that the disposition effect varies with portfolio
composition. By means of fixed effect regression, we are able to pin down
the within bank account variation of the disposition effect. We find that the
disposition effect drops as the percentage of stocks trading at a gain in the
bank account increases, and the disposition effect is close to neutral2 once there
are more than 50% of stocks at a gain in the bank account. The probability to
realise a loss increases as the percentage of gains in the bank account increases.
The relation between the probability of realising a gain and the percentage of
gains in the bank account account follows a U-shape. We also estimate the
change in the disposition effect when an investor realises more than one stock
on a trading day. When investors sell a stock, they are much more likely to
also realise another stock. In particular, when investors sell a loss (gain) they
are also more likely to realise a gain (loss). This provides an explanation for
the variation in the disposition effect, due to portfolio composition. Since
investors have a preference for realising more than one stock on the same day,
the probability of selling a gain (loss) will be higher if the number of gains
(losses) among which the investor can choose is lower. We believe that our
finding is a breakthrough in the literature on the topic. We observe that
investors are not always disposition effect prone, and the disposition effect is
highest when the relative number of gains in the account is lowest, which is
unexpected.
In Chapter 3 we dispute the magnitude of the disposition effect, from a
psychological point of view. We measure the disposition effect by defining gains
and losses with respect to some alternative reference points. The underlying
idea is that, from a psychological point of view, the investors might update
their reference point when they evaluate a stock. For example, they might
be satisfied of selling a stock for a loss, if the price is on a rising trajectory,
2When we say neutral, we mean that the probability of selling a gain is the same as the
probability of selling a loss.
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after having been on a decreasing trajectory for a while. Our hypothesis that
investors update their reference point during a trading episode is backed up
by the experimental evidence (Arkes et al., 2008; Baucells et al., 2011). It
is still true that the disposition effect leads to a worse performance, from an
accounting point of view. However, we find that it is much lower, if we define
gains and losses with respect to a different reference level, other than the
purchase price. In particular, when we measure gains and losses with respect
to the average of the last five trading days price realisations, we find that the
disposition effect is reduced by 70%. We also investigate differences based on
investors’ trading frequency and trades length. The main pattern we detect
is that the disposition effect measured with respect to the purchase price is
more likely to be low for traders who trade less often and for longer time,
while the disposition effect measured with respect to recent price realisations
is more likely to be low for traders who trade more but for shorter time.
Since we expect that less frequent traders should be more likely to adopt the
purchase price as the reference point and frequent traders should be more
likely to focus on recent price realisations, our evidence points towards the
idea that the disposition effect might be substantially lower, if we adopt the
most appropriate reference point formation rule for any investors.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we analyse Gallup data. We elicit a measure of
patience for more than 50,000 individuals from 65 countries. The question
is very easy to understand and based on the actual income situation of the
respondent, avoiding all the issues of converting the amount of money pro-
posed according to the purchase power. We ask if the individual would prefer
a reward equal to her monthly income now, or twice that reward in a year. We
find that, within countries, individuals in the richest income quintile discount
at the same rate at any age, while individuals in the poorest quintile of income
discount more, the older they are. The age-patience relationships in the other
income quintiles are distributed in an orderly manner between these extremes,
with patience declining with age, but at a lower rate the higher the income
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is. We suggest that either lower income leads individuals to be less patient as
they age, or that less patient individuals move downwards in the income rank
as they age. We find that non religious, optimistic, happy and educated indi-
viduals are more patient. Female, unemployed, retired or disabled individuals,
and those who have low confidence in vaccine effectiveness, tend to be less pa-
tient. We propose a national patience index which is highly correlated with
other more sophisticated measures that are harder to elicit (Wang et al., 2016;
Falk et al., 2018). Our index correlates with national characteristics linked to
economic development and with cultural features that are widely considered to
be associated with patience. Our findings have two main implications. First,
we document a relation between income, age and time discounting which had
never been detected. Second, we validate an easy to measure index of patience
which can be widely used in socioeconomic surveys of households.
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Chapter 1
Maximum Price, Regret and
Trading Decisions
1.1 Introduction
In the present chapter, we investigate an extension of Regret Theory (RT),
one of the most successful theories of decision under risk (Loomes and Sugden,
1982; Bleichrodt and Wakker, 2015; Strack and Viefers, 2019). We test an
application of Regret Theory to dynamic decisions (Strack and Viefers, 2019)
in the context of financial trading decisions. In this setting, Strack and Viefers
(2019) show that an Expected Utility (EU) agent would always stop at an
optimal threshold. That is to say, she would never sell at a price lower than
a price at which she previously had the possibility to sell the stock. A Regret
Theory agent does not necessarily stops at a threshold, when deciding to sell
a stock and her propensity to sell increases as the price of the stock increases
and decreases as the distance from the past maximum increases. We test
those predictions on the LDB dataset (Odean, 1998, 1999; Dhar and Zhu,
2006; Barber and Odean, 2013).
First, we test if investors stop on the day when maximum realised for
gains and on the day when minimum realised for losses and we find that only
31.6% of trading episodes in the gain domain and 25.8% of trading episodes
in the loss domain are stopped on the day when maximum and minimum
unfold, respectively. The discrepancy in the two figures is a corollary of the
the disposition effect, the higher propensity to realise gains with respect to
losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998).
Second, we characterise those traders who are more likely to stop at
1
a threshold and build some links with the literature on trading decisions and
individual characteristics (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2006;
Seasholes and Zhu, 2010; Korniotis and Kumar, 2011, 2013). We adopt a
negative binomial regression to model the rate at which investors stop at a
threshold and find that sophisticated investors and active traders are more
likely to follow a threshold strategy and affluent and older investors are less
likely to follow a threshold strategy. Males are more willing to realise losses
at a threshold than females.
Most importantly, we investigate the impact of the past maximum of
a stock, in a specific trading episode, on the propensity to sell that stock.
We model the time to sell using a proportional hazard (PH) model (Cox,
1972). This method has the advantage of assessing the impact of the covariates
over the entire time axis. A proportional hazard model incorporates all the
information accumulated in time for a given episode. We take into account
both the distance in price from the past maximum, the distance in time from
the maximum realisation and the return of the stock. Consistent with Strack
and Viefers (2019) we find that investors are more likely to realise a gain, the
higher is the return. In a Dynamic Regret Theory setting, when the agent
is only concerned with regret about past forgone decisions, the propensity to
sell is predicted to decrease as the distance from the past maximum increases.
The idea is that, ceteris paribus, if the price of the stock is further from the
past maximum, the regret is higher and the investor will be less likely to stop.
Figure 1.1 helps clarifying the point. The Utility of an Expected Utility agent
only depends on the level of the price, hence it would be the same at any
time the price hits the level highlighted in red. A Regret Theory agent would
experience a higher Utility by selling the stock the first time the price reaches
the price in red (left arrow in blue) than the second time (right arrow in blue).
However, we find that the relationship of the propensity to realise a gain with
the distance in price from the past maximum follows an inverse U-shape. It
peaks when the distance in price is low but it decreases when it gets very low.
As we said, we also consider the distance in time from the past max-
imum. We find a strong and clear pattern: investors are less likely to sell a
winning stock, the further in time the maximum price occurred. Moreover,
we investigate the relation between the distance in price and the distance in
time from the past maximum and find that, when the distance in time is low,
investors are more likely to realise a gain, the higher is the distance in price
from the past maximum. We suggest that a panic effect is the main force
2
Figure 1.1: Example of a threshold investment strategy. The threshold
is highlighted in red. The Utility of an Expected Utility agent only depends
on the level of the price. A Regret Theory agent would experience a higher
Utility by selling the stock the first time the price reaches the threshold (left
arrow in blue) than the second time (right arrow in blue).
leading to the realisation of a stock. This finding can be rationalised with the
experimental evidence in Fioretti et al. (2018). Investors anticipate the regret
about the future and decide to realise the stock to avoid experiencing an even
higher regret in the case the stock price keeps decreasing.
1.2 Regret and maximum price
Regret theory has already been used to explain several phenomena in finance
and economics: asset pricing and portfolio choice (Gollier and Salanie´, 2006;
Muermann et al., 2006), personal insurance market (Braun and Muermann,
2004), why people tend to invest too little in stocks (Barberis et al., 2006),
hedging with respect to currency risk (Michenaud and Solnik, 2008) and the
disposition effect (Muermann and Volkman, 2006).
We are the first to perform a test of dynamic regret on empirical data.
There have been three attempts to study dynamic regret in a laboratory set-
ting. Our closest predecessor is Strack and Viefers (2019). They extend Regret
Theory to dynamic trading decisions and test their predictions in a laboratory
experiment. As we said, they show that an Expected Utility agent would find
it optimal stopping at a threshold and her propensity to sell would not be
3
influenced by the distance from the past maximum. A Regret Theory agent
does not necessarily stops at a threshold and her propensity to sell would be
increasing in the price of the stock and decreasing in the price distance from
the past maximum. Their predictions are respected by subjects in the labo-
ratory. More specifically, agents do not have a constant reservation level and
they do not behave consistently in any repetition of the task. Agents do not
follow a threshold strategy, i.e. they stop at a level where they decided to
continue before. Agents are more willing to stop the higher the level of the
price and they are less willing to stop the higher the maximum level of the
price. Fioretti et al. (2018) perform a stock market experiment, where partic-
ipants know beforehand whether they will observe the future prices after they
sell the asset or not. When future prices are available, investors avoid regret
about expected after-sale high prices (future regret). Descamps et al. (2016)
study how regret influences information sampling. Participants deviate from
the optimal strategy in a systematic manner: information is either mostly
over-sampled or mostly under-sampled, depending on the cost of information.
There are several papers linked to the idea that the maximum point of
a price process has an effect on agents’ behaviour. First of all, Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) show that high recent past returns of stocks tend to increase
the propensity to sell of investors and the propensity to sell is higher when a
stock hits its last month maximum price. Heath et al. (1999) show that the
exercise of an option is higher when the price of the underlying stock is above
its last year’s peak. Barber and Odean (2008) and Huddart et al. (2009) find
that the trading volume is high around both last year maximum and minimum.
Finally, an experimental paper by Baucells et al. (2011) investigates the impact
of the highest level in a stream of payoffs, on the formation of the reference
point.
1.3 Too proud to stop: Regret in dynamic decisions
Strack and Viefers (2019) is a pioneering work in the exploration of regret in
dynamic decisions. Regret has been widely studied in the context of static
decisions while pretty neglected in the context of dynamic decisions. No-
table exceptions are the aforementioned works by Descamps et al. (2016) and
Fioretti et al. (2018). The objective of Strack and Viefers (2019) is a stopping
problem. In a stopping problem, a decision maker observes a sequence of of-
fers, which are realisations of a stochastic process Xt. After observing the n-th
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offer the decision maker is given the possibility to stop or keep seeing further
offers. Once she chooses to go on she cannot accept forgone offers, while if she
stops she cannot accept future offers. In such a decision framework, an EU
maximiser would adopt a threshold strategy, meaning that she should stop the
game as soon as the price reaches the gain threshold she fixed as her goal. The
optimal threshold is ex-ante optimal and optimal at any point in time (there
is no time inconsistency).
Definition 1. A threshold strategy τ (b) prescribes that the agent stops at
time t if the value of the process Xt exceeds the cut-off b and continues oth-
erwise, where b is a given constant. If the agent uses the cut-off strategy τ (b)
she will stop at the time τ (b, X) = min {t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ b}.
Building on Feng and Hobson (2016), Strack and Viefers (2019) show
that a RT agent would not necessarily follow a threshold strategy. On top
of that, she will adopt an optimal strategy which is different from the EU
maximiser one. A RT agent will never find it optimal stopping under a past
maximum while an EU maximiser who failed to stop at her threshold will not
take into account how far above the threshold the stock went and will still find
it optimal stopping at any value above her ex ante threshold. The intuition
behind the hypotheses of the authors is that in the EU framework the agent
only evaluates the current state of the process while in the RT context she
takes into account the path of the process. More formally, a regret agent faces
a disutility due to regret because she compares her choice to the one that
revealed to be ex-post optimal, namely
Regret =
(
max
s∈S
Us
)
− Ut (1.1)
where S = 0, 1, ..., t is the set of times relative to which the agent
evaluates her regret. Thus the regret is driven by the difference between
the maximum utility that could have been achieved and the utility actually
achieved stopping at time t.
Strack and Viefers (2019) go on testing in the lab the following hy-
potheses, derived from their model:
• H1: Agents have a constant reservation level and they behave consis-
tently in any repetition of the task, i.e. for all realised sequences (agents play
65 times the game) of offers X = (X1, X2, ...) 6=
(
X
′
1, X
′
2, ...
)
= X
′
the level
at which the agent stops the game is the same τ (X) = τ
(
X
′
)
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• H2: Agents never stop under the running maximum, i.e. they never
stop at a level where they decided to continue before;
• H3: Agents follow a threshold strategy, hence the stopping decision
τ satisfies τ = inf {t : Xt = Xτ}
• H4: Agents are more willing to stop the higher the level of the price
and they are less willing to stop the higher the maximum level of the price up
to the decision moment, i.e. the empirical frequency with which subjects stop
at a given level x, given past maximum s is increasing in x and decreasing in
s.
Figure 1.2: Experimental Results from Strack and Viefers (2019).
Empirical stopping frequency per any level of the price and distance from past
maximum (Figure 4 in Strack and Viefers (2019)).
In their work they are able to reject the first three hypotheses and to
confirm the fourth one (see Figure 1.2). The research questions we are going
to address are inspired to their hypotheses.
1.4 Data and methodology
We use two different samples of the LDB data for the two sections of the
analysis presented in this chapter. We are going to explain the details of all
our choices. Some of the data preparation steps are common between the two
specifications and we will describe them here. We obtain price data from the
CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices) of WRDS (Wharton Research
Data Services). We exclude those stocks for which we were not able to recover
price information. We remove investor-stocks records if at least one of the
entries has negative commissions (which may indicate that the transaction
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was reversed by the broker). We remove from the sample investor-stocks that
include short-sale transactions or that have positions that were opened before
the starting point of our dataset. We remove those trades where the buy and
sell dates coincide (Ivkovic´ et al., 2005; Ben-David and Hirshleifer, 2012).
The starting point of an investment is the first time an investor buys
a stock or any time she buys it without the stock being present in the bank
account at that time. The end point of an investment is the first sale date
after that buy date (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Brettschneider and Burgess,
2017). We define an episode as all the day-stock information between a buy
and a sell date. An episode is classified as a gain if the selling price is higher
or equal than the buy price. It is classified as a loss otherwise.
We now introduce a variable: the distance from the extreme at time t,
dt, which we will refer to as “distance”. Time t is defined in terms of trading
days.
Definition 2. The distance from the extreme is defined as
dt =
 t−tmaxt , if episode ends up as a gaint−tmin
t , if episode ends up as a loss
(1.2)
where t is the number of days since the episode started, and tmax and
tmin are the days when the current maximum and minimum prices of the
episodes realised, respectively. Hence, t is always bigger or equal than tmax
and tmin. These are calculated taking the starting point of an episode equal
to t = 0.
1.4.1 Threshold strategy
Our first research question is:
• Do investors follow a threshold strategy? Do they stop on the day when
maximum or minimum realises?
• Which categories of investors are more likely to follow a threshold strat-
egy?
Threshold strategy in the loss domain is not discussed from a theo-
retical point of view in Strack and Viefers (2019), hence our analysis is more
agnostic than the one we perform for the threshold strategy in the gain do-
main. We will assume that a threshold strategy is rational also for the loss
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domain. It is linked to the concept of “stop-loss”. A stop-loss order is an
order placed with a broker to buy or sell a security when it reaches a certain
price. Stop-loss orders are designed to limit an investor’s loss on a position
in a security. When a stock falls below the stop price the order becomes a
market order and it executes at the next available price. For example, a trader
may buy a stock and place a stop-loss order 10% below the purchase price.
Should the stock drop by 10%, the stop-loss order would be activated, and the
stock would be sold as a market order. A stop-loss order is consistent with a
threshold strategy. Stop-loss orders are issued in order to limit losses, since
the investor might not be able to issue a selling order at any point in time
or might be reluctant to realise a stock, when the price dropped significantly
(disposition effect). A stop-loss, or a threshold strategy, would limit that.
Hence, we can see it as a rational strategy to follow.
We take into account episodes whose length is shorter or equal to 300
days (209 trading days). We want to be sure we capture active trading de-
cisions and that we are not looking at decisions of buy-and-hold long term
investors (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Heath et al., 1999; Brettschneider and
Burgess, 2017). We focus on the sample of bank accounts for which demo-
graphics are available. The sample is summarised in Table 1.1. It is obviously
the case that an episode where the investor follows a threshold strategy is
characterised by the condition dT = 0 where T is the selling date for that
episode. This is the proxy we are going to use to define a threshold strategy.
Namely,
Definition 3. A trading episode is said to be a threshold strategy episode if
dT = 0.
Definition 3 gives a necessary but not sufficient condition to define
an investment as a threshold episode. However, since our aim is rejecting a
threshold strategy, we are only adding more obstacles to our goal by taking
into account a less stringent hypothesis. Being able to reject it would imply,
a fortiori, that a threshold strategy does not hold.
In Table 1.1 we see the distribution of some statistics for our sample.
We notice that they are in line with the idea that investors suffer from the
disposition effect. In particular, dT is lower for gains than for losses. This is a
signal that investors tend to realise gains quicker and have a strong aversion to
realise losses at a minimum. Overall, the vast majority of trades are not con-
sistent with a threshold strategy. Our definition of threshold strategy applies
only to 31.6% of episodes in the gain domain, and to 25.8% of trades in the
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for the sample used in the Threshold
analysis. Gain refers to the sample where only investments which resulted
in a gain are considered (return higher or equal than 0). Loss refers to the
sample where only investments which resulted in a loss are considered. All
refers to those bank account where at least a gain and a loss trading episode
were completed. Bank accounts are classified as Cash (the standard one),
Keogh or IRA (two types of retirement accounts), Margin or Schwab (two
sophisticated products available to investors). Client Segment: Affluent if at
any point in time she has more than $100, 000 in equity, active if she makes
more than 48 trades in any year and General for the residual individuals. If
traders could be classified as both affluent and active they were classified as
active traders.
Gain Loss All
Percentage of Threshold Episodes 0.316 0.258 0.293
Number of Bank Accounts 15, 624 11, 390 8, 674
Mean Rate of Threshold Consistency per Bank Account 0.275 0.216 0.257
Median Rate of Threshold Consistency per Bank Account 0.043 0 0.250
Mean Number of Episodes per Bank Account 4.640 3.954 11.493
Median Number of Episodes per Bank Account 2 2 6
Number of Cash Bank Accounts 2, 591 1, 812 1, 218
Number of IRA Bank Accounts 2, 798 1, 674 1, 227
Number of Keogh Bank Accounts 91 76 51
Number of Margin Bank Accounts 2, 436 1, 884 1, 469
Number of Schwab Bank Accounts 7, 708 5, 944 4, 709
Number of General Traders 10, 368 7, 080 5, 085
Number of Affluent Traders 2, 134 1, 549 1, 045
Number of Active Traders 3, 122 2, 761 2, 544
Mean Age 49.70 50.58 50.25
Median Age 48 48 48
Mean Income per Bank Account 6.219 6.224 6.213
Median Income per Bank Account 6 6 6
Number of Females 1, 329 949 689
Number of Males 11, 947 8, 717 6, 627
Number of Not Professional Traders 10, 362 7, 672 5, 916
Number of Professional Traders 880 632 462
Number of Traders with Other Occupation (even NA) 4, 382 3, 086 2, 296
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Figure 1.3: Rescaled distance in time from the extreme. Top-left: fre-
quency of dT , the rescaled distance in time from the maximum day calculated
on the day when a sell for a gain took place. One observation per episode.
Bottom-left: frequency of dt, the rescaled distance in time from the maximum
day calculated on any day when a stock was trading above the purchase price.
One observation per trading day. Top-right: frequency of dT , the rescaled
distance in time from the minimum day calculated on the day when a sell
for a loss took place. One observation per episode. Bottom-right: frequency
of dt, the rescaled distance in time from the minimum day calculated on any
day when a stock was trading below the purchase price. One observation per
trading day.
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loss domain, as can be clearly seen in the top panels of Figure 1.3. The two
bottom panels show the distribution of the rescaled distance from the extreme
on any days. We can see that a maximum occurs on 17.5% of the days when
a stock is trading at a gain and a minimum occurs on 13.8% of the days when
a stock is trading at a loss. If investors were realising the stocks at random
times, the percentage of max days on sale days of gains should be close to
the percentage of max days on any days when the stock is trading at a gain
and the same for minimum and losses. However, the percentage of extreme
days out of sale days is much higher than the percentage of extreme days on
any day. This suggests that maximum and minimum do have an impact on
the propensity of the individuals to realise stocks. However, our descriptive
statistics clearly hint that a threshold strategy is not consistently followed by
our population of investors. We can also make an exercise inspired by the
calculation of the disposition effect. We can take the number of days on which
a stock was sold at a maximum and divide it by the number of days on which
a maximum occurred, and call it “Proportion of maxima realised”. We can
take the number of days on which a stock was sold at a minimum and divide it
by the number of days on which a minimum occurred, and call it “Proportion
of minima realised”. We then divide the proportion of maxima realised by the
proportion of minima realised and we get 1.49. This is very close to the mea-
sure of the disposition effect (1.51) reported by Odean (1998). We find that
the propensity to realise a stock at a maximum is around 50% higher than the
propensity to realise a stock at a minimum. This is a different perspective on
the disposition effect and it can be considered a consequence of it. However,
in principle it could be possible that the propensity to sell at a maximum and
the propensity to sell at a minimum could be the same, even in the presence
of the disposition effect. Hence, this is a new insight on the topic.
In Section 1.5 we are going to investigate how the propensity to follow
a threshold strategy changes at the individual level, using a negative binomial
regression. We performed a Likelihood Ratio Test to check that a negative
binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson model. Negative binomial
models assume the conditional means are not equal to the conditional vari-
ances. This inequality is captured by estimating a dispersion parameter (not
shown in the output) that is held constant in a Poisson model. Thus, the Pois-
son model is actually nested in the negative binomial model. We can then use
a likelihood ratio test to compare these two and test this model assumption.
The Poisson distribution may be generalised by including a gamma noise vari-
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able which has a mean of 1 and a scale parameter of ν. The Poisson-gamma
mixture (negative binomial) distribution that results is
P (Y = yi|µi, α) = Γ(yi + α
−1)
Γ(yi + 1)Γ(α−1)
(
α−1
α−1 + µi
)α−1 (
α−1
α−1 + µi
)yi
(1.3)
where µi = ti ∗µ and α = ν−1. The parameter µ is the mean incidence
rate of y per unit of exposure. Exposure may be time, space, distance, area,
volume, or population size. Because exposure is often a period of time, we use
the symbol ti to represent the exposure for a particular observation. When no
exposure is given, it is assumed to be one. The parameter µ may be interpreted
as the risk of a new occurrence of the event during a specified exposure period,
t.
In our case the exposure time ti is the number of episodes in a bank
account and µi is the number of threshold episodes in the same bank account.
In negative binomial regression, the mean of y is determined by the exposure
time t and a set of k regressor variables (the x’s). The expression relating
these quantities is
µi = exp(log(ti) + β1x1i + ...+ βkxki) (1.4)
often x1 = 1, in which case β1 is called the intercept. We estimate the vector
of β coefficients through maximum likelihood.
1.4.2 Maximum price investigation
Our second research question is:
• How does the propensity to sell a stock vary with respect to the three
following variables?
– Level of the price;
– Distance in time from the day of running maximum realisation;
– Distance in price from the running maximum.
In this section we restrict our attention to a random sample of 13000
episodes. We look at a sample of investments which lasted no longer than
300 days (209 trading days) and resulted in a gain. The choice of restricting
the sample to such a period comes from the fact that we want to guarantee
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the proportional hazard assumption holds and we base our estimation on the
idea that investors attention does not span a very long period (Benartzi and
Thaler, 1995; Brettschneider and Burgess, 2017). We restrict our attention
to the gain domain since it would be difficult estimating the impact of the
maximum price on the propensity to sell a stock for a loss, given that the
maximum price would often coincide with the purchase price. Hence, it would
be difficult to disentangle if a stock is being sold for being far from the past
maximum or for being far from the purchase price. On top of that, Strack
and Viefers (2019) test their predictions in a laboratory setting where stocks
are on average in the gain domain (selling at a loss is a dominated strategy in
their experiment). We exclude the 10% of most volatile episodes1. Since we
are interested in how the propensity to sell a stock changes when the distance
of the price from the past maximum increases, we did not want to focus on
those trades where the likelihood of big intraday drops in price is high. The
characteristics of our sample are summarised in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics for the sample used in the Maximum
analysis.
Number Bank Accounts 8704
Number Trading Episodes 13000
Mean Return per Episode 1.19
Median Return per Episode 1.12
Mean length per Episode 68.07
Median Return per Episode 52
We analyse data using the proportional hazard model, developed by
Cox (1972). Survival analysis models are widely used in medical research and
they are relatively popular in demography and labour economics. They have
recently been used in a series of financial applications (Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner,
2005; Deville and Riva, 2007; Jiao, 2015; Brettschneider and Burgess, 2017).
PH model is a semi-parametric model, aimed at describing the “time-
to-event” of individuals. In our case the time to event is the time from the
start to the end of an investment episode. It has the advantage of assessing the
impact of covariates over the entire time axis, while for example a logistic re-
gression only evaluates the odds of the event/non event with respect to a fixed
time. Informally, a PH model incorporates all the information accumulated in
time for a given episode. A logistic regression would evaluate the information
1We get the average daily ratio of minimum to maximum price per each investment
episode and we exclude those trades where the ratio is lower or equal than 0.93
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on a given day independently from the information on other days of the same
episode. We now add more details to our discussion. In particular, we need
to define some objects
Definition 4. Let T be a non-negative continuous random variable, repre-
senting the time until the event of interest.
F (t) = P (T ≤ t) denotes the distribution function and f(t) the prob-
ability density function of random variable T .
S(t) = P (T > t) = 1 − F (t) is the survival function. It is the proba-
bility that a randomly selected individual will survive beyond time t. It is a
decreasing function, taking values in [0, 1] and it equals 1 at t = 0 and 0 at
t =∞.
H(t) = − logS(t) is the cumulative hazard function.
The hazard function (or hazard rate) h(t) measures the instantaneous
risk of dying right after time t given that the individual is alive at time t.
In particular, we will fit a regression model where we evaluate the
change in the hazard rate with respect to a set of covariates. That is to say,
given a set of covariates xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xip) measured for subject i, the
following model is fit to the data
hi (t) = h0 (t) exp
(
βtxi
)
;
with β, a p × 1 vector of parameters and h0(t) which is the baseline hazard
function (i.e. hazard for a subject i with xi = 0).
The proportional hazards assumption states that the ratio of the hazards of
two subjects with covariates xi and xi′ is constant over time:
hi (t)
hi′ (t)
=
exp
(
βtxi
)
exp (βtxi′)
The Cox PH model is a semi-parametric model. It means that it leaves
the form of h0(t) completely unspecified and it estimates the model in a semi-
parametric way. Then, to estimate the model we maximise a partial likelihood.
Finally, we should point out that we are estimating a model with time changing
covariates so it is better to define it as
hi (t) = h0 (t) exp
(
βtxit
)
To deal with unobserved heterogeneity we stratify the model based on the
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investor who holds the position. This means each bank account has a different
baseline hazard function, which can absorb any heterogeneity not captured by
the model covariates Hence, the hazard function for the ith position of the jth
bank account is
hij (t) = h0j (t) exp
(
βtxijt
)
;
where xijt is the covariate vector for the position. A final word should
be spent on why we need to stratify at the bank account level. Possible reasons
for there being a difference between investors include their preference for risk,
their beliefs about the market (e.g. whether there is price momentum or not),
their investment objectives and the particular strategy they are following. For
example, some investors may trade very frequently and follow a strategy based
on short term changes in stock prices. The holding periods of these investors
will therefore be shorter than other investors in the sample. Differentiating
investors baseline hazards can separate out this kind of difference from the
effects of covariates included in the model, that are in theory common across
all investors. In our results we report the pseudo R squared proposed by Xu
and O’Quigley (1999). Xu and O’Quigley (1999) start from a coefficient of
explained randomness derived by Kent and O’Quigley (1988). The coefficient
aims at explaining the variability on the outcome looking at the distribution of
time to events, given covariates. That coefficient has the following properties:
• When a covariate is unrelated to survival, and the corresponding regres-
sion coefficient it is equal to zero, it is equal to zero;
• When the effect of at least a coefficient is different from 0, it is between
0 and 1;
• It is invariant under linear transformations of covariates and under mono-
tone increasing transformations of time.
The coefficient we use, uses the same basic ideas but looking at the distri-
bution of covariates at each time. The construction can be carried out using
routine quantities calculated during a standard proportional hazards analy-
sis. The inference is also greatly simplified. Most importantly, the presence of
time-dependent covariates presents no difficulties for Xu and O’Quigley (1999)
coefficient estimation, while the one by Kent and O’Quigley (1988) is not de-
fined in that case. In O’Quigley et al. (2005) there are further discussions on
the robustness of the pseudo R-squared we use.
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1.5 Threshold strategy consistency
An investment episode respects a threshold strategy if it satisfies Definition 3,
hence if the stock was sold on the maximum day for gains or on the minimum
day for losses. We already saw in Section 1.4 that the vast majority of trading
episodes is not consistent with a threshold strategy. The unit of analysis in
this section will be the bank account, since we are interested in the rate of
consistency with threshold for each bank account. In Table 1.3 we analyse
the rate of threshold consistency per bank account. The dependent variable
in our negative binomial regression is defined as:
• Ng, the number of investments in a bank account which were realised on
the day when the maximum since purchase price realised and resulted
in a gain, for columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3.
• Nl, the number of investments in a bank account which were realised on
the day when the minimum since purchase price realised and resulted in
a loss, for columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.3.
• N = Ng +Nl, for columns 5 and 6 of Table 1.3.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.3 we only look at those bank accounts
where at least an investment which resulted in a gain was recorded. In columns
3 and 4, we look at those bank accounts where at least an investment which
resulted in a loss was recorded. In columns 5 and 6, we look at those bank
accounts where at least an investment which resulted in a gain and at least one
which resulted in a loss were recorded. To control for the fact that different
investors completed different numbers of trading episodes, we take into account
the logarithm of the number of completed episodes (completed gains, losses or
all depending on the regression) as an offset. Hence, we measure how the rate
of threshold consistency varies from one bank account to the other. We now
introduce the covariates we are taking into account. They are all defined at
bank account level.
• Dummy for the account type: Cash Account which is a standard bank
account, IRA and Keogh, which are two different types of retirement ac-
counts, Margin accounts and Schwab One accounts (more sophisticated
products available to the investors);
• Client Segment: Affluent if at any point in time she has more than
$100, 000 in equity, active if she makes more than 48 trades in any year
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and General for the residual individuals. If traders could be classified as
both affluent and active they were classified as active traders;
• Age in decades;
• Income is classified as a numeric variable which takes values from 1 to 9
and increases with income of the individual2.
• Gender;
• Occupation, we follow Dhar and Zhu (2006): non-professional if the
trader has a “white collar/clerical”,“blue collar/craftsman” or “service/sales”
job; professional occupation if the trader has a “professional/technical”
or “administrative/managerial” occupation; the residual category is ev-
eryone else3.
We see that investors with margin accounts and Schwab accounts are
more likely to follow a threshold strategy. In particular, investors with margin
accounts show a rate of threshold consistency which is, on average, 20% higher
than cash accounts both for gains and for losses, separately (almost 30% when
we consider overall rate). Schwab account holders have a consistency rate
which is around 10% higher than cash accounts for gains and around 15%
for losses. If we believe that a threshold strategy as the rational choice for
an investors, we see that more sophisticated investors (those who have mar-
gin accounts and Schwab accounts) are more likely to adopt it. This is in line
with the idea that sophistication lowers investment biases (Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju, 2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). Retirement accounts show a higher rate
of threshold consistency than cash accounts but only when the overall rate is
considered. Active traders have a higher rate of threshold consistency. That
is especially true for losses (6 to 8% higher rate than general traders). That is
to be expected since frequency of trading increases the chances that investors
are constantly monitoring their investments. Consistency with threshold de-
pends also on attention (Barber and Odean, 2008) since investors might lose
the possibility to stop at a threshold because of inattention. Affluent traders
are less consistent than general traders with a threshold strategy but the effect
boils down when we take into account age. That is probably due to the fact
21 corresponds to less than $15, 000 per year; 2 to $15, 000 to $19, 999; 3 to $20, 000 to
$29, 999; 4 to $30, 000 to $39, 999; 5 to $40, 000 to $49, 999; 6 to $50, 000 to $74, 999; 7 to
$75, 000 to $99, 999; 8 to $100, 000 to $124, 999; 9 to $125, 000 or more
3To avoid having too many missing observations, also missing values were classified in
the residual category.
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that affluent traders are much older, on average, than general traders. Older
investors are less likely to be consistent with threshold strategy. Every ten
years, the rate of threshold consistency decreases by around 8%, 4% and 7%
in the gain, loss and overall sample. This finding can be linked to the idea
that older individuals have lower decision making abilities and make worse
financial decisions (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011; Bruine De Bruin, 2017). The
higher is the income of the traders, the less likely they are to follow a threshold
strategy. Males are more likely to follow a threshold strategy than females for
losses (their rate of threshold consistency is 14.1% higher). We do not see any
differences based on the occupation of the traders. As can be seen from Ta-
ble 1.4 both self-declared knowledge and self-declared experience do not have
prognostic power to identify who is more or less likely to follow a threshold
strategy.
The take home from this section is that investors do not consistently
follow a threshold strategy, in line with Strack and Viefers (2019). The main
differences in threshold consistency are due to age, client segment and account
type. Sophisticated investors and active traders are more consistent with a
threshold strategy. Affluent and older investors are less consistent than general
investors with a threshold strategy. Males are more willing to realise losses at
a threshold than females.
1.6 Maximum Price and stock realisation
We can now focus on the main results of the chapter. First, we introduce the
variables of interest. They are measured at the daily level. The buy date of
any investment episode is date 0. Every date is registered as the difference
in trading days between that date and the buy date and denoted by t. Only
the propensity to sell on days when the stock is trading above the buy price
is estimated. That means that the information on those days in which the
stock is trading at a loss is not incorporated in the estimate. We confine
ourselves to estimate the propensity to sell for a gain. Hence, we thought
it was not appropriate estimating the propensity to sell the stock on those
days when it was trading at loss, since we constrained it to zero. To make
a parallel with the medical literature, from which we borrow our estimation
strategy, think about an allergy which we know can only occur during the
spring. It would not make sense estimating the probability of occurrence based
on the covariates measured during the winter. We define now our covariates
20
of interest, measured at any given day t.
• Distance is the rescaled distance from the occurrence of the maximum
date, as we defined it in definition 2, t−tmaxt . tmax is the day when the
maximum price between day 0 and day t realised. We split it into tertiles
based on the stock-bank account-day distribution. Distance is defined
as low in the interval [0; 0.07]; medium in the interval [0.07; 0.34) and
high in the interval [0.34; 1];
• Ratio to Max Price (Ratiomax) is the ratio of the daily closing price to
the maximum price up to that time in the investment episode. On the
selling date it is equal to the ratio of the selling price to the maximum
price in the episode. We split it into quartiles based on the stock-bank
account-day distribution. Defined as low in the interval [0.349; 0.918];
medium-low in the interval (0.918; 0.957]; medium-high in the interval
(0.957; 0.981] and high in the interval (0.981; 1].
• Return is the ratio of the daily closing price to the purchase price in
the investment episode. On the selling date it is equal to the ratio of
the selling price to the purchase price in the episode. We split it into
tertiles based on the stock-bank account-day distribution. Defined as
low in the interval [1.00; 1.06]; medium in the interval (1.06; 1.17]; high
in the interval (1.17, 5.53].
We rescale all the variables since we need consistency from one trading
episode to another. Prices are really different from stock to stock. On top
of that, we stratify the variables instead of using their continuous version for
two reasons. First, to take into account non linearities. Second, to have a
model which can be analysed through proportional hazard technique. In our
specification the proportional hazard assumption is not violated for any of
the models, where we rescale the variables. On top of that, we are able to
capture the main non-linear changes in the effect of the variables. The most
important implication of the proportional hazard assumption is that the effect
of a covariate is constant in time. Whilst a violation of the assumption does not
invalidate the model, it does significantly alter the interpretation, particularly
when only hazard ratios are reported. If an effect does change over time then
the hazard ratio is only an average of this process, and if it changes a lot then
this average can be misleading. Take for example the distance in time from
the past maximum. We analyse it both looking at the value in absolute days
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Table 1.5: Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of selling a stock.
Absolute time distance. The event is the sale. Each day when the stock
is not sold is a non-event. Each observation is at stock-bank account-day
level. Odds Ratios with c.i. Baseline hazard rate stratified at investor level.
Clustered robust s.e. at bank account level. Distance in Time from Max Day
is measured in trading days.
Dist. from Maximum Day (ref. Max Day)
1 Day 1.093
(0.943,1.266)
2 Days 0.929
(0.783,1.101)
3 to 5 Days 0.742∗∗∗
(0.640,0.860)
More than 5 Days 0.413∗∗∗
(0.363,0.470)
Xu-O’Quigley R2 0.061
Concordance 0.61
PH Assumption Valid (0.01) NO
Time Controls YES
Number of Trading Episodes 13,000
Number of Bank Accounts 8,704
Observations 621,849
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(Table 1.5) and at the rescaled version (column 2 of Table 1.6). When we
take into account the absolute distance in trading days from the maximum
day, the proportional hazard assumption does not hold (Table 1.5). That
means that the effect we find changes over time and it is only an average effect
of the distance in time on the propensity to sell. To be more precise, the
effect of being one day after the maximum day has a different impact on the
propensity to sell a stock, if the effect is evaluated, for example, on day 7 or
on day 30 since purchase. That means that we need to rescale the distance in
time. The absolute distance in time from maximum realisation is much more
intuitive than the rescaled distance we defined in Definition 2 but it has a
much lower explanatory power for our variable of interest. Given this premise,
we observe that the propensity to sell a stock is very high on the maximum
day and on the two days after. More than one week (5 trading days) after the
maximum realised, the propensity to sell a stock is almost 60% lower than on
the maximum day. In a range between 3 to 5 trading days from maximum, the
propensity to sell is 25.8% lower than on the maximum day, while there are no
significant differences in the propensity to sell on the maximum day and on the
two days after that. Although the difference is not significant, it is interesting
to see that the propensity to sell is highest on the day after the maximum,
when it is 9.3% higher than on the maximum day. Hence, the propensity to sell
peaks the day after the investor missed the chance to sell at a maximum. This
leads to two possible interpretations. The first one is that investors wait until
the maximum unfolds and start selling in a time span which is close to it. This
is an equivalent mechanism to the one proposed by Strack and Viefers (2019)
for price. We suggest that regret is lower when the time distance is lower.
This hypothesis is only one possible explanation for the effect we observe. We
suggest that the regret component defined in Equation (1.1) can be framed
in terms of time distance. In particular, we suggest that investors might
experience a higher regret, the further they are from the time of the maximum
realisation. Hence, that the disutility experienced by the investor is not only
driven by the fact that she is stopping at a price below the past maximum but
also at a distant time from the maximum day. This is not discussed in Strack
and Viefers (2019) but the impact of several types of psychological distances
has been explored both in the psychological literature (Maglio et al., 2013) and
in the economic literature (Trautmann, 2019). Another option is attention.
When the stock peaks, the investor starts paying attention to it and sells it
shortly after. However, given that the PH assumption does not hold and the
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effects are small and not significant, we do not want to push the interpretation
too far.
Table 1.6: Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of selling a stock.
Single covariates analysis. The event is the sale. Each day when the stock
is not sold is a non-event. Each observation is at stock-bank account-day
level. Odds Ratios with c.i. Baseline hazard rate stratified at investor level.
Clustered robust s.e. at bank account level. Ratio to Max Price is the ratio
of daily closing price to maximum price up to that time in the investment
episode. On the selling date it is equal to the ratio of selling price to maximum
price in the episode. Low [0.349; 0.918]; Medium-Low (0.918; 0.957]; Medium-
High (0.957; 0.981]; High (0.981; 1]. Distance in Time from Max Day is the
standardised distance as defined in Definition 2. Low [0; 0.07]; Medium [0.07;
0.34); High [0.34; 1]. Return is the ratio of daily closing price to the purchase
price in the investment episode. On the selling date it is equal to the ratio
of selling price to the purchase price in the episode. Low [1; 1.06]; Medium
(1.06; 1.17]; High (1.17, 5.53].
(1) (2) (3)
Ratio Price to Max Price (ref. Low)
Medium-Low 0.909
(0.792,1.043)
Medium-High 1.062
(0.932,1.210)
High 0.720∗∗∗
(0.619,0.837)
Dist. in Time from Max Day (ref. Low)
Medium 0.877∗∗
(0.786,0.979)
High 0.430∗∗∗
(0.385,0.481)
Return (ref. Low)
Medium 2.719∗∗∗
(2.435,3.035)
High 3.435∗∗∗
(2.988,3.949)
Xu-O’Quigley R2 0.020 0.061 0.10
Concordance 0.57 0.61 0.64
PH Assumption Valid (0.05) YES YES YES
Time Controls YES YES YES
Number of Trading Episodes 13,000 13,000 13,000
Number of Bank Accounts 8,704 8,704 8,704
Observations 621,849 621,849 621,849
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
In Table 1.6 we estimate three proportional hazard models where we
take into account the effect of Ratiomax, Distance and Return. We stratify
the baseline hazard at the bank account level, in order to take into account
differences in the propensity to realise a stock due to fixed investors’ charac-
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Figure 1.4: Odds Ratio Proportional Hazard model: RatioMax and
Return. Odds Ratio from a Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of
selling a stock. Each Odds Ratio corresponds to the effect of being in a given
category. The event is the sale. Each day when the stock is not sold is a
non-event. Each observation is at stock-bank account-day level. Clustered
robust s.e. at bank account level. Blue odds ratios are significantly different
from 1 (p < 0.05), red are not. Return is the ratio of daily closing price to
the purchase price in the investment episode. On the selling date it is equal
to the ratio of selling price to the purchase price in the episode. Low [1; 1.06];
Medium (1.06; 1.17]; High (1.17, 5.53]. Ratio to Max Price is the ratio of daily
closing price to maximum price up to that time in the investment episode. On
the selling date it is equal to the ratio of selling price to maximum price in
the episode. Low [0.349; 0.918]; Medium-Low (0.918; 0.957]; Medium-High
(0.957; 0.981]; High (0.981; 1]. The baseline category is ”High Return and
High Ratio”.
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Figure 1.5: Odds Ratio Proportional Hazard model: Distance and
Return. Odds Ratio from a Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of
selling a stock. Each Odds Ratio corresponds to the effect of being in a given
category. The event is the sale. Each day when the stock is not sold is a
non-event. Each observation is at stock-bank account-day level. Clustered
robust s.e. at bank account level. Blue odds ratios are significantly different
from 1 (p < 0.05), red are not. Return is the ratio of daily closing price to
the purchase price in the investment episode. On the selling date it is equal
to the ratio of selling price to the purchase price in the episode. Low [1; 1.06];
Medium (1.06; 1.17]; High (1.17, 5.53]. Distance in Time from Max Day is
the standardised distance as defined in Definition 2. Low [0; 0.07]; Medium
[0.07; 0.34); High [0.34; 1]. The baseline category is “High Return and Low
Distance”.
26
teristics and we control for time effects (month and year). We see that the
propensity to sell is lowest when the stock is trading close to the maximum
price. The probability of selling at a high Ratiomax is 28% lower than the
probability of selling at other points. This contradicts the predictions of dy-
namic regret, when the agent is only focused on regret about past decisions.
Propensity to sell peaks at a medium-high level of the Ratiomax but differ-
ences among low, medium-low and medium-high categories are not significant.
We conclude that regret does not bite as we expected. Propensity to sell is
highest when price is close but not extremely close to the maximum. The
pattern for Distance is quite strong and clear. Propensity to sell is 12.3%
lower at a medium with respect to a low Distance and 57% lower at a high
distance. To reconcile these findings with what we observed before, we notice
that more than half of the times that the rescaled distance is low, it means
that the distance from the past maximum is not greater than 2 days. Hence,
we can say that the propensity to sell a stock peaks in those few days around
maximum realisation. Higher returns increase the propensity to sell steadily.
When returns are in the medium or high region (above 6% return) the rate
of selling is around 3 times the rate of selling when the stock is in the Low
return region (below 6%). This confirms the predictions of Strack and Viefers
(2019) and the evidence in Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012). In Figures 1.4
and 1.5 we show how the propensity to sell changes as Ratiomax and Distance
change, for any levels of the Return. First, we fit a proportional hazard model
where we take into account all the 9 combinations of Ratiomax and Return
categories. Second, we fit a proportional hazard model where we take into
account all the 9 combinations of Distance and Return categories. In both
cases, we stratify the baseline hazard at the bank account level, in order to
take into account differences in the propensity to realise a stock due to fixed
investors’ characteristics and we control for time effects (month and year).
All categories in our regression are disjoint. In Figure 1.4 we report the odds
ratios of the 8 coefficients for Ratiomax and Return. The analysis reported in
Figure 1.4 is similar to the one carried on by Strack and Viefers (2019), which
we showed in Figure 1.2. We only partially confirm their findings. You can
see that the propensity to realise a stock is highest for high return levels but
not in the region closest to the past maximum. For medium or low returns,
we actually find that the probability of selling is highest when Ratiomax is
low. Hence, the impact of the distance from the maximum is different from
the one hypothesised by Strack and Viefers (2019). In Figure 1.5 we report
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the odds ratios of the coefficients for Distance and Return. Distance plays
an important role, since investors’ propensity to sell at a low distance in time
from the past maximum is always higher than the propensity to sell at a high
distance in time, for any level of the return. The tendency of the investors to
sell at higher returns is confirmed.
Figure 1.6: Percentage of selling days for each combination of Ra-
tioMax and Distance. Percentage of selling days out of all stock-bank
account-days per each category (0.95 c.i.). Ratio to Max Price is the ratio
of daily closing price to maximum price up to that time in the investment
episode. On the selling date it is equal to the ratio of selling price to max-
imum price in the episode. Low [0.349; 0.918]; Medium-Low (0.918; 0.957];
Medium-High (0.957; 0.981]; High (0.981; 1]. Distance in Time from Max Day
is the standardised distance as defined in Definition 2. Low [0; 0.07]; Medium
[0.07; 0.34); High [0.34; 1].
Since the effect of Distance is very relevant in terms of both strength
and explanatory power, we are interested in the interaction of it with the
effect of Ratiomax. Table 1.7 reports the joint distribution of Ratiomax and
Distance. At least 2% of stock-bank account-day observations fall in each
category. From Figure 1.6 we can see that the interaction between Ratiomax
and Distance suggests some relevant insights. When the Distance is low or
medium, the average percentage of selling days is highest when Ratiomax is
low. There is probably a panic effect, which can be framed as regret but is
much deeper than what we described before. Investors are more willing to
realise a gain when it is closest in time to maximum but furthest in price. If
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regret has role, it is through this channel. Investors regret selling at a time
far from the maximum. However, they sell as soon as the price decreases
significantly. We can see this by looking at the fact that the percentage of sale
days is 2.5% at high Ratiomax and low Distance and it is 4% at low price and
low distance. Hence, it looks like anticipated regret of incurring higher losses
is higher than the experienced regret given by the distance in price from the
past maximum. This is in line with the evidence of anticipated regret present
in Fioretti et al. (2018).
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Figure 1.7: Odds Ratio Proportional Hazard model: RatioMax and
Distance. Odds Ratio from a Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of
selling a stock. Each Odds Ratio corresponds to the effect of being in a given
category. The event is the sale. Each day when the stock is not sold is a non-
event. Each observation is at stock-bank account-day level. Clustered robust
s.e. at bank account level. Blue odds ratios are significantly different from 1
(p < 0.05), red are not. Ratio to Max Price is the ratio of daily closing price
to maximum price up to that time in the investment episode. On the selling
date it is equal to the ratio of selling price to maximum price in the episode.
Low [0.349; 0.918]; Medium-Low (0.918; 0.957]; Medium-High (0.957; 0.981];
High (0.981; 1]. Distance in Time from Max Day is the standardised distance
as defined in Definition 2. Low [0; 0.07]; Medium [0.07; 0.34); High [0.34; 1].
The baseline category is “Low Distance and High RatioMax”.
We fit a proportional hazard model where we take into account all the
12 combinations of Ratiomax and Distance categories. Here as well, we strat-
ify the baseline hazard at the bank account level, in order to take into account
differences in the propensity to realise a stock due to fixed investors’ charac-
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Table 1.8: Odds Ratio Proportional Hazard model: RatioMax and
Distance. PH model of the hazard of selling a stock. The event is the
sale. Each day when the stock is not sold is a non-event. Observations at
stock-bank account-day level. Odds Ratios with c.i. Baseline hazard rate
stratified at investor level. Clustered robust s.e. at bank account level. Ratio
to Max Price is the ratio of daily closing price (selling price on selling days)
to maximum price up to that time in the investment episode. Low [0.349;
0.918]; Medium-Low (0.918; 0.957]; Medium-High (0.957; 0.981]; High (0.981;
1]. Distance in Time from Max Day is the standardised distance as defined in
Definition 2. Low [0; 0.07]; Medium [0.07; 0.34); High [0.34; 1].
Dist. in time from Max and Ratio to Max (ref. Low and High)
Low dist. and Low Ratio to Max 2.649∗∗∗
(1.803,3.891)
Medium dist. and Low Ratio to Max 1.755∗∗∗
(1.421,2.166)
High dist. and Low Ratio to Max 0.882
(0.731,1.064)
Low dist. and Medium-Low Ratio to Max 2.430∗∗∗
(1.968,3.002)
Medium dist. and Medium-Low Ratio to Max 1.266∗∗
(1.051,1.524)
High dist. and Medium-Low Ratio to Max 0.604∗∗∗
(0.501,0.728)
Low dist. and Medium-High Ratio to Max 2.061∗∗∗
(1.779,2.387)
Medium dist. and Medium-High Ratio to Max 1.230∗∗
(1.021,1.482)
High dist. and Medium-High Ratio to Max 0.620∗∗∗
(0.519,0.742)
Medium dist. and High Ratio to Max 0.996
(0.809,1.226)
High dist. and High Ratio to Max 0.360∗∗∗
(0.286,0.453)
Xu-O’Quigley R2 0.095
Concordance 0.65
PH Assumption Valid (0.05) YES
Time Controls YES
Number of Trading Episodes 13,000
Number of Bank Accounts 8,704
Observations 621,849
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
31
12.65
1.75
0.882
2.43
1.27
0.604
2.06
1.23
0.62
0.996
0.36
High dist. & H Ratio to Max
High dist. & ML Ratio to Max
High dist. & MH Ratio to Max
High dist. & L Ratio to Max
Medium dist. & H Ratio to Max
Short dist. & H Ratio to Max
Medium dist. & MH Ratio to Max
Medium dist. & ML Ratio to Max
Medium dist. & L Ratio to Max
Short dist. & MH Ratio to Max
Short dist. & ML Ratio to Max
Short dist. & L Ratio to Max
1 2 3 4
Figure 1.8: Odds Ratio Proportional Hazard model: RatioMax and
Distance. Firth and De Menezes (2004) method. Odds Ratio from
a Proportional Hazard model of the hazard of selling a stock. Each Odds
Ratio corresponds to the effect of being in a given category. The event is the
sale. Each day when the stock is not sold is a non-event. Each observation is
at stock-bank account-day level. Clustered robust s.e. at bank account level.
Blue odds ratios are significantly different from 1 (p < 0.05) when relying upon
exact standard errors, red are not. Confidence intervals were obtained with
the Quasi-Variance method of Firth (2003); Firth and De Menezes (2004).
Ratio to Max Price is the ratio of daily closing price to maximum price up to
that time in the investment episode. On the selling date it is equal to the ratio
of selling price to maximum price in the episode. Low [0.349; 0.918]; Medium-
Low (0.918; 0.957]; Medium-High (0.957; 0.981]; High (0.981; 1]. Distance in
Time from Max Day is the standardised distance as defined in Definition 2.
Low [0; 0.07]; Medium [0.07; 0.34); High [0.34; 1]. The baseline category is
“Low Distance and High RatioMax”.
32
teristics and we control for time effects (month and year). All categories in
our regression are disjoint. Table 1.8 reports the outcome of the regression.
In Figure 1.7 we report the odds ratio of the 11 coefficients. For the sake
of replicability, Figure 1.8 reports the same results, where confidence inter-
vals are measured using the quasi-variance method of Firth (2003) and Firth
and De Menezes (2004). That allows the estimate of confidence intervals for
all categories, including the baseline. The baseline category corresponds to
“Low Distance and High Ratiomax”, the ideal point to sell a stock, from an
accounting perspective. We can see that all cases where distance is low are
clustered at the top, when we rank categories based on the propensity to sell
for each of them. All cases where distance is high are clustered at the bottom.
The big exception is the baseline category, low Distance and high Ratiomax.
Figure 1.7 offers a more complete interpretation to the sample averages we
reported in Figure 1.6. Hazard of selling is 2.65 higher for low distance and
low Ratiomax stock-days than at the baseline. In general, when the stock is
close in time but not close in price to the maximum (i.e. low distance but
not high Ratiomax) the hazard of selling is always estimated to be at least
double than that at the baseline. The complete picture seems to suggest that
reality is more complicated than how the lab describes it. Distance in price
from the maximum plays a role but the effect is not nice and linear as the one
observed by Strack and Viefers (2019). When distance in price is considered
in isolation, the propensity to sell peaks at a point which is close but not the
closest possible the to maximum. We can safely claim that traders are more
willing to sell at a low distance in time from the maximum. They probably
wait for a new maximum when a lot of time has passed since the last one.
Hence, it is always a salient figure in their mind. However, when the distance
in time is short, they are more willing to sell stocks which are further from
the past maximum. We believe that panic might play a big role. It looks like
investors are not extremely good at catching the best time to realise a stock
and decide to realise it only when the price path shows a defined descending
trend. Predictions of regret theory in a dynamic context by Strack and Viefers
(2019) are only partially confirmed then.
We can advance some mechanisms to explain what we have just defined
as a “panic” effect. The first one relies upon the evidence presented in Fioretti
et al. (2018). In their paper, Fioretti et al. (2018) vary the information given
to subjects in an experimental market. They observe that telling subjects
that they will see price information after they have sold an asset leads to a
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phenomenon called anticipated regret. Investors focus on the regret they might
experience because of future price realisations. In our setting, we suggest that
investors try to minimise the regret they might experience if the future price
is lower than the actual price. We suggest that when the price is dropping at
a fast rate, this mechanism is stronger than when the stock is dropping at a
slow rate. This explanations is tied very closely to the second one we propose.
The second explanation we propose is purely beliefs driven. We suggest that
when the stock is close in time but far in price from the past maximum, the
investor might update her beliefs on the future trajectory of the price and
overestimate the probability of future big drops, leading to higher sales. This
can be exacerbated by some mechanisms like diagnostic expectations (Bordalo
et al., 2019) where the probability of unlikely events is overstated after an
unlikely event realised. More specifically, bad news on the past leads to an
overestimate of the probability of bad news in the future. We cannot conclude
that a single force is at work but we see that a panic effect is at work, in our
empirical observations. This suggests that only regret about the past price
is not a fully explanatory theory for investors’ selling behaviour in the stock
market.
1.7 Regret about what?
We tested if investors stop at an optimal ex ante threshold and are prone
to regret in their decision to sell stocks. We moved from theoretical and
experimental evidence of Strack and Viefers (2019). A threshold strategy
implies that an investor never sells a stock at a price where she previously
decided not to sell. We rejected that hypothesis for our sample of investors. We
further investigated investors differences in the propensity to adopt a threshold
strategy. First, we saw that investors are more willing to adopt a threshold
strategy in the gain with respect to the loss domain. That is a consequence
of the disposition effect, the higher propensity to realise gains with respect
to losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2013).
Second, we found that the main differences in the rate of threshold consistency
are due to age, client segment and account type. Sophisticated investors and
active traders are more consistent with a threshold strategy. Affluent and older
investors are less consistent than general investors with a threshold strategy.
Males are more willing to accept losses at a minimum, that is partially at odds
with Barber and Odean (2001), who find that males under-perform females
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because of overconfidence. Affluent and older investors are more likely to
depart from a rational threshold strategy, this is linked to the idea that decision
making of older individuals is poorer (Korniotis and Kumar, 2011; Bruine
De Bruin, 2017).
We investigated the impact of running maximum price in an investment
episode on the propensity of investors to realise gains. We fitted a proportional
hazard model to the decision to sell for a gain. Predictions of regret theory
in a dynamic context (Strack and Viefers, 2019) are that the propensity to
sell increases with the level of the price and decreases with the distance of the
price from the past maximum. The first prediction was confirmed, since the
propensity to sell a gain strongly increases as the return increases, consistent
with Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012). The effect of distance in price from
the past maximum is not the one predicted by Strack and Viefers (2019). We
did find that the propensity to sell is actually lower when the stock is trading
very close to maximum price, while it is highest when the price is close to the
past maximum but not in the closest region.
We also investigated the impact that distance in time from the past
maximum has on the propensity to sell a stock. We found a very strong effect,
with the propensity to sell a stock falling as the distance in time from the
past maximum increases. On top of that, we investigated the joint effect of
distance in time and distance in price from the past maximum, finding that
investors are more willing to realise stocks which are closer in time but further
in price from the past maximum. When time distance from the past maximum
is short, the predictions of regret reverse. Investors are more willing to realise
stocks, the further is the price from the maximum. Two forces are at work:
investors are willing to wait for a new maximum to occur if a long time has
passed since the last one and they panic when the stock price drops a short
time after maximum. Anticipated regret (Fioretti et al., 2018) is a possible
explanation. Investors focus on the possibility that the stock price might
decrease even more and they rush to sell to minimise regret which has not
materialised yet. This is also linked to the possibility that investors’ perceived
probability of future drops of the stock price is higher, after they experience
a sharp drop right after the maximum. These findings open up the way to
further experimental and theoretical work in this area. First, we believe that
it would be interesting isolating the effects of time and price in a controlled
laboratory setting and second, we think that it would be worth incorporating
the time dimension in a theoretical dynamic model of regret.
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Chapter 2
Wide Framing Disposition
Effect
2.1 Introduction
In the present chapter, we shed new light on the disposition effect. In the
extant literature, the disposition effect has been considered in tandem with
an assumption of narrow framing (Thaler and Johnson, 1990; Barberis et al.,
2006). Narrow framing, in this context, is the tendency to treat investments
separately and it is well established that decision makers do narrow frame
their choices, in some cases1. It is the tendency to see investments without
considering the context of the overall portfolio. It is well known that decision
makers take different decisions if they focus on each of them in isolation from
the others or if they take into account more than one at the same time (Read
et al., 1999). We ask the question whether a wide framing perspective might
help our understanding of the disposition effect. In a wide framing perspec-
tive, investment decisions may depend on the overall portfolio composition. If
investors were really adopting narrow framing, their decisions should not be
influenced by the composition of the portfolio but only by the condition of the
asset they are trading.
In this chapter, we relax the assumption of narrow framing and un-
dertake an empirical investigation of the disposition effect. We focus our
attention on the 5% most active traders (Richards and Willows, 2018) in the
LDB dataset, who account for around 35% of the trades. We do so, in order to
look at bank accounts where several stocks are traded at the same time. We
1Whilst the term “narrow framing” was first used by Kahneman and Lovello (1993), the
more general concept of “decision framing” dates back to Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
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demonstrate that portfolio effects are very relevant for the disposition effect.
Our main finding concerns how the disposition effect varies as the number of
stocks trading at a gain or at a loss in a bank account changes2. We find that
the disposition effect is much weaker when the percentage of stocks trading
at a gain in the account of an investor is higher. In addition, we analyse
the impact that the realisation of other gains or losses in an account has on
the propensity to sell a stock, and on the disposition effect itself. Investors’
propensity to realise a stock is dramatically increased if they are realising an-
other stock on the same day. Baseline propensities to sell on days when other
trades do not take place are around 1%-2%. However, propensities to sell a
stock at a gain (loss) rise to around 50% on days where another stock in the
account is sold at a gain (loss), and to around 10% when another stock is sold
at a loss (gain). This result can help to explain why the disposition effect
varies with portfolio composition. Take a day when an investor has a low
proportion of stocks trading at a gain in their account. Since investors have
a preference for realising a gain and a loss on the same day, the propensity to
realise a gain will be relatively high, whilst the propensity to realise a loss will
be relatively low, giving a strong disposition effect. As the proportion of stocks
trading at a gain is increased, the propensity to realise a gain will drop, and
the propensity to realise a loss will rise, leading to a decrease in the strength
of the disposition effect. This is indeed consistent with our main finding that
the disposition effect is much weaker when the percentage of stocks trading at
a gain in the account of an investor is higher.
Our work is innovative, in several aspects. It is well known that in-
vestors are subject to trading biases (Barber and Odean, 2000, 2013). We find
that in some specific circumstances that is no longer true. In particular, the
disposition effect is widespread in economics. We find that investors do not
always show it. It is already well known that the disposition effect changes
from one individual to another (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Dhar and
Zhu, 2006) and it is also known that it decreases in time for a given investor
as sophistication and trading experience increase (Feng and Seasholes, 2005).
However, we find that it also changes at the individual level, within the same
bank account, when we measure it for different account compositions. To sum
up, we knew already that the disposition effect changes among investors and
within investor from one point in time to another. We add that it changes
2In our analysis, each bank account is treated separately and investors may hold more
than one account.
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within investor at the same point in time, as the bank account composition
changes.
2.2 Wide Framing Disposition Effect
Recent works that are closest to ours are those of Sakaguchi et al. (2019)
and An et al. (2019). Sakaguchi et al. (2019) analyse data from a laboratory
experiment and two datasets from trading activity: the LDB dataset and
a dataset of UK based investors from the 2010’s. They estimate how the
disposition effect changes as the number of stocks in the gain and loss domain
in a given portfolio changes. In particular, in the LDB and UK datasets, they
find that the disposition effect is highest when there is only one stock trading at
a loss and 2 or more stocks trading at a gain in a portfolio. The effect decreases
with the number of stocks at a gain. When there is one stock at a gain and 2
or more stocks trading at a loss in a portfolio, the propensity to realise gains is
lower than the propensity to realise losses. The main conclusion of Sakaguchi
et al. (2019) is that the probability that a stock in the gain domain is sold
is relatively constant across portfolios with different numbers of stocks in the
gain domain and in the loss domain. However, they reach this conclusion
after restricting the analysis to the set of sell-days when exactly one stock
was sold. This influences by construction the measure of the disposition effect
they obtain. In contrast, we show that investors have a strong preference for
realising more than one stock on the same trading day. Sakaguchi et al. (2019)
cannot capture this effect.
An et al. (2019) estimate the disposition effect separately for portfolios
which are trading at a gain or at a loss. They observe that the disposition
effect is weaker when the portfolio as a whole is trading at a gain (has positive
paper return) than when it is trading at a loss. An et al. (2019) propose
two possible explanations for their findings. The first possible explanation is
related to mental accounting. When the portfolio as whole is trading at a gain
investors are more likely to realise losses since they frame the sale of the losing
stock as the sale of a share of the entire portfolio, hence a share of an asset
which is trading at a gain. Their second explanation builds on Barberis and
Xiong (2009), extending realisation utility to paper gains and losses.
There are some important differences in our analyses. Differently from
us, An et al. (2019) use the entire dataset of investors regardless of whether
they are frequent or infrequent traders. Furthermore, An et al. (2019) focus on
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the performance of the portfolio as a whole, disregarding the actual imbalance
between the number of stocks which are trading at a gain or at a loss. Our
analysis shows that this is important. We believe that the actual percentage of
positions trading at a gain or at a loss is a salient figure in investors’ mind. This
idea comes from the literature on naive diversification. We suggest that selling
decisions which depend on the percentage of positions at a gain in the portfolio
are a form of decision heuristics, similar to naive diversification for buying
(Read and Loewenstein, 1995; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Gathergood et al.,
2019). Hence, we both take a very different psychological perspective on the
topic with respect to An et al. (2019) and we expand on their findings by taking
into account a much more detailed granularity of the portfolio composition.
We estimate the propensity to sell gains and losses for various levels of the
percentage of stocks trading at a gain. These estimates are used to compute
the disposition effect across varying compositions of the bank account.
2.3 The Disposition Effect for any bank account
composition
Here, we explain the reasoning and implementation of the estimation of the
disposition effect stratified by percent of stocks at a gain given in Table 2.4 in
Section 2.4. An example is given to demonstrate the method.
We define PGRAt as the proportion of gains realised in the account A
on day t (realised gains divided by paper gains plus realised gains) and PLRAt
as the proportion of losses realised in the account A on day t (realised losses
divided by paper losses plus realised losses). DEAt is defined as the difference
between PGRAt and PLRAt. We define PGAt as the percentage of positions
trading at a gain in the account A on day t. We partition percentages into
a (small) number of equally-sized gain bins and only distinguish bin numbers
for PGAt, but they may change from day to day even within the same account.
Given a particular bin number j, we can find all the days t for which PGAt
belongs to j. We call this set of days T
(j)
A and denote the number of days in
this set by #T
(j)
A .
We now calculate account level disposition effects restricted to days
where the percent gain is in a particular bin. These disposition effects at
account-gain bin level DE
(j)
A are constructed as follows. For each account A
and each gain bin j, average the account-day-gain bin disposition effects DE
(j)
At
over all days T
(j)
A . These are temporal averages and can be expressed via the
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formula:
DE
(j)
A =
1
#T
(j)
A
∑
all days t in T
(j)
A
DEAt. (2.1)
We now aggregate over accounts to focus on dependency of the dispo-
sition effect on percent gain. The disposition effects at gain bin level DE(j)
are constructed as averages of the disposition effects at account-gain bin level
DE
(j)
A over accounts. The collection of these over all gain bins is the percent
gain stratified disposition effect. They are averages over accounts. Written as
a formula, using # accounts for the total number of accounts in the data sets,
we obtain
DE(j) =
1
# accounts
∑
all accounts A
DE
(j)
A . (2.2)
Averaging first over days and then over accounts gives each account
holder the same weight, regardless of how often and over what length of periods
the account holder traded. This ensures that the estimates of the percent gain
stratified disposition effect are not driven by a few particularly active traders.
We include a numerical example based on the values in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Gain stratified disposition effect. An Example. Numerical
example data showing two accounts A and B with 3 and 5 trading days,
respectively. DE and PG bin are both at account-day level. DE refers to the
disposition effect. PG bin refers to the percent of stocks at a gain, with 1
referring to [0, 0.5] bin and 2 referring to (0.5, 1] bin. From these we calculate
summaries of the disposition effect at account-gain-bin level and at gain-bin
level.
Account Day DE PG bin DE account-gain-bin DE gain-bin
A 1 0.22 1 0.20 0.19
2 0.18 1 0.20 0.19
3 0.02 2 0.02 0.03
B 1 0.15 1 0.18 0.19
2 0.05 2 0.04 0.03
3 0.03 2 0.04 0.03
4 0.20 1 0.18 0.19
5 0.19 1 0.18 0.19
The calculations for the disposition effect at account-gain-bin and at
gain-bin level were carried out as follows. The average disposition effects at
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account-gain-bin level are, using (2.1),
DE
(1)
A =
1
2
(DE
(1)
A1 + DE
(1)
A2) =
1
2
(0.22 + 0.18) = 0.20
DE
(2)
A = DE
(2)
A3 = 0.02
DE
(1)
B =
1
3
(DE
(1)
B1 + DE
(1)
B4 + DE
(1)
B5) =
1
3
(0.15 + 0.20 + 0.19) = 0.18
DE
(2)
B =
1
2
(DE
(2)
B2 + DE
(2)
B3) =
1
2
(0.05 + 0.03) = 0.04
The average disposition effects at gain-bin level are, using (2.2),
DE(1) =
1
2
(0.20 + 0.18) = 0.19
DE(2) =
1
2
(0.02 + 0.04) = 0.03
The numbers in Table 2.1 were chosen to show the same message as
the real data set considered in this chapter. They show that the disposition
effect is negatively associated with the percentage of stocks at a gain in the
account. A summary (in the style of Table 2.4) is given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Gain stratified disposition effect. An Example; Part 2.
Calculated using results of Table 2.1.
Perc. of gains DE
[0,0.5] 0.19
(0.5,1] 0.03
2.4 Data and methodology
We restrict our attention to approximately 5% of the bank accounts present in
the LDB dataset, which account for more than 35% of the investment episodes.
This corresponds to bank accounts where 24 or more investment episodes were
started. After restricting our attention to this subset of accounts, we censor
investment episodes. We only include investment episodes where the selling
date is no later than 400 days from the buying date, in line with Brettschneider
and Burgess (2017). We do this in order to capture active decisions of traders
rather than buy and hold decisions. After imposing this condition and deleting
(a very small number of) trades for which we suspected data were misreported,
we retain bank accounts where at least 20 trading episodes were completed.
This resulted in 114,441 episodes from 2,783 bank accounts (Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of the sample.
Summary Statistics of the sample.
Bank accounts 2,783
Episodes 114,441
Episodes per bank account (mean) 41.12
Episodes per bank account (median) 31
Percentage of gains in an account-stock-day (mean) 0.48
Percentage of gains in an account-stock-day (median) 0.50
Number of stocks in an account-stock-day (mean) 8.35
Number of stocks in an account-stock-day (median) 5
In this section, we give a preliminary estimate of the disposition effect
that takes into account the percentage of stocks at a gain in the account. In
other words, we calculate a disposition effect stratified by the current percent-
age of a stocks at a gain in the account, following the method explained in
Section 2.3. For each bank account, on each day when at least one stock is
realised, we calculate PGR and PLR following Odean (1998), where PGR is
the Proportion of Gains Realised
PGR =
Realised Gains
Realised Gains + Paper Gains
and PLR is the Proportion of Losses Realised
PLR =
Realised Losses
Realised Losses + Paper Losses
For each such day, we calculate the disposition effect following Dhar
and Zhu (2006) as the difference between PGR and PLR. For days when at
least one stock is realised, we also determine the percentage of stocks which are
trading at a gain in the bank account and classify it in one of four bins (0 to
0.25; 0.25 to 0.5; 0.5 to 0.75 and 0.75 to 1). Then, we calculate the disposition
effect at account-gain-bin level. That is, we average the disposition effect, at
account level, over all days in which a given account falls in a given gain bin.
Finally, we calculate the disposition effect at the gain-bin level. That means,
we average the disposition effect at account-gain-bin level over accounts, to
obtain the average disposition effect for each of the four bins. The output
is shown in Table 2.4. We observe striking differences in the magnitude of
the disposition effect, depending on the percentage of stocks at a gain. The
disposition effect is ten times larger in bin 1 than in bin 43.
3A Jonckheere-Terpstra test confirms that the DE decreases when the percentage of
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Table 2.4: Disposition effect stratified by percentage of stocks at a
gain. Disposition effect (DE) was calculated in three steps. First, disposition
effect was estimated as PGR-PLR within each account on any day where at
least one stock is realised. Then, these account-day disposition effects were
averaged over days, stratified by the percentage of stocks at gain within each
account. Here, four equally sized bins were used for the stratification. Finally,
within each of these gain bins, averages over accounts were taken resulting
in the four quantities listed below. A Jonckheere trend test (also known as
Jonckheere-Terpstra test) confirms that the disposition effect decreases with
increasing percentage of stocks at a gain (P < 0.001).
Perc. of gains DE
[0.00, 0.25] 0.20
(0.25 ,0.50] 0.18
(0.50, 0.75] 0.08
(0.75, 1.00] 0.02
We can go beyond these preliminary estimates by performing regression
analyses to estimate the disposition effect. The unit of observation is an
account-stock-day triple (An et al., 2019). The dependent variable takes the
value of 1 for sell days and 0 otherwise. While the earlier literature used
logit models (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Birru, 2015), more recent works
employ a linear probability model (Chang et al., 2016; An et al., 2019). In
all these cases, the effects that covariates have on the different propensities to
sell are mediated by an interaction with a dummy variable which indicates if a
stock is trading at a gain on a specific day. Ai and Norton (2003) highlighted
that the magnitude of the interaction effect in logit models does not equal the
marginal effect of the interaction term and it can be of opposite sign. A linear
probability model guarantees an easier interpretation of marginal effects and a
robust identification of the coefficients. Furthermore, a linear approximation
is sufficient, because the range of the probabilities is small and the sample
size is large enough to guarantee approximately normal residuals. We model
heteroskedasticity by fitting robust clustered standard errors at bank account
level (Arellano, 1987). We estimate three linear probability models. The
first model focuses on the impact of the percentage of stocks at a gain in the
gains increases (p<0.001, H1 that the disposition effect is decreasing from bin 1 to bin 4,
where bin 1 corresponds to gain percentage between 0 and 0.25 and bin 4 to gain percentage
between 0.75 to 1).
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account. It takes the following form:
yijt = α+Gijtβ +Dkijtδk +Gijt ×Dkijtγk (2.3)
where i refers to the bank account, j refers to the investment episode
and t to the day. Then:
Response: yijt is equal to 1 on those days t when the stock traded in
episode j in account i is sold, and 0 otherwise.
Gain: Gijt is a dummy equal to 1 on those days t when the stock traded
in episode j in account i is trading at a gain (closing price is higher than
(or equal to) purchase price).
Sextile percentage of gains: Dkijt with k ∈ {1,2,4,5,6} are five dum-
mies we obtained in the following way:
– Consider all days when more than one stock was open in a given
bank account.
– Calculate the percentage of stocks trading at a gain (excluding the
stock for which we are estimating the probability of selling, traded
in episode j).
– Split the percentage of stocks at a gain into six sextiles (based on the
distribution of the percentage of gains at account-stock-day level).
Observed sextiles are marked by the following cut-points (these are
the upper limits of each category): 0.10, 0.33, 0.50, 0.61, 0.80, 1.
– Each dummy Dk refers to one of the sextiles, imposing the third
one as the reference category.
The intercept α measures the probability of selling a loss when the
percentage of gains in the account is in the third sextile. β captures the
difference in the propensity to sell a gain and the propensity to sell a loss
for the third sextile, the disposition effect. δk captures the difference in the
propensity to realise a loss when the account is in the kth sextile with respect
to the third sextile. The sum of β and δk measures the disposition effect for
the kth sextile. We obtain out of sample prediction for the probability to
sell a gain and the probability to sell a loss, for any of the gain percentage
sextiles. The disposition effect is then calculated as the difference between the
probability of selling a gain and the probability of selling a loss, following the
widely used definition of Odean (1998).
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The second and third models focus on the impact of realisations of
stocks other than the one in question, distinguishing gains and losses. They
take the following form:
yijt = α+Gijtβ + Iijtδ +Gijt × Iijtγ (2.4)
In the second (third) model, Iijt is a dummy equal to 1 if, on a given
day t, at least one stock at a gain (loss), (apart from the stock traded in
episode j) is realised in the bank account i. β captures the disposition effect
and δ the difference in the propensity to realise a loss when a gain (a loss) is
realised in the account, apart from the stock traded in episode j. The sum of
β and γ captures the disposition effect on days when a stock at a gain (loss),
apart from the stock traded in episode j, is realised in bank account i.
For each model described, we fit three regressions. First, the baseline
model as defined in Equation (2.3) and Equation (2.4). Second, a Fixed Effects
OLS regression with fixed effects at the account level. We do this to control
for the propensity to sell a stock that is unique to each account. The propen-
sity to sell may be linked to trading frequency, size or other account specific
characteristics. Third, a Fixed Effects OLS regression with fixed effects at
the account level and control variables for month and year (and respective
interactions with the gain dummy). This is to control for differences in the
propensity to sell due to time.
2.5 Variation in the Disposition Effect with Portfo-
lio Composition
Our key finding is that from a wide framing perspective, the disposition effect
vanishes for some portfolio compositions. Our first set of results are sum-
marised in Table 2.5, which reports the estimation of model (2.3). From these
estimates, we obtain out-of-sample predictions displayed in Figure 2.1 and
summarised in Table 2.6. We will discuss these first. Table 2.6 reports the
propensities to sell for each sextile of the distribution of the percentage of
stocks trading at a gain in an account day. For example, we can see that the
propensity to sell when the percentage of gains is in the first sextile and the
stock is trading at a gain (gain dummy equal to 1) is 2.7%. These propensities
are presented graphically in the lower panel of Figure 2.1. The disposition
effect, based on the relative propensities to sell, is also reported in Table 2.6,
and in the upper panel of Figure 2.1.
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From the top panel of Figure 2.1, we see that the disposition effect
is largest when the percentage of stocks trading at a gain in the account is
lowest. The observations in the lower panel of Figure 2.1 show that the spread
between the propensity to realise a gain and the propensity to realise a loss is
largest when the percentage of gains in the account is in the first sextile.
In other words, investors tend to sell one of their few stocks at a gain,
rather than one of the many they hold at a loss. Table 2.6 examines this in
more detail by estimating the disposition effect for any sextile of the distri-
bution of the percentage of gains in the account. It demonstrates that the
disposition effect broadly decreases as the percentage of stocks trading at a
gain increases. The disposition effect increases slightly from the fifth to the
sixth sextile, but it is close to 0 from the fourth sextile onwards, when the
percentage of positions at a gain in the account is higher than 50%.
The lower panel of Figure 2.1 displays the relative magnitudes of the
propensities to realise gains and losses, which together drive the disposition
effect. Our first observation is that the propensity to realise a gain varies much
more than the propensity to realise a loss, for any level of the percentage of
stocks at a gain in the account. In particular, the propensity to realise a
loss lies between 1.08% and 1.7%, whilst the propensity to realise a gain is
between 1.3% and 2.7%. The reduction of the disposition effect we described
above, is largely driven by a reduction in the propensity to realise a gain as
the percentage of stocks trading at a gain in the account increases.
Two technical observations arise from the more detailed analysis of
the estimation of model (2.3) presented in Table 2.5. First, the effect of the
percentage of stocks at a gain is not linear, hence stratifying by sextiles was
appropriate. Second, estimates are fairly stable when we control for bank
account and time fixed effects. The direction and magnitude of the effects are
fairly stable across all specifications.
Our finding is a breakthrough in the literature on the disposition effect.
We have shown that investors are not prone to the disposition effect, when
the overall situation of their portfolio is positive. Other authors have demon-
strated considerable variation in estimates of the disposition effect for different
types of investors. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) observed that the disposi-
tion effect is weaker for institutional and foreign investors than for domestic
investors in Finland. Dhar and Zhu (2006) found that the disposition effect is
weaker for more experienced investors. Feng and Seasholes (2005) found that
the disposition effect decreases in time for a given investor as sophistication
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and trading experience increase. What we see is different. We observe that
the disposition effect varies significantly as the account composition changes.
Our finding that the disposition effect decreases as the percentage of stocks
trading at a gain increases is almost counter-intuitive. When the number of
paper gains is higher, the difference in the propensity to realise gains and
losses is smaller. When times are good, the disposition effect becomes almost
non-existent.
Table 2.5: Sextile of gains regression. Linear probability model (given in
(2.3)) where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for sale days and 0
for hold days. Each observation is at account-stock-day level. Gain dummy
is equal to 1 on those days when the stock is trading at a gain. Sextiles of
stocks trading at a gain are obtained as follows: we calculate the percentage of
stocks trading at a gain (excluding the stock for which we are estimating the
probability of selling) in a given account-day, we split it into sextiles. Observed
sextile are marked by the following cut-points (these are the upper limits of
each category): 0.10, 0.33, 0.50, 0.61, 0.80, 1. The third sextile is the reference
category.
OLS FE FE
Gain 0.00404∗∗∗ 0.00484∗∗∗ 0.00766∗∗∗
(0.000411) (0.000498) (0.000708)
Sextile percentage of gains (ref. Third)
First 0.000998∗∗∗ -0.00492∗∗∗ -0.00530∗∗∗
(0.000302) (0.000354) (0.000353)
Second -0.00139∗∗∗ -0.00232∗∗∗ -0.00235∗∗∗
(0.000296) (0.000292) (0.000294)
Fourth -0.000406 0.00173∗∗∗ 0.00179∗∗∗
(0.000405) (0.000373) (0.000397)
Fifth 0.00115∗∗∗ 0.00249∗∗∗ 0.00258∗∗∗
(0.000260) (0.000307) (0.000304)
Sixth 0.00442∗∗∗ 0.00169∗∗∗ 0.00154∗∗∗
(0.000367) (0.000370) (0.000366)
Gain × Sextile percentage of gains (ref. Third)
Gain × First 0.00989∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗
(0.000587) (0.000653) (0.000654)
Gain × Second 0.00422∗∗∗ 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00479∗∗∗
(0.000484) (0.000522) (0.000527)
Gain × Fourth -0.00321∗∗∗ -0.00376∗∗∗ -0.00386∗∗∗
(0.000487) (0.000512) (0.000512)
Gain × Fifth -0.00418∗∗∗ -0.00471∗∗∗ -0.00484∗∗∗
(0.000412) (0.000438) (0.000441)
Gain × Sixth -0.00145∗∗ -0.00144∗ -0.00148∗
(0.000510) (0.000574) (0.000574)
Time FE NO NO YES
N 6611755 6611755 6611755
Standard errors clustered at bank account level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
47
Figure 2.1: Disposition effect and sextile of gain percentages. Out of
sample predictions of the linear probability model (first column in Table 2.5)
where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for sale days and 0 for hold
days (observations at account-stock-day level, clustered se at bank account
level). Sextiles of stocks trading at a gain are obtained as follows: we calculate
the percentage of stocks trading at a gain (excluding the stock for which we
are estimating the probability of selling) in a given account-day, and split it
into sextiles. Observed sextiles are marked by the following cut-points (these
are the upper limits of each category): 0.10, 0.33, 0.50, 0.61, 0.80, 1. The
third sextile is the reference category.
Top: Disposition effect (propensity to realise a gain minus the propensity to
realise a loss) for each level of the sextiles of the distribution of the percentage
of gain stocks in the portfolio. Brown line is drawn at 0 (no disposition effect).
Bottom: Probability of sale for gains and losses for each level of the sextiles
of the distribution of the percentage of gain stocks in the portfolio.
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Table 2.6: Disposition effect and sextile of gain percentages. Estimated
propensity to sell a gain and propensity to sell a loss for each sextile of the
distribution of the percentage of stocks trading at a gain in an account-day.
Disposition effect is calculated as the difference between the propensity to
realise a gain and the propensity to realise a loss. Out of sample predictions of
the linear probability model (first column in Table 2.5) where the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 for sale days and 0 for hold days (observations
at account-stock-day level, clustered se at bank account level). Sextiles of
stocks trading at a gain are obtained as follows: we calculate the percentage
of stocks trading at a gain (excluding the stock for which we are estimating
the probability of selling) in a given account-day, and split it into sextiles.
Observed sextiles are marked by the following cut-points (these are the upper
limits of each category): 0.10, 0.33, 0.50, 0.61, 0.80, 1. The third sextile is the
reference category.
Sextile of gain perc. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Propensity to sell gain 0.027 0.019 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.019
Propensity to sell loss 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.017
Disposition effect 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.003
Although mental accounting is a potential explanation (An et al., 2019),
we will now propose some alternative explanations for our result. A first pos-
sibility entails reference point updating. Arkes et al. (2008) showed in an
experimental setting that investors update upwards (downwards) their refer-
ence point after an asset increases (decreases) in price. Investors only partially
update the reference point, and they update it asymmetrically, by more in the
gain than in the loss domain. Chiyachantana and Yang (2013) propose a refer-
ence point updating mechanism to explain the disposition effect. They argue
that, when the stock is trading below the reference point, the investor is in the
risk seeking region of the S-shaped utility function. Hence, choosing between
a sure loss and a risky loss she will prefer the risky loss and hold on to the
stock. If she adapted her reference point down to the current price, she would
stop to perceive it as belonging to the loss domain and sell it (since it would
be a choice between a sure gain and a risky gain and the investors would be
in the risk averse portion of the S-shaped utility function).
We now apply this line of reasoning to our results and start with the
loss domain. Suppose that the effect found by Arkes et al. (2008) holds. When
the stock enters the loss domain, the investor does not immediately update the
reference point downwards and the price will be lower than investor’s reference
point. We see in Figure 2.1 that the propensity to realise a loss is relatively
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constant and only increases when the percentage of stocks at a gain is very
high. One possible driver for the increased propensity to realise a loss is the
following: when there are only a small number of losing stocks in the account,
they are evaluated as being relatively worse since the investor compares them
to the large number of winning stocks. Hence, she is willing to adjust the
reference point of that loss downwards to the current price and to realise
losses. The propensity to realise a gain is at its highest when the percentage
of stocks trading at a gain is really low (Figure 2.1). Using a similar line of
reasoning, an investor considers those few gains to be relatively valuable as
compared to a large number of losing stocks. She adjusts the reference points
of the winning stocks upwards, closer to the running prices, which leads to a
higher propensity to realise gains.
We can suggest other explanations for the pattern we observe. For
example, regret (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) or disappointment (Bell, 1985;
Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Jia et al., 2001; Delquie´ and Cillo, 2006) might play
a role. Anticipated regret might explain why investors realise gains when they
have relatively few winning positions. Regret refers to the idea that a decision
maker would regret obtaining an outcome which is ex-post sub-optimal. When
the percentage of gains is low, the worst possible outcome would be that those
few gains end up in the loss domain. Hence, the investor chooses to sell them
now, before their price decreases. On the other hand, when the proportion
of positions at a paper gain is higher, the investor would not be as concerned
that she may not realise any gain at all and would not necessarily rush to
sell. The central idea of disappointment theory is that an individual forms
an expectation about a risky alternative, and may experience disappointment
if the outcome obtained falls short of this expectation. If investors have a
well defined expectation regarding their future earnings, it is likely that their
expectation will be positive, otherwise they would have not bought the stock in
the first place. Hence, when the percentage of gains in the account is low, the
probability of the final outcome falling short of expectations is high. Then,
individuals rush to realise the few gains they have, in order to meet their
ex-ante expectations.
This explanation is linked to the rational belief that if the investor
has more stocks in the gain domain, then the likelihood that she will have a
loss is smaller. On the other hand, if the investor has only a few stocks in
the gain domain, then the likelihood that she will have a gain is small. This
automatically leads to a higher propensity to realise gains when there is only a
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few of them in the account. In this framework, this behaviour is not irrational.
If the objective of the investor is to maximise the number of investments sold
for a gain, it is perfectly rational selling one of the few gains when she mainly
has losses on her account, since the likelihood that many of those losses will
turn into gains is small. Another possibility is that the investor updates her
confidence on her own stock selection ability. In the situation where she only
has a few gains, the investor might have lower confidence in her own stock
selection ability. She might think that those few gains are in her account
because of some lucky circumstances and rush to sell them since she became
more pessimistic on her choices.
A final explanation might rely upon investor attention (Barber and
Odean, 2008; Dierick et al., 2019). We see that the propensity to realise a
gain is lower for balanced compositions of the bank account. It might be
the case that unbalanced compositions of the portfolio lead the investor to
focus their attention on their investments, and to be more active, by realising
positions. We emphasise that it is very important to focus on the propensity to
realise a gain and the propensity to realise a loss separately, as we do (lower
panel in Figure 2.1). We are not only interested in estimating changes in
the disposition effect, but also in unraveling whether they are linked to the
variation in the propensity to realise a gain or the propensity to realise a loss.
2.6 The Impact of Realising Other Gains and Losses
on the Propensity to Sell
In our second set of results, we investigate the impact that the realisation
of other gains or losses in the account has on the propensity to realise a
stock. Tables 2.7 and 2.9 report the results from the estimation of the linear
probability models given in (2.4), where another loss or gain, respectively, is
realised. From these estimates, we obtain out-of-sample predictions which are
given in Tables 2.8 and 2.10, again, for the situation of another loss or gain,
respectively.
Our first striking observation from Tables 2.8 and 2.10 is that investors
have a high propensity to realise a stock if they are already realising another
one, on a given day. In particular, the propensity to realise a loss is around
50% and the propensity to realise a gain is slightly higher than 10% on those
days when another stock at a loss in the account is realised. The propensity
to realise a loss is slightly smaller than 10% and the propensity to realise a
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gain is around 50% on those days when another stock at a gain in the account
is sold. These magnitudes should be compared to baseline propensities to sell
on days when another loss or gain is not realised, which are all in the region
of 1%-1.7%.
Portfolio or bank account effects are very relevant. In particular, the
fact the investors have a much higher propensity to realise another stock, once
they have realised one, is an indication that decisions regarding stocks in the
same account are correlated. Furthermore, realising a gain makes it more
likely to realise another gain than to realise a loss, and realising a loss makes
it more likely to realise another loss than to realise a gain. We note that this
effect cannot be captured using the framework adopted by Sakaguchi et al.
(2019), since they restrict their analysis to sale days where only one stock is
realised in a portfolio.
How might we explain the observed behaviour? The notion of investor
attention (Barber and Odean, 2008) may be relevant. If investors only pay
attention to their portfolio on some days, then they also trade more on those
days. Another possible explanation may be related to reference point updat-
ing, particularly for investors’ realising multiple losses on the same day. Upon
realising the sale of one stock trading just below its reference point, an in-
vestor may update (downgrade) her reference points on other stocks trading
at paper losses as well, leading to further sales. A further possibility is simply
that since realising losses is difficult, it may be a defense mechanism to realise
more than one at the same time.
Whilst we demonstrate that the realisation of a gain (loss) significantly
increases the propensity to realise another gain (loss), we also find that it
increases the propensity to realise a loss (gain). For example, the propensity
to sell a gain rises sixfold when a loss is realised on the same day (in the same
account). This can shed some light on why the disposition effect varies with
portfolio composition. If investors have a preference for realising a gain and
a loss on the same day, on days when there is a low percentage of gains, the
propensity to realise a gain will be high and the propensity to realise a loss will
be low. This follows from the fact that, on those days, the investor can choose
from a small pool of stocks at a gain, and a larger pool of losing stocks. PGR,
as defined in Odean (1998) will have a very low denominator and PLR will have
a high denominator. As the percentage of gains in the account increases, we
expect the propensity to realise a loss to increase, and the propensity to realise
a gain to decrease. This describes well the pattern we observe in Figure 2.1
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Table 2.7: Other loss indicator regression. Linear probability model
(given in (2.4)) where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for sale
days and 0 for hold days. Each observation is at account-stock-day level.
Gain dummy is equal to 1 on those days when the stock is trading at a gain.
Other loss realised indicator is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if, on a
given account-day, a stock at a loss is realised (other than the stock whose
propensity is being estimated).
OLS FE FE
Gain dummy 0.00701∗∗∗ 0.00876∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗
(0.000328) (0.000416) (0.000642)
Other loss realised indicator 0.488∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.0291) (0.0276) (0.0275)
Gain dummy × Other loss realised indicator -0.399∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0263) (0.0263)
Time FE NO NO YES
N 7133537 7133537 7133537
Standard errors clustered at bank account level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.8: Disposition Effect and other loss indicator. Disposition effect
when a loss is realised in the account on a given day or not. Disposition Effect
is calculated as the difference between the propensity to realise a gain and the
propensity to realise a loss. Out of sample predictions of a linear probability
model (first column of Table 2.7) where the dependent variable takes the value
of 1 for sale days and 0 for hold days (observations at account-stock-day level).
Other loss realised refers to those day when, in a given account, a stock at a
loss is realised (other than the stock whose propensity is being estimated).
Propensity to sell gain Propensity to sell loss Other loss realised Disposition Effect
0.017 0.010 NO 0.007
0.105 0.497 YES -0.392
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Table 2.9: Other gain indicator regression. Linear probability model
(given in (2.4)) where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 for sale
days and 0 for hold days. Each observation is at account-stock-day level.
Gain dummy is equal to 1 on those days when the stock is trading at a gain.
Other gain realised indicator is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if, on a
given account-day, a stock at a gain is realised (other than the stock whose
propensity is being estimated).
OLS FE FE
Gain dummy 0.00358∗∗∗ 0.00486∗∗∗ 0.00640∗∗∗
(0.000294) (0.000349) (0.000556)
Other gain realised indicator 0.0762∗∗∗ 0.0738∗∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗
(0.00317) (0.00306) (0.00307)
Gain dummy × Other gain realised indicator 0.409∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0287) (0.0286)
Time FE NO NO YES
N 7133537 7133537 7133537
Standard errors clustered at bank account level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2.10: Disposition Effect and other gain indicator. Disposition
effect when a gain is realised in the account on a given day or not. Disposition
Effect is calculated as the difference between the propensity to realise a gain
and the propensity to realise a loss. Out of sample predictions of a linear
probability model (first column of Table 2.9) where the dependent variable
takes the value of 1 for sale days and 0 for hold days (observations at account-
stock-day level). Other gain realised refers to those day when, in a given
account, a stock at a gain is realised (other than the stock whose propensity
is being estimated).
Propensity to sell gain Propensity to sell loss Other gain realised Disposition Effect
0.015 0.011 NO 0.004
0.500 0.087 YES 0.412
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and leads the disposition effect to decrease as the percentage of stocks at a
gain increases. The probability of realising a loss increases as the percentage
of gains increases, while the probability of realising a gain follows a U-shape.
It is lower in sextile 6 than in sextile 1 but it does reach the minimum in sextile
4. We are not suggesting that the preference for realising multiple stocks on
the same day alone leads to the variation in the disposition effect that we
observe, but it potentially contributes to it. Hence, the finding that investors
tend to realise more than one stock on a given day, contributes to partially
explain the mechanism which leads the disposition effect to change with the
account composition.
The fact that the realisation of a gain (loss) has a dramatic impact on
the propensity to realise another gain (loss) does not affect this explanation.
Let’s focus on the case where the percentage of gains is high. We know that
realising a gain will increase the probability of realising another gain, and
will also increase the probability of realising a loss, albeit to a lesser extent.
Hence, there will be variation in the disposition effect due to changes in both
PGR and PLR. However, since the denominator of PGR is high, the marginal
(increasing) contribution that any realisation of gains has on the disposition
effect, will be less than the marginal (decreasing) contribution that any loss
has on the disposition effect, since the denominator of PLR is low.
2.7 A wide framing perspective on the disposition
effect
These findings shed new light on the literature on narrow framing (Thaler
and Johnson, 1990; Barberis et al., 2006). We suggest investigating investors’
choices from a wide framing perspective, also in other domains. Choices might
depend not only from the characteristics of the stock the investor is trading
but also from the characteristics of other stocks in the bank account.
In his chapter we focused on a sample of relatively active traders (the
5% most active, who account for 35% of trades in the LDB dataset). We
proposed a description of the disposition effect from a wide framing perspec-
tive. We looked at how the disposition effect changes when the percentage of
stocks trading at a gain in a specific account-day changes. We estimated the
propensity to realise gains and losses when more than one stock is realised on
a given account-day.
We observed that when the percentage of stocks trading at a gain on
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a given account-day increases, the disposition effect is much lower and in
some cases it disappears: the propensity to realise losses is higher than the
propensity to realise gains. Our findings are similar to Sakaguchi et al. (2019)
and An et al. (2019). However, Sakaguchi et al. (2019) impose some constraints
on their data in order to fit a two-stage psychological model of sale. They
restrict their analysis to those trading days when only one stock per account
is realised. This influences their conclusions by construction and prevents
them from observing the effect we find, that individuals have a preference for
realising more than one stock at the same time. Moreover, Sakaguchi et al.
(2019) found that the probability of realising a gain is independent of the
number of stocks in the gain domain, while we found that the relationship
between the propensity to realise gains and the percentage of stocks at a gain
follows a U-shape and it is highest when the percentage of stocks trading at
a gain is lowest. An et al. (2019) focused on the overall performance of the
portfolio and how the disposition effect changes with it. The main conclusion is
that the disposition effect is weaker when the portfolio as a whole is trading at a
loss than when it is trading at a gain. We proposed some possible explanations,
like mental accounting, reference point adaptation and disappointment. Our
work has important implications for future research. First, we have shown the
importance of a wide framing perspective. Taking such a perspective may lead
to new findings in other settings. Second, given the prevalence and accessibility
of financial trading across the economy, it is imperative to understand how
portfolio composition shapes individual sale decisions. In particular, it would
be of interest to see the extent to which our findings hold in other datasets
which have been studied in relation to the disposition effect.
Our main conclusion represents an important advance in the literature
on the disposition effect. It is already well known that the disposition effect
is not necessarily the same for all types of investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju,
2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2006). However, we control for fixed effects at account
and time level and we find that the disposition effect changes from period to
period at the individual level. When the percentage of stocks trading at a
gain in a given account-day is higher, the disposition effect is lower. That
is almost counter-intuitive, since we observe that when the number of paper
gains that the investor can choose to sell is relatively higher, the difference in
the propensity to realise gains and losses is smaller. The disposition effect does
not capture the behaviour of investors in all possible situations. In particular,
it is more likely to occur in bad times than in good times.
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Chapter 3
Reference Point and
Disposition Effect
3.1 Introduction
The disposition effect has already been discussed in Chapter 2 from a wide
framing perspective. There, we focused on how it changes as the portfo-
lio composition changes. Here, we ask the question if the disposition effect
changes if we change the reference point with respect to which we measure
it. As we already pointed out, the disposition effect is the tendency to re-
alise gains at a higher rate than losses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean,
1998; Barber and Odean, 2013). In measuring it, gains and losses are defined
with respect to the purchase price. That is the most natural term of com-
parison and it is also the appropriate benchmark from an accounting point of
view. However, we suggest that, at the psychological level, investors might
not define gains and losses with respect to the purchase price but they might
adopt an alternative reference point. The reference point is a vital component
of Kahneman and Tversky Prospect Theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
introduced Prospect Theory as a descriptive alternative to the normative the-
ory of Expected Utility. There are three main elements of Prospect Theory.
First, people derive utility from gains and losses relative to a reference point,
while traditional utility theory assumes that people derive utility from total
wealth or consumption. Second, the value function is concave in the domain
of gains and convex in the domain of losses (S-shaped utility). The shape of
the function captures “dual risk attitudes”: individuals tend to be risk averse
in the gain domain but risk seeking in the loss domain. Third, the effect of a
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loss on utility is much larger than that of a gain of the same size (“loss aver-
sion”). One possible explanation of the disposition effect is framed in terms
of Prospect Theory where each of the S-shaped utility, loss aversion, and use
of a reference point play a role (Barberis and Xiong, 2009; Henderson, 2012;
Ingersoll and Jin, 2013). In this chapter, we focus on the formation of the
reference point. We cannot elicit the reference point of investors, while they
trade. However, it is natural to expect that investors would incorporate infor-
mation unfolding since the purchase date of an investment, on the formation of
their reference point. To make this point more clear, imagine that an investor
buys a stock on day 1 at a price p1 = 100 and she is considering the possibility
of selling it on day 200. Will she evaluate the price on that day, p200 against
the purchase price p1 or will she compare it to some weighted average of the
prices she experienced from day 1 to day 200. Imagine that the stock started
decreasing in price from day 1 to day 100, reaching a minimum of p100 = 90,
then it rebound and it started increasing in price, up to p200 = 95. Selling the
stock at a price p200 = 95 is for sure a loss, from an accounting point of view.
However, we suggest it might not be considered as a loss from a psychological
point of view. If the investor puts more weight on recent prices, when form-
ing her reference point, she might have a reference point which is lower than
95. Hence, she might consider the realisation of that stock as a gain, from a
psychological point of view. This leads us to the three questions which we will
try to address in this chapter:
• Is it possible that the disposition effect does not exist or it is attenuated,
from a psychological point of view?
• Can we find a reasonable reference point formation rule which supports
this statement?
• Are there different rules which attenuate the disposition effect for differ-
ent investors’ categories?
Our main conclusion is that, once we depart from the definition of
the reference point as the purchase price, we can observe a lower disposition
effect. Once we define gains and losses with respect to recent realisations of the
trading price, we find that the disposition effect is strongly attenuated. The
propensity to realise stocks which recently appreciated (local gains) and stocks
which recently depreciated (local losses) is very similar. However, this is not
true for any investors. As a general pattern we find that investors who trade
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less but for longer time tend to have a low disposition effect, when measured
with respect to the purchase price. Investors who trade more have a lower
disposition effect, when measured with respect to recent price realisations. We
also test other possible reference point rules and produce a detailed comparison
of two of them.
3.2 The quest for the reference point
In the early years of Prospect Theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) argued
that “although the reference point usually corresponds to the decision maker’s
current position it can also be influenced by aspirations, expectations, norms,
and social comparisons”. Many years later Barberis (2013) claims that ad-
dressing the formation of the reference point is still a key challenge to apply
Prospect Theory. Our hypothesis that the reference point might not be the
purchase price and might stem from an adaptation process which incorpo-
rates intermediate prices, is backed up by both theoretical derivations and
experimental observations of reference point adaptation.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) propose that the reference point does
not need to be fixed exogenously but can be determined endogenously based
on rational expectations about future outcomes. They develop a model where
the reference point is determined endogenously by the economic environment.
They assume that a person’s reference point is her rational expectations held
in the recent past about outcomes. The derivation of Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006) stems from the idea that, in the presence of uncertainty, expectations
change as the uncertainty is resolved. For example, in within-day labor-supply
decisions, a worker is less likely to continue work if the income earned is unex-
pectedly high, but more likely to show up as well as continue work if expected
income is high. Several theoretical models suggest an important role for the
reference point in explaining the disposition effect (Shi et al., 2015; Meng and
Weng, 2018; Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou, 2019). Meng and
Weng (2018) is an extension of the model proposed by Barberis and Xiong
(2009). They show that an expectations-based reference point model can ex-
plain the disposition effect, under Prospect Theory preferences. In particular,
a model based on loss aversion in Prospect Theory can explain the disposition
effect under the Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) setting. Their model can explain
the disposition effect by allowing the reference point to depend on the lagged
values of the expected final wealth, only. They also predict that the disposi-
59
tion effect is more likely to be present when the reference point is not updated
quickly enough, when the expected stock return is low, and when stock trading
is infrequent. More generally, their model predicts that the quicker investors
are able to adjust their reference points, the less conservative they are in ini-
tial purchase decisions. They do not commit to any specific mechanism of
reference point formation but they suggest that “investors may linearly ex-
trapolate from their past returns to form new expectations, or demonstrate
overoptimistic beliefs and representative biases”. Shi et al. (2015) as well pro-
pose to adopt a dynamic updating reference point, which is state and decision
dependent, into a dynamic portfolio choice model. They model an asymmet-
ric reference point adaptation, which causes the disposition effect. In their
framework, investors update their reference point upwards after good news
more than how they update it downwards after bad news since prior trading
outcomes affect the reference point through its adaptation process. In turn,
the shift in the reference point affects future trading actions. Although they
use a partial and asymmetric adaptation in their specifications, their reference
point model is rich enough to incorporate different patterns of reference point
adaptation. Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (2019) propose a
method to estimate a dynamic reference point and test it in the context of
trading data from a sports wagering market. They find that if the reference
point is not sticky to the first price, Prospect Theory can explain the preva-
lence of the disposition effect. They argue that betting data from people with
a long story of trading are a good approximation of stock trading and go on to
document that the disposition effect is explained, in that context, by a model
where the reference point is a convex combination of the initial level and the
intermediate levels of wealth. They structurally estimate a memory decay pa-
rameter and they conclude that investors take into account intermediate levels
of wealth, since the memory decay is weaker than in the setting of Barberis
and Xiong (2009), where memory decays immediately and the reference point
is sticky to the initial level of wealth.
The formation of the reference point has been directly investigated
in a series of experimental papers (Arkes et al., 2008, 2010; Baucells et al.,
2011; Baillon et al., 2020) and in the context of financial investment (Quispe-
Torreblanca et al., 2020). In an experimental setting, Arkes et al. (2008)
show that investors tend to update their reference point upwards after a good
outcome realises and downwards after a bad outcome realises. They find that
the magnitude of reference point adaptation following a price change is not
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as large as the magnitude of the price change itself, and any adaptation is
asymmetric with a greater adjustment after good, than after bad outcomes.
This finding replicates in China, South Korea and the USA (Arkes et al.,
2010). In the first treatment of their experiment Arkes et al. (2008) ask the
two following questions.
• Two months ago, you bought a stock for $30 per share. Last month, you
were delighted to learn the stock was trading higher at $36 per share.
This month, you decide to check the stock’s price again. At what price
would the stock need to trade today to make you just as happy with the
stock’s price this month as you were when you learned the stock had
risen from $30 to $36 last month? The average answer was $40.24 with
an implied adaptation of $4.24.
• Two months ago, you bought a stock for $30 per share. Last month,
you were disappointed to learn the stock was trading lower at $24 per
share. This month, you decide to check the stock’s price again. At what
price would the stock need to trade today to make you just as sad with
the stock’s price this month as you were when you learned the stock had
dropped from $30 to $24 last month? The average answer was $21.49
with an implied adaptation of $2.51.
Adaption was found to be greater after gains than after losses of the
same size. The effect replicated, holding expectations constant, including
the possibility of repurchasing the stock and introducing portfolio effect, by
assuming that other stocks were present in the portfolio. Most importantly,
the findings were replicated in a setting which involved financial incentives,
adopting the Becker et al. (1964) procedure. They follow the same procedure
we have just described, with a small change. At the beginning of the trading
round, subjects are told that they purchased a stock at a certain price (p0)
and have held the stock for a week. They are then informed of the current
price p1, which is either higher or lower than their purchase price p0. Also,
they are informed of the two future possible prices of the stock in the next
trading period (p2). Before the realisation of the second period price p2,
subjects have a chance to sell the stock to the experimenter by stating their
minimum selling price. Then, a buying price is randomly drawn between the
two possible future prices. If the randomly drawn buying price exceeds or
equals the subject’s minimum selling price, the subject sells the stock at the
randomly drawn buying price. If the buying price is less than the minimum
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selling price, the subject holds the stock and sells it at the next trading period’s
price p2 which is determined by a coin flip. Under the Becker et al. (1964)
procedure, it is optimal for the subjects to set their minimum selling price
equal to their valuation of the gamble. Thus, the procedure reveals through
subjects’ minimum selling prices their valuations of risky gambles, which in
turn helps us infer how their reference point changes after they experience
gains or losses. The update of the reference point was still higher after gains
than after losses. Starting from a stock price of p0 = $20, the reference point
increased by $5.75 after a $6 increase and it decreased by $5.13 after a $6
dollar decrease.
In a lab experiment, Baucells et al. (2011) elicit the reference point
after individuals experience a streak of payoffs and propose a recursive for-
mula to derive the reference point. In their experiment, subjects were shown
some streams of payoffs and they were subsequently asked the following ques-
tion, to which we will refer as the “emotional neutrality question”: At what
selling price would you feel neutral about the sale of the stock, i.e., be nei-
ther happy nor unhappy about the sale? Values were obtained for 60 differ-
ent streams of payoffs, which pairwise, had only one different characteristic.
For example, take the sequence s2 = {250, 200, 150, 200} and the sequence
s1 = {150, 200, 250, 200}. They have different starting (purchase) prices but
they have the same minimum, maximum, average and final value. Hence, the
average difference that subjects give in the evaluation of the sequences s1 and
s2 accounts for the causal effect of the purchase price on the reference point.
If the subjects gave the same answer to the “emotional neutrality question”
after looking at both sequence s1 and s2 the implications would be that the
purchase price has no effect on the formation of the reference point. Bau-
cells et al. (2011) find that the purchase price and the current price have a
positive and significant correlation with the reference point. The average of
the intermediate prices (200 and 250 in s1) and the maximum price have a
positive but weaker effect on the reference point and they find mixed evidence
for the lowest price. Baucells et al. (2011) also test the impact of two other
characteristics of the price path: dashed hope vs false alarms and early vs
late. In the dashed hope case, an increase precedes a decrease; and in the
false alarm, a decrease precedes an increase. The increases and decreases are
of the same magnitude and the difference in reference points is found to be
highly significant (higher in the dashed hope case). In the early vs late several
combinations of two different patterns unfolded at an early or late stage of
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the payoff stream but no effect was found. Baucells et al. (2011) go on to
estimate a recursive formula and a segregated formula to calculate the refer-
ence point, one of which we will refer to in Section 3.3. The formulas were
tested, through out-of-sample predictions and revealed to have good external
validity. In the context of static decisions, Baillon et al. (2020) discriminate
amongst several alternative reference point rules. In a laboratory experiment,
subjects were faced with the choice amongst several prospects and the refer-
ence point is elicited through a hierarchical Bayesian model. They find that
three models explain around 80% of the choices of their participants. Around
30% used the so called “status quo”1 as the reference point. Around 30% of
the subjects were consistent with the MaxMin rule (use the highest of the
minimal values of all prospects) and around 20% with the “prospect itself” as
the reference point (Delquie´ and Cillo, 2006; Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007).
If the prospect itself is the reference point, then the decision maker will, for
example, re-frame the prospect (0.50, 100; 0.50, 0) as a 25% chance to gain 100
(if she wins 100 and 0 is the reference point, the probability of this happening
is 0.50 × 0.50), a 25% chance to lose 100 (if she wins nothing and 100 is the
reference point), and a 50% chance that she wins or loses nothing (if either
she wins 100 and 100 is the reference point, or she wins nothing and nothing
is the reference point). Finally, in the context of financial trading decisions
Quispe-Torreblanca et al. (2020) measure the disposition effect with respect to
the purchase price and with respect to the price of the last login, in a sample
of British investors. Measuring the disposition effect with respect to the last
login price means that stocks which appreciated since the last login of the
investor are classified as a gain and stocks which depreciated are classified as
a loss. Quispe-Torreblanca et al. (2020) find that investors realise a stock at
a higher rate if the stock is in the gain domain with respect to both reference
points. They also find that the disposition effect with respect to the purchase
price is higher than the disposition effect calculated with respect to the last
login price.
3.3 Alternative reference points for the disposition
effect
We analyse the bank accounts in the LDB dataset where at least a stock for a
gain and at least one for a loss were realised, at any point in time. As we did
1The equivalent of using the purchase price in our case
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in the other chapters, the starting point of an investment is the first time an
investor buys a stock or any time she buys it without the stock being present
in the bank account at that time. The end point of an investment is the first
sale date after that buy date (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Brettschneider and
Burgess, 2017). We define an episode as all the day-stock information between
a buy and a sell date. An episode is classified as a gain if the selling price is
higher or equal than the buy price. It is classified as a loss otherwise. The
summary statistics of the sample are contained in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the sample.
Bank Accounts 29374
Episodes 371403
Episodes per bank account (mean) 12.64
Episodes per bank account (median) 7
Episode length in trading days (average) 227.95
Episode length in trading days (median) 113
To calculate the disposition effect we follow the procedure of Dhar
and Zhu (2006). For each bank account, on any days where at least one
stock is traded, we calculate the Proportion of Gains Realised, PGR, and the
Proportion of Losses Realised, PLR. Then we average over all days at the
account level, to obtain the average DE for any bank account. The proportion
of gains realised is equal to the number of stocks sold for a gain divided by
the number of stocks in the bank account which are trading at a gain on that
day and equivalently for losses to define PLR (see Section 2.4 for a definition
of PGR and PLR). There is a subtle but fundamental difference with what we
did in Chapter 2. There, we stratified over bank account-gain percentage and
then averaged over those two dimensions. Here, we only need to stratify at
the bank account level, since we are not interested into within bank account
variations of the disposition effect. To be more precise, we now calculate the
average disposition effect at the account level. For each bank account A there
is a sequence of days TA where at least one stock is sold. For the number
of days in this set we use #TA. On any day, t ∈ TA, we obtain PGRAt as
the proportion of gains realised on day t in account A and PLRAt as the
proportion of losses realised on day t in account A. DEAt is defined as the
difference between PGRAt and PLRAt. The disposition effect at the account
level DEA is constructed as follows. For each account A we obtain the average
PGRA and the average PLRA. These are temporal averages and can be
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expressed via the formula:
PGRA =
1
#TA
∑
all days t in TA
PGRAt
PLRA =
1
#TA
∑
all days t in TA
PLRAt
(3.1)
The disposition effect for a given account A is then
DEA = PGRA − PLRA (3.2)
Table 3.2: Disposition Effect assuming that the reference point is the
lagged price. Disposition Effect calculated with respect to a lagged reference
point. We defined gains and losses with respect to the price which realised n
days before (given in the second column) and recalculated the DE. To give an
example, in the first line of the column we report the DE calculated in the
following way. We define all stocks whose price increased since the day before
as gains (either paper or realised) and all stocks whose price decreased since
the day before as losses (either paper or realised). We then calculated PGR,
PLR and DE according to this figure. PP stands for Purchase Price. Hence,
the last row reports the original disposition effect.
DE Days
-0.008 1
0.003 2
0.022 3
0.028 4
0.035 5
0.057 10
0.068 15
0.068 20
0.071 30
0.073 40
0.075 50
0.089 PP
As we said in Section 3.1, we will focus on the calculation of the dis-
position effect with respect to alternative reference points. Our investigation
is an “as if” analysis. We cannot elicit the actual reference point of the in-
vestors but we can assume they might have a different reference point from the
purchase price. In our analysis, we look at how the disposition effect changes
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if we change the reference point. A preliminary analysis is reported in Fig-
ure 3.1 and in Table 3.2. There, we report the disposition effect calculated
with respect to several alternative reference points. To make an example the
disposition effect is equal to 0.035 if we assume that the reference point is the
lagged price of a stock, with a lag of 5 trading days. This means that all the
stocks which appreciated with respect to the closing price they had 5 days
earlier, are classified as a gain and otherwise as a loss. We calculated it for
several alternative reference points. In particular, we calculated it only if the
reference point was included in the investment episode. To make it more clear,
the DE calculated taking the 5 days lagged price is calculated only for those
episodes which lasted at least 5 trading days.
What we see is a very clear and sharp pattern. The disposition effect is
higher, the higher is the lag we assume for the reference point. In particular,
if we assume that the investors adopt the previous day price as the reference
point, we see that the disposition effect disappears (it is slightly negative).
This means that the investors do not have a preference for realising stocks
which appreciated with respect to stocks which depreciated from the previous
day. In general, the disposition effect is attenuated for prices which are differ-
ent from the purchase price and it is very low if recent prices (lagged price up
to 5 tradings days) are adopted as the reference point. We find it reassuring
that the trend is increasing as the lag of the reference point is increased. This
makes us think that some psychological process might possibly be at work.
Our investigation is limited from the fact that we do not actually know if
the investors are shifting their attention to some alternative reference points,
different from the purchase price. However, it is illuminating to observe that
the disposition effect is extremely different, if we assume so. The experimental
works we reviewed in Section 3.2 support the view that decision makers in-
corporate information dynamically in a dynamic decision (Arkes et al., 2008;
Baucells et al., 2011). If traders incorporate information unfolding over the
course of an investment episode, this means that the disposition effect is not
so pronounced for them, from a psychological point of view. It is obviously the
case that from an accounting perspective, investors sell their gains too early
and keep their losses for too long. We are not saying that the disposition effect
should not be defined as an investment bias. We are simply suggesting that
from a psychological point of view, this might be a much more limited phe-
nomenon. A decision maker, in this context might not be so prone to realise
gains at a much higher rate than losses, it is just the case that she defines gains
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and losses with respect to a very specific and personal reference point rule.
In Section 3.4 we are going to spell out possible differences in the disposition
effect assuming that the investors adopt any of 4 possible reference point rules
and we are going to investigate which rule minimises the disposition effect for
which category of investors, defining the category based on the length and
frequency of trading. Finally we will focus on two specific rules and see how
investors’ characteristics shape the disposition effect according to those two
rules and which investors swap from a positive to a negative disposition effect
from one rule to the other. Given that the starting point of an investment is
day 1 and the purchase price is equal to p1, the reference point on day n, rn
is defined according to any of the four following rules:
• The reference point is the purchase price (Purchase DE): rn = p1 ∀n;
• The reference point is the average of the last five trading days closing
prices: rn =
∑n−1
i=n−5 pi (Recent DE);
• The reference point is the average of all trading days closing prices since
purchase: rn =
∑n−1
i=1 pi (AvgAll);
• The reference point is obtained from one of the formulas proposed in
Baucells et al. (2011): rn = 0.05p1 + 0.26p1 + 0.09pmediann−1 + 0.49 ∗
Xpn−1 + 0.15pmaxn−1 − 0.01pminn−1 where p1 is the purchase price.
We input the two weights separately to stress that 0.05 is the expected
return, in line with Baucells et al. (2011) derivations, and 0.26 is the
actual weight given to the purchase price. pmediann−1 is the median
price from time 1 to time n-1, pmaxn−1 and pminn−1 are the maximum
and minimum from time 1 to time n-1 respectively (Baucells DE).
They all have a psychological justification. The purchase price is the
reference point usually adopted to calculate the disposition effect and it is
the reference point from an accounting point of view. The Recent rule char-
acterises an extreme case of updating, an investor who is only focused on
the most recent realisations of the price. Recency effects are documented
in the psychological and economic literature. Recent prices or wages easily
come to mind since recent experiences are close to the current one on the
time dimension, and influence judgment even if they are normatively irrele-
vant (DellaVigna et al., 2017). The psychological literature suggests that, in
highly auto-correlated settings (the stock market is such a case), forgetting,
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and relying on small sets of the most recent experiences, can be very effec-
tive (Anderson and Schooler, 1991; Schooler and Hertwig, 2005). The AvgAll
rule is inspired by the idea that investors might give the same weight to all
the intermediate price of an investment, something similar to the context of
Andrikogiannopoulou and Papakonstantinou (2019) but with a non decaying
weight for past information. Finally, the rule inspired by Baucells et al. (2011)
might look too complicated and a not very realistic description of investors’
way of reasoning but it is just a different framing of the AvgAll rule. It is
a rule where all the information which unfolded since the purchase date is
taken into account, but different weights are given to different salient features
of the price path. Before we move to a detailed discussion of our results, we
would like to stress two practical points about the PGR and PLR definitions.
First, we define a position as trading at a gain on a given day if the closing
price on that day2 is higher or equal than the reference point. Odean (1998)
originally defined a stock as trading at a gain if the minimum price on a given
day was higher than the purchase price. If the purchase price was between the
minimum and the maximum on a given day, that stock was neither defined
as a gain nor as a loss, on that day. We made our choice, to avoid a drastic
reduction of stocks classified as gains and losses, when using the alternative
rules. Take for example the Recent rule. If we stuck to the original definition
of Odean (1998) we would have classified a stock as a gain, only if the mini-
mum price on a given day was higher than the average of the closing prices in
the five previous days. This would have excluded many observations. In any
case, we measured the Purchase disposition effect by following Odean (1998)
very closely and by adopting our approach and the difference between the two
was negligible. Second, the number of bank accounts for which we are able to
measure the disposition effect slightly changes from one rule to the other. The
reason is easily explained. We analyse the bank accounts where at least one
gain and one loss are realised. Imagine the extreme case of a bank account
where only one gain and one loss are realised. When we switch the reference
point from the Purchase rule to, say, the Recent rule, they might be both
classified as gains. Hence PLR would not be defined and we would not be able
to obtain the disposition effect according to the Recent rule. This happens
only for a few bank accounts.
2The selling price on selling days.
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3.4 Results
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.2 show that the disposition effect can change substan-
tially if we assume alternative reference points for the investors. In particular,
the Recent rule leads to the lowest disposition effect, while all the other rules
do not lead to big changes. Given the pattern we observed in Figure 3.1, this
is not surprising. There, we saw that assuming a lag in the reference point
of a few days from the running price, led to a strong decrease in the dispo-
sition effect, with respect to the Purchase rule. This is reflected by the very
small value for the Recent DE. However, assuming a longer lag in the refer-
ence point only led to a small decrease in the disposition effect. That is the
case when we take into account the AvgAll disposition effect. The AvgAll is
slightly smaller (not significantly smaller) than the Purchase DE. This reflects
the preponderant effect that realisations of the price further in time have on
the formation of this reference point. Finally, the Baucells inspired rule leads
to a higher disposition effect than the Purchase rule. This is a consequence
of the weight given to the maximum price in the derivation of the reference
point, according to this rule. A weight of 15% given to the maximum price
can push the reference point to a much higher level than all the other rules.
This leads more observation to fall in the losses domain, a fortiori. Hence, if
we believe that Baucells et al. (2011) give a representative description of the
reference point formation, this means that the disposition effect represents a
true preference that investors have for realising gains with respect to losses.
Actually, this is even more pronounced than what we have so far observed by
using the purchase price as the reference point. It should be noticed that the
salient features of a series of prices might be more salient for a short series.
Hence, the weights which were estimated by Baucells et al. (2011) in the lab
are not easily transferable into the field. However, we believe that some salient
features have a relevant impact on the decisions of investors. To make an ex-
ample very close to our discussion, in Chapter 1 we highlighted how relevant
the time and level of the past maximum price can be for the decision to realise
a stock.
We go on to investigate the differences among investors, asking which
rule minimises the disposition effect for them. We are not suggesting that
the investor has the goal of minimising the disposition effect. However, we
are interested in understanding the impact of the different reference point
formation rules on the disposition effect. We checked which rule minimises the
disposition effect for any investor and compared them based on the average
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Table 3.3: Disposition Effect with four different reference point
rules. We defined gains and losses with respect to four different reference
point and calculated the DE accordingly. The reference point is: 1) Pur-
chase: the purchase price; 2) Recent: the average of the last five trad-
ing days price; 3) AvgAll: the average of all prices since purchase; 4)
Baucells, a weighted average of prices derived by Baucells et al. (2011):
0.31 ∗ (purchase price) + 0.09× (median rice) + 0.49× (1 day lagged price) +
0.15× (maximumprice)− 0.01× (minimumprice).
DE Rule
0.089 Purchase
0.026 Recent
0.082 AvgAll
0.111 Baucells
Figure 3.2: Disposition Effect with four different reference point rules.
We defined gains and losses with respect to four different reference points
and calculated the DE accordingly. The reference point is: 1) Purchase: the
purchase price; 2) Recent: the average of the last five trading days price;
3) AvgAll: the average of all prices since purchase; 4) Baucells, a weighted
average of prices derived by Baucells et al. (2011): 0.31 ∗ (purchaseprice) +
0.09 ∗ (medianprice) + 0.49 ∗ (1daylaggedprice) + 0.15 ∗ (maximumprice) −
0.01 ∗ (minimumprice).
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Table 3.4: Reference point minimising rule for the Disposition Effect.
Number of bank accounts for which the disposition effect is minimised by a
specific reference point rule. We only included bank accounts for which the
disposition effect is minimised by a singles reference point rule. The reference
point is: 1) Purchase: the purchase price; 2) Recent: the average of the last
five trading days price; 3) AvgAll: the average of all prices since purchase;
4) Baucells, a weighted average of prices derived by Baucells et al. (2011):
0.31 ∗ (purchaseprice) + 0.09 ∗ (medianprice) + 0.49 ∗ (1daylaggedprice) +
0.15 ∗ (maximumprice)− 0.01 ∗ (minimumprice).
Number Rule
3422 Purchase
9528 Recent
3573 AvgAll
3922 Baucells
Figure 3.3: Reference point minimising rule for the Disposition Ef-
fect: Average number of episodes. Average number of episodes for each
set of bank accounts for which the disposition effect is minimised by a specific
reference point rule. We only included bank accounts for which the dispo-
sition effect is minimised by a singles reference point rule. The reference
point is: 1) Purchase: the purchase price; 2) Recent: the average of the last
five trading days price; 3) AvgAll: the average of all prices since purchase;
4) Baucells, a weighted average of prices derived by Baucells et al. (2011):
0.31 ∗ (purchaseprice) + 0.09 ∗ (medianprice) + 0.49 ∗ (1daylaggedprice) +
0.15 ∗ (maximumprice)− 0.01 ∗ (minimumprice).
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Figure 3.4: Reference point minimising rule for the Disposition Ef-
fect: Average episode length in trading days. Average episode length
in trading days, for each set of bank accounts for which the disposition ef-
fect is minimised by a specific reference point rule. We only included bank
accounts for which the disposition effect is minimised by a singles reference
point rule. The reference point is: 1) Purchase: the purchase price; 2) Re-
cent: the average of the last five trading days price; 3) AvgAll: the average of
all prices since purchase; 4) Baucells, a weighted average of prices derived by
Baucells et al. (2011): 0.31 ∗ (purchaseprice) + 0.09 ∗ (medianprice) + 0.49 ∗
(1daylaggedprice) + 0.15 ∗ (maximumprice)− 0.01 ∗ (minimumprice).
Table 3.5: Purchase DE and Recent DE comparison: Disposition Ef-
fect presence. Percentage of bank accounts which show the disposition effect
under Purchase or Recent rule. We defined gains and losses with respect to
two different reference points and calculated the DE accordingly. The refer-
ence point is: 1) Purchase: the purchase price; 2) Recent: the average of the
last five trading days price.
NO Recent DE YES Recent DE
NO Purchase DE 0.32 0.12
YES Purchase DE 0.20 0.35
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Figure 3.5: Positive to negative Disposition Effect under two reference
point rules: Number of episodes and Average episode length. Left:
Average number of episodes for bank accounts. Right: Average episode length
for bank accounts. YES to NO is the set of bank accounts for which the
disposition effect is strictly positive under the purchase reference point and
zero or negative under the recent reference point. NO to YES is is the set
of bank accounts for which the disposition effect is strictly positive under the
recent reference point and zero or negative under the purchase reference point.
Purchase reference point rule defines gains and losses w.r.t. the purchase price.
Recent reference point rule defines gains and losses w.r.t. the average of the
last five trading days price.
number of episodes and the average length of their trades. We take into
account only bank accounts for which the disposition effect is minimised by
a single rule. To make an example, if the disposition effect for a given bank
account is 0.03 following the Purchase rule, 0.04 following the Recent rule,
0.05 following the AvgAll rule and 0.03 following Baucells rule, this account is
not considered, since there is a tie between the Purchase rule and the Baucells
rule. Most of the bank accounts (83%) for which we were able to obtain the
disposition effects under all the four rules, have the disposition effect minimised
by a single rule. From Table 3.4 we see that the number of bank accounts for
which the Recent rule minimises the disposition effect is almost as big as the
number of the bank accounts for which the other three rules minimise the
disposition effect. For 9528 bank accounts the Recent rule leads to the lowest
possible measure of the disposition effect. This was to be expected, given
what we saw in Table 3.3. On average, assuming recent price realisations as
the reference point induces a lower disposition effect. Now, we see that the
Recent rule minimises the disposition effect for most of the bank accounts. We
also checked differences of the bank account for which the disposition effect is
minimised by a specific rule (Figure 3.3). Before discussing them, we would
like to point out that in our discussion we focus on two characteristics of the
bank accounts: number of trades and average trade length. We investigated
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differences induced by other demographic characteristics (Dhar and Zhu, 2006)
but since we did not find significant differences and since demographics are
only available for a limited sample of individuals, we decided to focus on a
bigger sample and on trading frequency and length, only. We find that the
group of bank accounts for which the disposition effect is minimised by the
Purchase rule is characterised by a lower number of investment episodes. On
the other hand, the group of bank account for which the disposition effect is
minimised by the Recent rule is made of those bank account which registered
the highest number of trades. In principle, we can expect investors with lower
trading frequency (value investors) to rely more upon the purchase price as
their reference point and traders with higher trading frequency to be more
likely to incorporate recent price realisations in their reference point. This
expectation is due to the fact that traders who trade more frequently are
more likely to often log in their bank account. Hence, information unfolding
over the course of an investment is more salient in their mind. We find that the
purchase price, which is most likely to describe the reference point mechanism
for value investors, leads to a lower disposition effect for that group. Recent
price realisations, which are more likely to form the reference point of frequent
traders, lead to a lower disposition effect for them. This is not conclusive
evidence on the weakness of the disposition effect but it is somehow reassuring
that the most likely reference point updating rule for each type of investors,
also leads to a lower disposition effect for that group.
In Figure 3.4 we report the average length in trading days of the
episodes contained in those bank accounts for which a specific rule minimises
the disposition effect. This is an average of averages. We obtained the average
length of trades for any bank account and then reported the average of that
figure for any category. The bank accounts for which the Baucells rule leads
to the minimum disposition effect are characterised by shorter trades, while
the bank accounts for which the Purchase rule leads to the lowest possible dis-
position effect are characterised by longer trades. The Baucells rule is based
on the salience of some features of the price process. We believe that those
features are more likely to be salient in a shorter investment. What we find
is that those investors who we believe are more likely to adopt the Baucells
rule, are also those for whom the Baucells rule leads to the lowest possible
disposition effect. A final thought on the fact that the Purchase rule is more
likely to minimise the disposition effect for investors who trade less times for a
longer number of days. We have already argued that we expect value investors
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to rely more upon the purchase price as their reference point. Value investors
make less trades and their trades are longer. The Purchase price leads to the
lowest possible measure of the disposition effect for them. We believe that
value investors are able to develop some detachment from current price reali-
sations and they might be less emotionally involved by ups and downs of the
stocks. We are not surprised that, even when looking at the purchase price,
this leads to a low disposition effect, for them.
We now restrict our focus to the comparison between the disposition
effect induced by the Purchase rule and the disposition effect induced by the
Recent rule. First of all we look at the so called “swappers”. We started this
chapter saying that, by assuming an alternative reference point rule to the
purchase price, we could have observed a lower disposition effect. We already
saw that the Recent rule induces, on average, a lower disposition effect. Here,
we check for how many investors this is true. Table 3.5 reports the percentage
of investors who show the disposition effect under the two rules. We say that
the disposition effect is positive if the proportion of gains realised is strictly
bigger than the proportion of losses realised. We observe that 32% of the
bank accounts do not show a positive disposition effect under either rule,
while 35% have a positive disposition effect under both rules. Later in our
discussion, we will focus on those bank accounts for which the disposition
effect is reduced by the Recent rule (without necessarily going from a positive
to a negative disposition effect), with respect to the Purchase rule, but for now
we restrict our attention to the set of the swappers. 20% of the bank accounts
show a disposition effect under the Purchase rule but do not show it under the
Recent rule, while 12% show the opposite pattern. Hence, the number of bank
accounts where the disposition effect disappears as a consequence of the change
in the reference point (from the purchase price to the average of recent prices)
is higher than the number of bank accounts for which the reference point arises
as a consequence of the change in the reference point. Figure 3.5 shows the
differences in the characteristics of the two groups of swappers. Those who
do not show the disposition effect under the Purchase rule but show it under
the Recent rule, complete less trades but their trades are longer. Those who
show the disposition effect under the Recent rule but do not show it under the
Purchase rule, complete more trades and their trades are shorter.
We see a difference between those investors who can be defined as
“buy and hold” (or value investors) and those who can be defined as “frequent
traders”. We appreciate the fact that probably not all investors in a group
76
are “buy and hold” and vice-versa. We will give a much more fine grained
analysis of the behaviour of investors based on their trading frequency, in a
moment. For now, we can say that the most likely reference point updating
rule for each type of investors also leads to a lower disposition effect for that
group.
Finally, we compare the Purchase rule and the Recent rule from a
detailed perspective. We will focus on four characteristics and see how they
vary as the number of episodes in a bank account and the average length of
trades in a bank account change:
• Purchase disposition effect;
• Recent disposition effect;
• Percentage of bank account for which the Purchase disposition effect is
greater or equal than the Recent disposition effect;
• Average difference between the Purchase disposition effect and the Re-
cent disposition effect. It is obtained as follows: for any bank account we
take the difference of the two measures, obtained for that bank account,
and we plot the average of the bank account level differences.
First, Figure 3.6 shows how these variables change, depending on the
number of episodes in a bank account. We find that the Purchase disposition
effect has an inverse-U shaped relationship with the number of trades. The
impact of the number of trades on the disposition effect had been investigated
by Dhar and Zhu (2006). They found that trading frequency is negatively
correlated to the disposition effect. However, they did not take into account
investors with few trades3 and they only included the number of trades as a
linear predictor of the disposition effect, hence they could not capture any non
linear effects. Given this premise, we believe that our conclusion and theirs
are consistent one with the other. This finding is consistent with the idea that
trading frequency eliminates the endowment effect. The more investors trade,
the lower is the disposition effect. The Recent disposition effect is constant
for any level of trading frequency but it drops down sharply for investors who
trade very frequently (more than 40 times in the 6 years period).
Investors who trade more are more likely to log in their account very
frequently. Hence, we believe they are more likely to adopt the Recent rule
3They excluded those who traded less than once per year, hence all the investors who
traded less than 6 times in the 6 year period and possibly some of the other groups as well.
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to form their reference point, since recent realisations of the price are more
salient in their mind. We see that those investors have a lower disposition
effect, according to the Recent rule. Turning our attention to the differences
among the two measure we see that in the group of investors who trade more
than 40 times the percentage of investors for which the Recent rule leads to a
strictly lower disposition effect than the Purchase rule is as high as 75% and
the absolute difference among the two is very high. For that group of investors,
the two rules give two very different estimates of the disposition effect. This
takes our reasoning to the extreme. Those investors trade very frequently and
because of that they must log in their account very often. Hence, the Recent
rule is probably a very good description of their reference point formation
process. That rule also leads to a low disposition effect for many of them.
One tentative explanation is that the disposition effect is lower, if we adopt
the appropriate reference point rule.
Second, Figure 3.7 looks at the changes induced by the average trade
length, measured in trading days. We remind that the disposition effect is
always measured at the bank account level. Hence, when we refer, for exam-
ple, to the average disposition effect when trading length is between 2 and 6
months, we refer to the average disposition effect for those bank account where
the average length of trades, at the account level, is between 2 and 6 months.
The Recent disposition effect does not change substantially as trading length
changes. However, the Purchase disposition effect decreases for traders whose
trades are longer. Investors whose trades are longer are “buy and hold” indi-
viduals. For them, the Purchase disposition effect is very low, confirming our
preliminary estimates from the previous observations. As the average trading
length increases, the percentage of traders for whom the Purchase disposition
effect is higher than the Recent disposition effect decreases. If, again, we as-
sume that value investors are more likely to use the purchase price as their
reference point, we see that they have a lower disposition effect if we calculate
it using that rule.
One relevant issue is the interaction between trading frequency and
trades length. There might be traders who trade a lot and whose trades are
short and traders who trade a lot and whose trades are very long. We now
disentangle the differences due to the combination of these two characteristics.
We look at the differences we investigated, based on trading length, but we
split the analysis by number of episodes categories. From Figures 3.9 and 3.10
we see that in the group of subjects who completed 7 to 10 trades (11 to 40
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trades) the general pattern we observed is replicated (almost) perfectly. In the
group of traders who completed less than 6 trades (see Figure 3.8), we find a
lower level of both measures of the disposition effect and we find that they both
increase with the average trades length, but the increase is not strong. This is
a departure from the general pattern, especially for the Purchase disposition
effect. However, given that the measures are based on only a few observations
(only a few selling days) we refrain from over-interpreting these findings. In
the group of frequent traders (more than 40 trades in the 6 years window) we
also see some departures from the general trend. In particular, the Purchase
disposition effect is very high for investors whose trades are short.
Very active traders (see Figure 3.11), who possibly try to take advan-
tage of short price movements, are more prone to the disposition effect. This
complements the idea that high frequency in trading activity can increase in-
vestment biases (Barber and Odean, 2000). Most importantly, we see that the
percentage of traders for whom the Recent rule is lower than the Purchase rule
is always very high and does not decline steadily as trading length increases.
We stress once more that the Recent rule might be a better description of ref-
erence point formation for very active traders. We see that this rule leads to a
lower disposition effect for many of them, independently of the length of their
trades. We have not found conclusive evidence on our question yet. However,
the evidence suggests that traders who are more likely to adhere to a given
reference point rule, also see a greater reduction in the disposition effect if that
rule is adopted. Hence, there is the possibility that the disposition effect is a
smaller effect than what has been so far hypothesised, from a psychological
point of view.
3.5 Reference point and disposition effect: a new
perspective
In this chapter we addressed three points:
• Is it possible that the disposition effect does not exist or it is very at-
tenuated, from a psychological point of view?
• Can we find a reasonable reference point formation rule which supports
this statement?
• Are there different rules which attenuate the disposition effect for differ-
ent investors’ categories?
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First of all, we would like to stress the point that we do not have access
to investors’ belief and we can only hypothesise that they evaluate stocks with
respect to some alternative reference point, other than the purchase price.
Our hypothesis is supported by the experimental evidence (Arkes et al., 2008;
Baucells et al., 2011) but we could not test it with our data. However, we
reached one conclusion for sure: there is at least one alternative reference
point rule which leads to a lower disposition effect. We took the, so called,
Recent reference point rule to define the disposition effect. The Recent rule
prescribes that the reference point in an investment is the average of the last
five price realisations. Take for example an investment which started on day 1.
The reference point on, say, day 18, is the average of the prices from day 13 to
day 17. We defined gains and losses with respect to this rule and we found that
this led to a decrease in the disposition effect of 70%. This is an advancement
into the study of the relationship between reference point updating and the
disposition effect, per se. We reached the conclusion that there is at least one
rule which leads to a strong reduction of the disposition effect. In principle,
it was possible that we could not find any rule which led to a decrease in the
disposition effect. We cannot obviously claim causality but we are not the first
to propose the idea that recent price realisations are salient in the mind of an
investor (Arkes et al., 2008; DellaVigna et al., 2017; Quispe-Torreblanca et al.,
2020). We also tested alternative reference point formation rules but those did
not drastically impact the disposition effect. However, from that analysis we
saw that some heterogeneity among investors might be present. Alternative
rules lead to the minimisation of the disposition effect for different types of
investors.
The main differences are linked to the number of trading episodes com-
pleted by the traders and the average trading length of the trading episodes.
We detected several patterns but one was really decisive: the split among
traders who trade less often for longer time and the traders who trade more
but for shorter time. There are obviously several nuances in traders’ behaviour
but those are the two extremes. On the one hand, the set of value investors,
the “buy and hold” investors who trade a few stocks and keep them for a
long time. On the other hand, the set of frequent traders. We argued that,
if we had to guess which reference point rule best describes reference point
formation of the two groups, we would expect that the value investors would
be more anchored to the purchase price and the frequent traders to recent
price realisations. What we observe is that, on average, the disposition effect
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induced by the purchase price is linked to a lower disposition, especially for
those who trade longer. On the other hand, the disposition effect induced by
recent price realisations is linked to a lower disposition effect for those traders
who trade more. The debate is not obviously concluded but this is the first
evidence that some alternative reference point rules might lead to a sensible
decline in the disposition effect. On top of that, the most likely reference point
updating rule for each type of investors, also leads to a lower disposition effect
for that group. More evidence is needed on the process of reference point
formation for traders but this is a first step towards the conclusion that the
disposition effect might be a weaker phenomenon, from a psychological point
of view.
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Chapter 4
Age, Income and Time
Discounting
4.1 Introduction
A now-widespread critique of judgement and decision making research is that
it focuses on a relatively small part of the human universe or what Hen-
rich et al. (2010) call the WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialised Rich and
Democratic) world. Researchers have responded to this critique by seeking to
generalise findings beyond this group, and to investigate how factors which
differ between the WEIRD world and the rest of the world matter. The im-
portance of understanding individual and national differences and how they
contribute to economic outcomes for individuals and nations can hardly be
overstated. In this chapter we contribute to this project by investigating pa-
tience in intertemporal choices in a large sample of individuals all over the
world, varying in age, education, income, religion and the nature of their na-
tional cultural, economic and political conditions.
Patience, or the willingness to defer current consumption in exchange
for greater future consumption, may be one of the most important individual
characteristics. Patience in childhood plays an important role in the devel-
opment of successful and well-functioning adults (Mischel et al., 1989), and
is also associated with a variety of factors in adulthood (Madden and Bickel,
2010). Patience has also been hypothesised to underpin vital pathways to
growth and development. For instance, the willingness to invest in a long
term project with larger overall rewards is one driver of the adoption of new
technologies and hence the development and growth of economies (Ramsey,
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1928). A population with more patient entrepreneurs will naturally invest
in more long term projects. Many models of economic development such as
Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans models or model of accumulation of the stocks of
physical capital, human capital, or research intensity involve a key role for
time preference (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008;
Galor and O¨zak, 2016; Sarid and Galor, 2017; Dohmen et al., 2018).
We investigate the role of patience at both an individual and collective
level by means of a dataset that combines fine-grained individual level data
with international coverage and representation. This is the Gallup End of Year
Survey whose questions allow us to investigate the microeconomic and socio-
demographic determinants of patience on an individual level. We consider how
these relationships differ across different groups within and between countries
and regions, and ask how macroeconomic variables such as GDP relate to
the level of patience of members of the population. We included a simple
measure of time preference designed to elicit individual time preference while
controlling for differences in purchasing power across individuals and nations.
We emphasise what we can learn about individual characteristics and
their universality, and especially how patience is related to age and income.
As reviewed in the next section, these characteristics have previously been
connected to patience, both theoretically and empirically, but the interaction
between them has not been tested empirically. Moreover, our large interna-
tional sample and substantial selection of individual characteristics enable us
to test the robustness and generality of any observed relationships. Our main
result is that our measure of patience shows a clear interaction with age and
wealth. At a young age, people of all income groups show roughly the same
likelihood of choosing a larger later over a smaller sooner option, but with
age this changes. Richest older people are considerably more patient than
poor older people; poor older people are considerably less patient than poor
younger people, and younger people are just as patient, no matter what their
income is.
We also discuss the relationship between patience and a host of other
important individual characteristics, notably sex, employment, religion, eco-
nomic optimism, education, and even attitudes toward vaccines. We report
that women are more impatient than men, atheists more patient than protes-
tants, who are more patient than other religious groups. Greater economic
optimism, more education, and more positive attitudes toward vaccines’ effec-
tiveness are associated with greater patience. Employed people, students and
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housewives are more patient than unemployed and retired or disabled indi-
viduals. These analyses are apparently universal, since they hold even when
the effects of country are accounted for by means of fixed effects models, or
several alternative ways of taking into account within country correlations.
We then develop a simple and easily measurable index of country aver-
age patience and relate it to national characteristics. We find that, in order of
relevance, higher GDP per capita, higher life expectancy, lower interest rates,
higher Private Credit to GDP, higher distance from the Equator, higher level
of Individualism, lower level of Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede and Bond,
1988; Hofstede, 2001) and lower level of inflation are positively and signifi-
cantly correlated to our measure of patience. Countries whose main language
is weakly future oriented (Chen, 2013) and countries whose Future Orienta-
tion Index (Preis et al., 2012) is higher show a higher level of patience, but
the correlations we find are not statistically significant. We do not find any
correlation with the Long Term Orientation index, debt to GDP rate, growth
rate or gross savings rate. Most importantly, our measure of patience is highly
and significantly correlated to the one proposed by Falk et al. (2018) and the
one proposed by Wang et al. (2016), but it is much easier to elicit.
4.2 Some hypotheses on age, income and their ef-
fect on time discounting
Time discounting is a multifarious concept, but at its heart is the idea that,
from the perspective of an agent deciding at a given time, consumption closer
to that time is viewed as more valuable than consumption farther from that
time. This specific claim is not generally the object of empirical investiga-
tion, which focuses on proxy measures, mostly on tradeoffs between money or
goods over time. While these proxy measures can be objected to on theoretical
grounds (Ramsey, 1928; Cubitt and Read, 2007), they nonetheless are associ-
ated with individual differences in patience-related outcomes, such as smoking,
obesity and financial well-being (Chabris et al., 2008). Perhaps the main rea-
son they do reflect individual differences is narrow bracketing, in that people
can generally be relied upon to ignore opportunity costs and therefore to make
intertemporal monetary tradeoffs much as they might make consumption or
“utility” tradeoffs (Andreoni et al., 2018). It is therefore largely believed that
intertemporal choices for money do reflect, at least to some degree, underlying
time preferences for consumption (Andreoni et al., 2018).
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One personal characteristic that has long been associated with dis-
counting is wealth. Even the earliest economists who made time preference
a special focus of study universally expected the poor would discount the fu-
ture more than the wealthy (Loewenstein, 1992). Sometimes this expectation
was based on the crushing effects of poverty itself (Fisher, 1930), sometimes
on other correlates of poverty such as lack of education (Strotz, 1955), and
sometimes impatience was expected to be the cause of poverty in itself (Ram-
sey, 1928). Fisher (1930) provided both rational and irrational explanations:
“This influence of poverty is partly rational, because of the importance, by
supplying present needs, of keeping up the continuity of life and thus main-
taining the ability to cope with the future; and partly irrational, because the
pressure of present needs blinds a person to the needs of the future.” In line
with the “rational” argument, Becker and Mulligan (1997) famously suggested
that the poor should rationally discount more. They argued that discounting
is inversely related to how much is invested in thinking about the future, and
that the poor discount more because they have a bleak future which they do
not want to spend time thinking about.
Empirical research has supported this prediction. Greater wealth is as-
sociated with a lower rate of time discounting. This is true in experimental or
survey studies (Green et al., 1996; Poulos and Whittington, 2000; Meier and
Sprenger, 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010), in estimates drawn from consumption
data (Lawrance, 1991), and in field studies of choice behaviour (Hausman,
1979; Warner and Pleeter, 2001). Even experiments in which “wealth” is
manipulated artificially show the same people discount the future more heav-
ily when they are induced to think of themselves as poor rather than rich
(Haushofer et al., 2013; Bickel et al., 2016).
Age is also widely believed to affect impatience. Unlike wealth, how-
ever, predictions concerning the effects of age differ widely because there are
so many factors that might influence discounting over the lifespan, and these
factors do not always work in the same direction. It was again Fisher who
offered one of the earliest and most comprehensive accounts of the relation-
ship. The following lengthy passage, provides a vivid portrait of how a single
individual’s time preference will change over the lifespan and the factors that
influence it:
Everyone at some time in his life doubtless changes his degree
of impatience for income. In the course of an ordinary lifetime
the changes in a man’s degree of impatience are probably of the
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following general character: as a child he will have a high degree of
impatience because of his lack of foresight and self-control; when
he reaches the age of young manhood he may still have a high
degree of impatience, but for a different reason, namely, because
he then expects a large future income. He expects to get on in
the world, and he will have a high degree of impatience because of
the relative abundance of the imagined future as compared with
the realised present. When he gets a little further along, and has
a family, the result may be a low degree of impatience, because
then the needs of the future rather than its endowment will appeal
to him. He will not think that he is going to be so very rich; on
the contrary, he will wonder how he is going to get along with so
many mouths to feed. He looks forward to the future expenses of
his wife and children with the idea of providing for them an idea
which makes for a high relative regard for the future and a low
relative regard for the present. Then when he gets a little older,
if his children are married and have gone out into the world and
are well able to take care of themselves, he may again have a high
degree of impatience for income, because he expects to die, and he
thinks, “Instead of piling up for the remote future, why shouldn’t
I enjoy myself during the few years that remain?” (Fisher, 1930)
Fisher emphasises multiple determinants of the age/discounting relationship.
Foresight, self-control, expectations and the bequest motive all play a role to
produce a “U-shaped” time course of discounting, with the greatest discount-
ing amongst the young and the old. Other theoretical accounts also predict
a U-shaped time course. These have a similar flavour to Fisher’s although
they differ in the details (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Sozou and Seymour,
2003; Chu et al., 2010). In line with this, several studies have reported this
U-shaped pattern, or at least data highly suggestive of it, using standard dis-
counting tasks (Harrison et al., 2002; Read and Read, 2004; Bruderer Enzler
et al., 2014; Falk et al., 2018; Richter and Mata, 2018).
The U-shaped pattern is by no means the only theoretical prediction
available, nor the only empirical result in the literature. Rogers (1994) devel-
oped the idea that discounting is a function of evolutionary fitness, and argued
(approximately) that since younger people can transform resources into chil-
dren much more easily than can older ones, younger people will discount at a
higher rate. This pattern of the observed discount rate declining with age has
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also been reported frequently (Green et al., 1996, 1997; Reimers et al., 2009;
Lahav et al., 2010; Lo¨ckenhoff et al., 2011; Sparrow and Spaniol, 2018).
Another theoretical approach is that of Trostel and Taylor (2001) who
proposed that discounting would be greater amongst the old than the young,
because the ability to enjoy consumption decreased at an accelerating rate
amongst the old. A pattern consistent with this has been reported by several
researchers (Cropper et al., 1994; Kirby et al., 2002; Seaman et al., 2016;
Eppinger et al., 2017). Moreover, to add to the diversity, some studies find no
effect of age on discounting (Chao et al., 2009).
The diverse observed effects of age are what we would expect if, as
already anticipated by Fisher (1930), there are many motives influencing dis-
counting that can vary with age yet for different groups the different motives
differ in their relative importance. For instance, Rogers (1994) evolutionary
fitness argument combined with a bequest motive could suggest older people
will discount at a very low rate – if your personal reproductive capacity is
restricted, but you have children or grandchildren who can benefit from your
support, then you might discount at a very low rate to increase the fitness of
your offspring. But this might depend on the personal comfort of these older
people. Someone who anticipates rapid decline in their ability to enjoy life
might discount at a high rate, as suggested by Trostel and Taylor (2001) and
in the passage by Irving Fisher, because they believe that now is their last
opportunity to eke some pleasure from their life. The balance between these
motives would produce a “net” discount rate that might decrease or increase
or stay constant with age.
One opportunity we took with our study was to investigate the inter-
action between ageing, income, and discount rates. The possibility that the
effect of age on discounting depends on financial circumstances has, with two
exceptions we know of (Green et al., 1996; Epper et al., 2020), not previously
been discussed. Green et al. (1996) investigated the wealth/income relation-
ship but were unable to obtain the four cells of data needed to test for the
age/income interaction. They did show a wealth effect, however, with older
wealthier people discounting less than older poorer people. They did not lo-
cate a poor group of young people, but they did find that older wealthy people
discounted at the same rate as younger wealthy people, suggesting that dis-
counting might not change with age, at least for the well-off. It is natural,
however, to imagine that age and poverty might interact. In particular, one
reason not to expect big differences at younger age is the idea, suggested also
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by Fisher, that a young person is expected to be optimistic and forward look-
ing, independently from the financial situation. In this study we are able to
investigate the relationship between discounting and different levels of income.
The literature has been mainly focused on the relation between discounting
and wealth. However, we only have access to income information and we
will use it as a proxy of wealth. The literature suggests we should find that
discounting will decrease with wealth overall, and the one study by Green
et al. (1996) suggests that for the wealthy, discounting will not change with
age. There are many reasons to expect a specific interaction, in which the
population of wealthy old people is more patient on average than poorer old
people. This can occur both if greater patience “causes” wealth with age,
as suggested by Ramsey (1928), or greater wealth “causes” greater patience
with age, as suggested by Becker and Mulligan (1997). Unravelling the joint
effect of income and age will be the main scopus of our work. Both Ramsey
(1928) and Becker and Mulligan (1997) foster the expectation that the gap in
patience between individuals in good financial conditions and individuals in
bad financial conditions should increase with age, with patience being greater
for individuals in good financial conditions. This claim is supported by the
evidence presented by Epper et al. (2020). In their work, they measure dis-
counting at one point in time and check where individuals ranked in the wealth
distribution, over their lifespan. They find that those who are more patient
are consistently wealthier. Epper et al. (2020) support the view that patience
“causes” wealth with age and they attribute the effect to savings. In their
sample, patience predicts big differences in the wealth ranking of individuals
who are not credit constraint and can freely invest and borrow their money,
only. This is in line with the explanation proposed by Ramsey (1928).
4.3 Discounting around the world
There have been other studies that measure discounting at the international
level, allowing for comparison across countries, while examining individual,
cultural, economic and geographic differences and how they are related to
future oriented thinking.
Our closest predecessors are Wang et al. (2016) and Falk et al. (2018).
Wang et al. (2016) collected data from 53 countries using a large-scale in-
ternational survey on time preferences comprising almost 7000 undergraduate
students in Economics, Finance or Business Administration. Time preferences
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were measured by asking three questions. First, their participants chose be-
tween “$3400 dollars this month” and “$3800 dollars next month”. Then, they
were asked to state the delayed payments which would make them indifferent
between $100 now and that payment in one year, or in ten years. Wang et al.
(2016) tested whether demographic variables, economic factors, and a range
of individual differences predicted patience. They found a small effect of age,
with older students more willing to choose the $3800 reward than younger
ones. However, age differences in a sample of students are really small. Three
of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001), measured at the individual
level, were found to have an impact on discounting. The three cultural factors
were what Hofstede referred to as Individualism, Uncertainty avoidance, and
Long Term Orientation1. Higher levels of uncertainty avoidance were asso-
ciated with stronger hyperbolic discounting and higher present bias, whereas
higher degrees of individualism and long term orientation were associated with
a stronger tendency to wait for larger payoffs. GDP per capita as well, was
positively associated with the tendency to wait for larger payoffs.
Falk et al. (2018) conducted a major study of global variation in eco-
nomic preferences using their own proprietary Global Preferences Survey (GPS).
As well as time preferences, they measured risk preference, positive and neg-
ative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 respondents in 76 countries.
Time preferences were measured by means of a quantitative and a qualitative
measure (Falk et al., 2016). The quantitative measure involved five hypothet-
ical binary choices between an immediate and delayed payment. The specific
items asked depended on the respondents’ answers to previous questions using
a “staircase” method, and the monetary amounts were expressed in the re-
spective local currency, scaled relative to the median household income in the
given country. The qualitative measure was a self-assessment of the willingness
to wait based on the statement “how willing are you to give up something that
is beneficial for you today in order to benefit more from that in the future?”.
Falk et al. (2018) combined the two measures to create a patience index. At
the individual level, they found that patience varies with age, in a hump-
shaped pattern: middle-aged individuals were the most patient, compared
with the young and the elderly. Patience was also higher for individuals with
1The labels for Hofstede (2001) scales may be misleading taken on their own, so it
is worth mentioning the specific measures. In Section 4.4 we carefully explain how these
measures were taken and we spell out the differences between Wang et al. (2016) approach
to measure Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and the one followed by Hofstede, on which Falk
et al. (2018) and we rely.
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higher cognitive ability and individuals with higher subjective maths skills.
Females were more impatient than males. Finally, they found patience to be
positively related to savings and educational attainment of the respondents.
Patience at the national level was correlated with: individualism and long-
term orientation (Hofstede, 2001) measured at the national level; GDP per
capita; geographic and biological variables that have previously been argued
to be conducive for economic development (Diamond, 2005; Olsson and Hibbs,
2005; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013); distance from the equator; weak Future
Time Reference (Chen, 2013); pronoun drop not allowed in the language of the
country (Tabellini, 2008); share of protestants in the country (Weber, 1930;
Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008) and risk taking. In addition, they found nega-
tive correlation of their index with the intensity of family ties (Alesina and
Giuliano, 2014). They found that western European and English speaking
countries were the most patient. In particular, when comparing the effect
of the preferences they estimated, Falk et al. (2018) found that patience has
a much higher explanatory power of GDP per capita of a country than the
others (risk taking, positive and negative reciprocity, trust, altruism).
Other studies on cross-cultural differences in temporal discounting in-
volved only two or three countries. Tan and Johnson (1996) studied Canadian
undergraduates and foreign undergraduates of Chinese descents but they re-
ported no difference in discount rates between the two groups. Du et al.
(2002) studied American, Chinese, and Japanese graduate students on two
tasks. In the delay discounting task, participants made choices between im-
mediate and delayed hypothetical monetary rewards; in the probability dis-
counting task, participants made choices between certain and probabilistic
rewards. They found that the Americans and Chinese discounted delayed re-
wards more steeply than the Japanese. In addition, the Americans discounted
probabilistic rewards the most, whereas the Chinese discounted probabilistic
rewards the least. Mahajna et al. (2008) found that Israeli Jews, who are
supposedly from a more individualistic society, are more patient than Israeli
Arabs, who are supposedly from a more collectivistic society. They asked their
participants to bid and ask prices for delayed fixed amounts and for lotteries
and found that the subjective discount rate of Israeli Arabs were significantly
higher than that of Israeli Jews.
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4.4 Hofstede cultural dimension and measurement
Here, we spell out the details on how Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofst-
ede and Bond, 1988; Hofstede, 2001) are measured. Most importantly, Wang
et al. (2016) directly measured the cultural dimensions at the individual level,
by asking some question inspired to the one used by Geert Hofstede, while
Falk et al. (2018) and we compared our indices of patience at the national
level to the values of the cultural dimension, as measured by Hofstede and
available at Geert Hofstede’s website. Wang et al. (2016) directly measured
cultural factors at the individual level, in their survey. Individualism was
measured by asking the participants to rate the importance of four features
for an ideal job: having sufficient time for their personal or family life; good
physical working conditions; security of employment and an element of variety
and adventure in the job. Uncertainty Avoidance was derived from four ques-
tions. The first was “How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?” and
the other three questions asked the participants to what extent they agreed
with each of the following statements: “One can be a good manager without
having precise answers to most questions that subordinates may raise about
their work”; “Competition between employees usually does more harm than
good” and “A company’s or organisation’s rules should not be broken – not
even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.”. Finally,
they measured Long Term Orientation by asking participants to rate the im-
portance of two questions: “In your private life, how important is ‘respect to
tradition’ for you?” and “How important is ‘thrift’ for you?”. The questions
used in the Hofstede’s release on which Falk et al. (2018) and we relied upon
are the following. Individualism was measured according to the answers to
the following question: Please think of an ideal job, disregarding your present
job, if you have one. In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to
you to (1) have sufficient time for your personal or home life (2) have security
of employment (3) do work that is interesting (4) have a job respected by your
family and friends? Uncertainty Avoidance was measured according to the
answers to the following four questions: (1) How often do you feel nervous
or tense? (2) All in all, how would you describe your state of health these
days? (3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements? (3a) One can be a good manager without having a precise answer
to every question that a subordinate may raise about his or her work. (3b)
A company’s or organisation’s rules should not be broken, not even when the
employee thinks breaking the rule would be in the organisation’s best interest.
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Long Term Orientation is measured according to the answers to the following
four questions: (1) How important is doing a service to a friend? (2) How
important is thrift (not spending more than needed)? (3) How proud are you
to be a citizen of your country? (4) To what extent do you agree or disagree
with the following statement: persistent efforts are the surest way to results?
4.5 Data and methodology
Our data come from the 2015 wave of the Gallup End of Year Survey. The
survey was conducted in the autumn of 2015, from October to November, with
66040 interviewees across 68 countries. The survey was done via three ways:
face-to-face interview, telephone and online interview. Data from one country
could be collected from only one or more methods. Specifically, the face-to-
face interview was the most commonly used method, done with 32172 subjects
from 30 countries. The online survey was conducted with 22068 interviewees
in 23 countries. 11800 subjects in 15 countries were interviewed via telephone
(WIN/Gallup international, 2016). One advantage of the survey is that it
spans the entire income distribution in each country and it also spans countries
with very different characteristics and wealth. This enables us to control for
income and age at the same time.
The dependent variable is the following question, which Gallup Inter-
national permitted us to include:
Think about your current household income: which of the following choices
would you choose if offered?
• Today you receive an extra payment which is equal to that of your normal
monthly income.
• In exactly one year from now you receive an extra payment equal to
twice that of your normal monthly income.
Participants had a right to refuse to answer this question. In partic-
ular, in three countries (Denmark, Israel and South Korea) no answer to our
question were collected, which reduces the number of countries on which we
have data to 65. This question enabled us to account for differences in income
and currency within a single item and without using control questions. As we
show later, it is highly correlated with other, typically more time consuming,
measures. By convention, we use the abbreviations SS (smaller-sooner) for the
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first option, and LL (larger-later) for the second option, and when we refer to
“patience” we are referring to choices of LL.
We obtained answers to the patience question from 55,939 from 65
countries. However, income information is available for 50,754 respondents.
The number of participants in each country making each choice, along with the
percentage of respondents choosing the LL option is reported in Table 4.2 and
shown in Figure 4.1. We investigate the relationship between individual and
personal characteristics and the individual choice of LL, and the relationship
between country characteristics and the country choice of LL. Table 4.1 lists
the variables from the survey that entered into our analysis. Note that we had
no control over any measure other than our own.
Our analysis is structured into two parts. We start by investigating
how individual characteristics are related to the choice of LL (patience). Our
main focus will be on the influence that age and income have on patience,
although we do include a number of potentially relevant individual measures
in our analysis. In the second part we look at national characteristics.
4.5.1 Analysis of patience at the individual level
In Section 4.2, we discussed in great details that the main focus of our work is
to investigate how income and age combined shape discounting. There are two
competing explanations, both of which lead to the conclusion that the gap in
patience between richer and poorer individuals increases with age. However,
they differ in the mechanism which they advance. On the one hand, Ramsey
(1928) suggests that greater patience leads to higher wealth with age. He
suggests that patience is a driver of economic development and as a conse-
quence patient individuals will accumulate higher levels of wealth throughout
their lives. This is also consistent with the evidence presented by Epper et al.
(2020), for Danish citizens. On the other hand, Becker and Mulligan (1997)
propose that greater wealth leads to greater patience with age. They argue
that the poor discount more because they have a bleak future which they do
not want to spend time thinking about. Hence, poverty leads individuals not
to invest energies into thinking about their future.
We included a wide range of factors from the survey. Several of these
are already known to be associated with patience, or are associated with strong
theoretical predictions, and so serve as “sense checks” for our measure of time
preference, as well as providing further information on the generalisability of
these earlier results. Others are novel or even exploratory.
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Table 4.1: List of variables included in the analysis of patience at the
individual level. Answers were collected in the WIN/Gallup End of Year
(EoY) Survey 2015.
Income Quintile Quintile of the income of the respondent in the distri-
bution of the respondent’s country. Ordered as poor-
est, second poorest, middle, second richest, richest.
Age Age of the respondent.
University degree A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent completed at
least a university degree.
Employment Employment of the respondent. Classified as Unem-
ployed, Housewife, Retired/Disabled, Student, Work-
ing Part-time or Working full-time.
Next Year Out-
look
A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered “Eco-
nomic Prosperity” to the question “Compared to this
year, in your opinion, will next year be a year of eco-
nomic prosperity, economic difficulty or remain the
same for your country?”.
Happy A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered ei-
ther “Happy” or “Very Happy” to the question “In
general, do you personally feel very happy, happy, nei-
ther happy nor unhappy, unhappy or very unhappy
about your life?”.
Confidence Vac-
cine Effectiveness
Rate of agreement with the statement “Overall I think
vaccines are effective.”.
Religion Religion of the respondent. Possible answers were:
Roman Catholic, Russian or Eastern Orthodox,
Protestant, Other Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Jewish,
Buddhist, Other, Atheist/Agnostic.
Change Soon A dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered either
“In the short term” or “Right now” instead of “Never
need to change”, “In the medium term” or “In the long
term” to the question “In your opinion, how soon does
your country need to change to be a better place?”.
Risk Averse The question asked to elicit risk aversion was “Think
about your current household income: which of the
following choices would you choose if offered?” It is
a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answered “ A
guaranteed increase in your household income of 50%”
instead of “A 50/50 chance to receive double your
household income”.
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First, we check whether women or men are more patient. This is a
subject about which there has been considerable discussion but no agreement.
In several studies women have been found to display more patience than men
(Silverman, 2003; Frederick, 2005; Bauer and Chytilova´, 2013; Dittrich and
Leipold, 2014), but others have reported no effect, or a reverse effect. Our
immediate predecessors either found no effect Wang et al. (2016) or found
women to be more impatient than men (Falk et al., 2018). It is not the goal of
this work to give a definitive answer to this question, but the breadth of our
sample can certainly help provide a definitive answer. Similarly, more educa-
tion has been associated with more patience, as in Perez-Arce (2017) and Falk
et al. (2018). We use the dummy University degree, equal to 1 if the respon-
dent completed a University degree. We control for the employment status
of the respondent with dummies corresponding to: Unemployed, Housewife,
Retired/Disabled, Student, Working Part-time with Working full-time as the
baseline. The Gallup End of Year survey does, indeed, include the category
“Housewife”. The survey also contained a question measuring risk attitude.
Risk attitude has frequently been compared to intertemporal preference, and
Ferecatu and O¨nc¸u¨ler (2016) find participants willing to take risks are less will-
ing to defer consumption. Also Anderhub et al. (2001); Tanaka et al. (2010)
find that risk aversion is correlated to lower discounting. However, Falk et al.
(2018) found patience to be correlated with the propensity to take risks. We
included a dummy taking the value of 1 if the participant chose the risk averse
option.
We check how the respondent felt about her current situation and the
beliefs she had on the future of her country. First, we include a dummy equal
to 1 if the respondent claimed to be happy or very happy about her life. Ifcher
and Zarghamee (2011) found that people who are happier tend to discount the
future less heavily. Second, participants were asked if their country needed
to change soon to be a better place. Third, they were asked to evaluate the
economic outlook for the country in the next year, resulting into two dummy
variables indicating whether the respondent believed the economic outlook for
the next year was neutral or positive (with negative as the baseline). These
last two variables capture the possibility that individuals who are concerned
about the future might be more wary of rewards which are distant in time. On
top of that, economic uncertainty might raise doubts about the future value of
money. Previous research indicated that an individual’s tendency of temporal
discounting is not only associated with the amount of money and the length
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of time, but also on how risky the future reward is perceived by the individual
(Green and Myerson, 2004). If people consider the LL reward as less certain
and riskier than the SS one, they might discount the future more.
Participants were also asked about their belief in the effectiveness of
vaccines. While we know of no research comparing belief in vaccine effective-
ness to patience, researchers have found that the willingness to vaccinate is
associated with patience, with more patient people more willing to vaccinate
(Nuscheler and Roeder, 2016). This belief was captured with three dummies
ranking the degree of belief of the respondent in Vaccine Effectiveness, with
strong agreement being the baseline. We control for the religion of the respon-
dents, using Roman Catholic as the baseline. Weber (1930) proposed the idea
of a “Protestant ethics” which, among other aspects, is believed to have made
people more patient. Falk et al. (2018) found that the share of protestants
in a given country is positively related to patience. Hence, we investigate the
correlation between religious beliefs of the respondents and their propensity
to delay the reward.
The first specification for our analysis, including only the effects of age
and income, is:
yi = α+ βai + γkIki + δkai ∗ Iki i ∈ I; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} (4.1)
where yi takes the value of 1 if i respondent chose LL (was patient);
Ik are four dummies for the four quintiles of the income distribution (the first
is the baseline), and ai is age (in decades) of subject i
2. We model it as a
Linear Probability Model, since interpretation of the marginal effect of the
interactions is more straightforward (Ai and Norton, 2003).
We expect that all effects observed might vary from country to country.
We accommodated this by including fixed effects at the country level3. In
addition, we include the individual characteristics just summarised:
yi = α+ βai + γkIki + δkai ∗ Iki + ωxi + λjCji i ∈ I; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}; j ∈ J
(4.2)
2Age is reported in 6 bins in our data. We assigned the mid-point value to all individ-
uals in a given bin and we treated age as a continuous variable. We did this to keep the
interpretation simple. Having 4 dummies for the income quintile and 5 dummies for the age
bins would have led to 20 interactions. We repeat the analysis using the bins for age and
the results are virtually unchanged (see Table 4.10)
3Table 4.7 reports attempts to model heterogeneity among countries in different ways
and results were robust across all specifications.
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where Cji is a dummy which refers to the country of the respondent.
Cj are 64 dummies for the countries (J is the set of countries). The vector xi
refers to the individual characteristics.
4.5.2 Analysis of patience at the national level
The second part of our analysis is devoted to the study of heterogeneity of
patience among countries. We take the percentage of respondents choosing
LL in each country, as reported in Table 4.2, as an index of patience for
that country. It is measured using answers of 55,939 individuals from 65
countries. We look at the correlation of our measure with those obtained by
Falk et al. (2018) and Wang et al. (2016). For Falk et al. (2018), we use
the index of patience available on the global perferences survey website. For
Wang et al. (2016) we use the proportion of respondents choosing “$3800
dollars next month” over “$3400 dollars this month”, in each country, as an
index of patience. Moreover, we correlate the measure to several country
characteristics (summarised in Table 4.3). We check the correlation of our
measure of patience with both the 2014 and the 2015 release of the indices.
Our subjects answered the patience question at the end of 2015, in the context
of the Gallup End of Year 2015 survey. Hence, if we believe in a correlation
which goes from patience to, say, economic development, it is worth looking
at how patience measured in 2015 impacts any outcome (for example GDP
per capita) at the end of that year. However, in some cases, the 2014 release
is an appropriate comparison as well. Think of inflation, for example. When
the subjects are answering the patience question, they are expected to take
into account expected inflation. We expect them to incorporate information
from the previous year (2014) which has already realised and information on
the current year (2015) which had not yet been released at the time of the
survey, but respondents were experiencing it in their every day consumption
choices.
Since patience has historically been associated to economic develop-
ment (Becker, 1962; Ben-Porath, 1967; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2008; Galor and
O¨zak, 2016; Sarid and Galor, 2017; Dohmen et al., 2018), defined in a mul-
tifaceted way, we verify how our index correlate to some proxies of economic
development. First, we consider the GDP per capita in 2014 and 2015 (World
Bank). Second, we consider the growth rate in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
On top of that, the growth rate is an index of how much individuals expect
the economic environment to change. We mentioned that the uncertainty
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics on the patience question by country
and region.
Country/Region SS LL LL (perc.) Country/Region SS LL LL (perc.)
Overall 28,439 27,500 0.49 Mongolia 488 459 0.48
Sweden 260 649 0.71 Argentina 433 403 0.48
Finland 314 708 0.69 Algeria 172 160 0.48
Netherlands 306 608 0.67 Mexico 498 460 0.48
Austria 300 596 0.67 Panama 565 501 0.47
Iceland 276 524 0.66 Slovenia 486 428 0.47
Canada 328 587 0.64 Palestine (W Bank Gaza) 459 393 0.46
Kosovo 247 441 0.64 Czech Republic 494 405 0.45
Bangladesh 282 493 0.64 South Africa 614 474 0.44
Saudi Arabia 206 352 0.63 Lebanon 542 382 0.41
Morocco 297 479 0.62 Russia 464 327 0.41
Germany 348 553 0.61 Ukraine 239 162 0.40
Colombia 379 587 0.61 Papua New Guinea 352 238 0.40
Japan 345 494 0.59 Congo 506 342 0.40
Macedonia 433 584 0.57 Armenia 524 352 0.40
United Kingdom 380 511 0.57 Ghana 534 357 0.40
India 446 587 0.57 Afghanistan 1,182 789 0.40
Australia 441 574 0.57 Nigeria 477 310 0.39
Belgium 380 493 0.56 Philippines 590 380 0.39
Bosnia Herzegovina 410 527 0.56 Serbia 539 344 0.39
Latvia 349 446 0.56 Ethiopia 605 334 0.36
United States 403 501 0.55 Greece 619 331 0.35
Hong Kong 191 233 0.55 Italy 547 292 0.35
Ecuador 379 450 0.54 Indonesia 313 167 0.35
Ireland 432 499 0.54 Bulgaria 568 300 0.35
Peru 426 481 0.53 Turkey 617 262 0.30
Portugal 471 481 0.51 Iraq 527 222 0.30
Tunisia 407 414 0.50 Brazil 1,351 523 0.28
Fiji 471 478 0.50 Azerbaijan 144 43 0.23
Thailand 181 182 0.50 North America 731 1,088 0.60
Poland 457 456 0.50 EU Europe ,7901 9,173 0.54
Pakistan 460 455 0.50 West South Asia 2,370 2,324 0.50
France 417 412 0.50 East Asia and Oceania 4,220 4,035 0.49
Vietnam 284 278 0.49 Eastern Europe 3,000 2,780 0.48
China 564 552 0.49 Latin America 4,031 3,405 0.46
Spain 497 481 0.49 MENA 3,450 2,878 0.45
Iran 223 214 0.49 Sub-Saharan African 2,736 1,817 0.40
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Table 4.3: List of variables included in the analysis of patience at
country level. We correlate them to the percentage of respondents choosing
LL, as reported in Table 4.2, in each country as an index of Patience for that
country. Sources of all variables are listed.
GDP per capita In 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Growth Rate In 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Distance from
Equator
Absolute latitude of the country.
Private Credit to
GDP
Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over
GDP in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Debt to GDP Ra-
tio
In 2014 and 2015 (IMF).
Gross savings to
GDP
The difference between disposable income and con-
sumption in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Life Expectancy Measured at birth in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Real interest rate The lending interest rate in 2014 and 2015 adjusted
for inflation as measured by the GDP deflator (World
Bank).
Inflation rate In 2014 and 2015 (World Bank).
Future Time Ref-
erence (FTR)
Developed by Chen (2013). It assumes a value of 1 if
a given language allows one to speak about the future
in the present tense (Weak FTR), and 0 otherwise
(Strong FTR).
Future Orien-
tation Index
(FOI)
Developed by Preis et al. (2012). Ratio of Google
queries looking for information on 2016 w.r.t. queries
looking for information on 2014.
Individualism
(IDV)
It measures the degree to which the society reinforces
individual or collective achievement, and the extent to
which people are expected to stand up as an individual
as compared to loyal affiliation to a life-long in-group
(e.g., extended family, friends, etc.). Geert Hofstede’s
website (“2015 08 16” version, average value for each
country).
Uncertainty
Avoidance (UAI)
A high score of UAI indicates that a society is afraid
of uncertain, unknown and unstructured situations.
Geert Hofstede’s website (“2015 08 16” version, aver-
age value for each country).
Long Term Orien-
tation (LTO)
It captures the society’s time horizon. It reflects to
what extent a society has “a dynamic, future-oriented
mentality”. A higher score implies that the past is val-
ued less than the future, and people may look more
forward. Geert Hofstede’s website (“2015 08 16” ver-
sion, average value for each country).
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Figure 4.1: Patience in the world. Dark shaded countries show a higher
level of Patience. Patience index in each country is measured as the percentage
of respondents who chose the LL option. Based on 55,939 responses from 65
countries.
about the future reward can play a role on how individuals discount the fu-
ture (Green and Myerson, 2004). Third, we consider the Distance from the
Equator (absolute latitude). Geography has been hypothesised having an im-
pact on economics development by several authors (Diamond, 2005; Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2013; Falk et al., 2018). We take into account three differ-
ent indices which account for the degree of indebtedness and the tendency to
save of a given country, in the public and in the private sector. We consider
the Debt to GDP ratio in 2014 and 2015 (IMF). We expect countries which
are more impatient to show higher levels of debt. We consider the Private
credit to GDP in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank). This is the ratio of domestic
credit to the private sector. However, it is true that these two indices do not
only account for the tendency of individuals to subscribe debts but also for
the degree of financial and economic development. Finally, we consider Gross
National Savings to GDP, the difference between disposable income and con-
sumption. Then, we correlate our measure of patience to three indices which
account for uncertainty in the economic environment which pertains the re-
ward, measured at the country level. First, life expectancy at birth in 2014
and 2015 (World Bank). We expect patience to be related to the probabil-
ity of living long enough to enjoy potential future rewards. Second, the real
interest rate in 2014 and 2015 (World Bank). This is the lending interest
rate adjusted for inflation. Given that we propose a reward to be awarded
in one year, the average interest rate the respondent might face is a natural
term of comparison. Finally, inflation rate for 2014 (World Bank). Since the
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hypothetical reward we offer is due to be delivered in one year, expectations
of inflation should have an impact on the propensity to accept it or not. We
finally correlate our measure to some measures which refer to the sociological,
linguistic and cultural approach to patience. We consider the Future Time
Reference (FTR), as developed by Chen (2013) and slightly modified by Falk
et al. (2018)4. Future Time Reference has attracted attention because it cor-
relates with future-oriented decisions (Gudmestad and Edmonds, 2016). This
variable assumes a value of 1 if a given language allows one to speak about
the future in the present tense (Weak FTR), and 0 otherwise (Strong FTR).
Chen (2013) suggested that languages with weak FTR would be associated
with more patience because they treat the future as being just like the present
and this is true for the sample of countries examined by Falk et al. (2018).
We consider the Future Orientation Index, as developed by Preis et al. (2012).
The FOI is an attempt to quantify how much people think about the future
relative to the past. It is the ratio of the volume of internet searches for the
next year to internet searches for the previous year. We take FOI for the pe-
riod spanned by our study, looking at the ratio of searches for 2016 to searches
for 20145. The argument is that if the ratio of future over past searches is high,
people in that group are devoting more resources to thinking about the future
than the past. Preis et al. (2012) found that the index is highly correlated to
the GDP of a country. Finally, we consider three of the Hofstede’s cultural di-
mensions, which have been found to be related to patience by previous studies
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Hofstede, 2001). Data were downloaded from Geert
Hofstede’s website (“2015 08 16” version, average value for each country). It is
not always obvious how the questions used to derive the dimensions map onto
those dimensions. However, this classification has been widely used, including
by Wang et al. (2016) and Falk et al. (2018), so we follow it. We consider
Individualism, which is intended to measure the degree to which the society
reinforces individual or collective achievement, and the extent to which people
are expected to stand up as an individual as compared to loyal affiliation to a
life-long in-group (e.g., extended family, friends, etc.). We also consider Un-
certainty Avoidance, which is intended to measure general fear of uncertain,
unknown and unstructured situations. Higher scores indicate greater Uncer-
tainty Avoidance. Finally, Long Term Orientation, or Confucian Dynamism,
4We follow Falk et al. (2018) classification. They set Farsi to “not classified” after
corresponding with Chen (it was initially classified as “Strong”) and classified Moroccan
Arabic independently from Chen.
5We thank Merve Alanyali for conducting this analysis for us.
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is intended to capture the society’s time horizon. It reflects to what extent a
society has “a dynamic, future-oriented mentality”. Wang et al. (2016) found
that higher levels of Uncertainty Avoidance to be associated with stronger
hyperbolic discounting and higher present bias, whereas higher degrees of In-
dividualism and Long Term Orientation predicted a stronger tendency to wait
for larger payoffs. Falk et al. (2018) found a positive correlation of patience
with individualism and long-term orientation.
4.6 Individual level discounting
Our main conclusion is already evident by looking at Table 4.4, where we
report the raw percentages of respondents choosing the “Larger Later” option
stratified for age and income. For the youngest group, the percentage of LL
choices is approximately the same for all the income levels, ranging from 48%
to 53%. The income groups however diverge as the respondents get older.
Those in the poorest quintile of income are less patient, while those with high
incomes become more patient. To put numbers on it, in the oldest group
(those older than 65 years), the percentage choosing LL is 61% for the richest
income quintile, but only 38% for the poorest income quintile. The other
income groups are distributed in an orderly manner between these extremes.
We will see that once we take into account country fixed effects, the gap in
patience among the high and low income group will still arise as age increases
but it will be solely driven by the decrease in patience of the lowest income
group.
Table 4.5 reports the results of our regression analysis. The marginal
effect of age for the poorest quintile is negative and fairly stable. For that
group, every ten years the probability of choosing the “Large Later” option
decreases by more than 2%, when we control for country fixed effects. The
marginal effect for the other categories is given by the sum of the coefficient of
age and the coefficient of age interacted with the appropriate category. From
there, we can see that the marginal effect of age is virtually zero for the richest
quintile of income. The coefficient of age interacted with the richest quintile is
always positive, significant and comparable in magnitude to the coefficient of
age. This means that the level of patience is constant, for any level of age, for
the richest category. For the intermediate levels of income patience declines
with age but the slope of the decline decreases as income increases. When we
estimate patience taking into account age, income and country fixed effects
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics on the patience question by age and
income group. Age corresponds to the age group of the respondent and in-
come corresponds to the position of the respondent in the income distribution
in her country of origin. LL stands for “Larger Later” and SS for “Smaller
Sooner”.
Income Quintile Age LL (perc.) LL SS
Poorest 18 to 24 0.49 877 918
Poorest 25 to 34 0.43 974 1293
Poorest 35 to 44 0.39 712 1107
Poorest 45 to 54 0.40 654 977
Poorest 55 to 64 0.39 481 767
Poorest 65+ 0.38 522 844
Second Poorest 18 to 24 0.49 858 902
Second Poorest 25 to 34 0.48 1389 1492
Second Poorest 35 to 44 0.47 1075 1219
Second Poorest 45 to 54 0.45 924 1117
Second Poorest 55 to 64 0.44 681 875
Second Poorest 65+ 0.44 569 715
Middle 18 to 24 0.48 1001 1095
Middle 25 to 34 0.50 1666 1645
Middle 35 to 44 0.49 1423 1494
Middle 45 to 54 0.48 1125 1207
Middle 55 to 64 0.48 804 867
Middle 65+ 0.49 527 545
Second Richest 18 to 24 0.53 696 628
Second Richest 25 to 34 0.53 1124 994
Second Richest 35 to 44 0.55 1052 871
Second Richest 45 to 54 0.53 904 791
Second Richest 55 to 64 0.55 661 532
Second Richest 65+ 0.54 400 342
Richest 18 to 24 0.51 431 406
Richest 25 to 34 0.54 763 655
Richest 35 to 44 0.57 807 598
Richest 45 to 54 0.58 797 581
Richest 55 to 64 0.56 503 401
Richest 65+ 0.61 288 188
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only (column 2 in Table 4.5) patience declines at the following rates: for the
lowest income quintile the probability of choosing LL decreases by 2.7% every
ten years; for the second poorest it decreases at a similar rate; for the middle
income quintile it decreases by 1.4% every ten years; for the second richest
by 1% and for the richest quintile only by 0.02%. This is clearly visualised
in Figure 4.2, where we plot the estimated probability of choosing LL for any
combination of age and income in the United States. In a nutshell, patience
is essentially constant for the richest quintile group, and strongly declining for
the poorest quintile, with all other income groups falling in between. Falk et al.
(2018) found that the relation between age and patience follows an inverse U-
shaped pattern: middle-aged individuals are the most patient, compared with
the young and the elderly. Wang et al. (2016) found that patience declines
with age, but student participants in their experiment show limited variation
in terms of age. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to observe the
relationship we describe between patience, income and age.
Figure 4.2: Probability of choosing LL (age/income). Estimated prob-
ability of choosing LL per each quintile of income. Predictions based on OLS
regression model from column 2 of Table 4.5 with country fixed effects and
clustered standard errors at country level. Country fixed to the United States
of America.
As anticipated, we investigate how several individual characteristics
influence patience. The effects of all the covariates are quite stable with respect
to the inclusion of extra variables and the variance inflation factors of the
models do not raise issues of collinearity. Women are around 3% less likely to
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Table 4.5: Individual level patience. Linear Probability Model based on a
sample of 65 countries.
Dep Var: Larger Later (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (decades) −0.018∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Second Poorest Quintile 0.017 0.024 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.019
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Middle Quintile −0.001 0.004 0.0004 −0.001 −0.007 −0.005
(0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Second Richest Quintile 0.028 0.017 0.025 0.009 0.0004 0.005
(0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Richest Quintile 0.007 −0.003 0.001 −0.016 −0.024 −0.016
(0.038) (0.031) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Age ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age ∗Middle Quintile 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.022∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age ∗Richest Quintile 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Female −0.030∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
University Degree 0.028∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Employment (ref: Full-time work)
Unemployed −0.048∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Housewife −0.003 −0.002
(0.014) (0.014)
Retired/Disabled −0.033∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Student −0.007 −0.009
(0.018) (0.019)
Working Part-time −0.010 −0.007
(0.010) (0.010)
Next Yr Econ (ref: negative)
Neutral 0.019∗∗
(0.008)
Positive 0.024∗∗
(0.009)
Happy 0.025∗∗∗
(0.008)
Observations 50,754 50,754 50,754 50,565 49,766 47,255
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.054 0.018 0.055 0.056 0.057
Country FE NO YES NO YES YES YES
Macro Area FE NO NO YES NO NO NO
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Clustered Standard Errors at Country Level.
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Table 4.6: Individual Level patience (extended). Linear Probability
Model. Religions not significant, not shown. Income not significant, not
shown. Employment status not significant, not shown.
Dep Var: Larger Later (1) (2) (3)
Age (decades) −0.026∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age (decades) ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.004 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Age (decades) ∗Middle Quintile 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age (decades) ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.017∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age (decades) ∗Richest Quintile 0.025∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk Averse 0.084∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023)
Happy 0.019∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Belief Country needs change soon −0.036∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009)
Next Yr Econ (ref: negative)
Neutral 0.012 0.013
(0.008) (0.009)
Positive 0.021∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Confidence Vaccine Effectiveness (ref: Strong agree.)
Strong disagreement −0.076∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Moderate disagreement −0.007 −0.003
(0.013) (0.013)
Moderate agreement −0.012 −0.008
(0.008) (0.008)
Female −0.026∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006)
University Degree 0.029∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Unemployed −0.043∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Retired/Disabled −0.027∗∗ −0.019
(0.012) (0.012)
Religion (ref: Catholic)
Atheist/Agnostic 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Protestant 0.036∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)
Observations 48,451 39,965 38,407
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.059 0.067
Country FE YES YES YES
Countries number 65 60 60
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Clustered s. e. at country level.
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choose LL, in line with the earlier paper by Falk et al. (2018). However, in the
analysis of Falk et al. (2018) only 68% of countries have a coefficient indicating
greater impatience for women, and only 32% have a statistically significant
difference (p-value<0.1) in that direction. A closer analysis of our results,
following the analysis of Falk et al. (2018) shows that in 48 of the 65 countries
men were more patient than women (with 18 cases significant at p<0.1), and
in 17 countries women were more patient with men (with 1 case significant at
p<0.1). The overall gender effect appears quite robust for international survey
data, although the diversity suggests that we should not be surprised by single
country studies that find results in either direction. Educated people with at
least a college degree are almost 3% more likely to choose LL, in line with recent
well-controlled research focusing on the role of education in intertemporal
choice (Perez-Arce, 2017; Dohmen et al., 2018). As expected, occupational
status is very important. This holds after controlling for income. We see that
including the employment conditions does not significantly impact the effect
of income. Unemployed, retired or disabled people are less likely to choose LL.
This may be due to financial constraints - for instance, it may be harder to
get loans if you are unemployed - although it is also plausible that impatient
individuals are more likely to end up unemployed. Our data do not allow us to
distinguish between these possibilities. Individuals who believe their country
is going to experience the same or better economic conditions in the future
are more patient than those who believe conditions will be worse (around 2%
for both groups). This is in line with the idea that the more uncertain are the
conditions that the decision maker will experience in the future, the more she
will discount it (Green and Myerson, 2004). A similar explanations applies
to the result that individuals who are longing for changes in their country
are around 4% less likely to choose LL than those who are satisfied with the
status quo. That might be due to the pessimistic view they have of their own
country. If they think their country needs to change they might fear, among
other things, future severe economic conditions or they might be willing to
leave the country soon. Hence, they are looking for an immediate reward
since they perceive the future as risky and uncertain. Happy people are more
patient. The probability of choosing LL increases by 2.5% for individuals who
describe themselves as happy or very happy with respect to others. It looks like
individuals who are unhappy look for some form of relief to their unhappiness
by claiming the reward immediately. Happy individuals, on the other hand, are
probably satisfied with the status quo and do not need some extra gratification.
113
This is in line with Ifcher and Zarghamee (2011). Individuals choosing the Risk
Averse option in a risk question are around 9% more likely to choose LL. That
is a huge effect and it backs up the evidence that Risk Aversion is correlated
with patience (Anderhub et al., 2001; Tanaka et al., 2010). Individuals who
strongly disagree that vaccines are effective are more than 7% less likely than
others to choose LL. We believe that choices about vaccines are inherently
related to discounting. The reward, namely being covered by the illness, comes
in the future, while there is a (small) sacrifice in the present. This is in line
with Nuscheler and Roeder (2016). We find that religion predicts patience.
Atheists and Agnostic are 6.5% more likely than the baseline to choose LL.
We could legitimately expect religious people to be more willing to delay the
reward since religion is usually a matter of sacrificing today satisfaction for
a future reward. On top of that, religion is usually forward looking being
focused on the after life. Hence, we did not expect non religious people to
score the highest on this metric. Protestants are around 3.5% more likely than
the baseline to choose LL. That is somehow expected. From an institutional
point of view, since patience is considered as a driver for development and
wealth, we expected it to be correlated to Protestantism. Since Weber (1930),
individual characteristics featured by Protestant ethics have been considered
as beneficial for the prosperity of an economic environment and individualism
is one of those characteristics. Here, Protestants score better with respect to
other major religions but lower than non-religious people. Actually, it may
be argued that individualism could be even stronger for an atheist than for a
Protestant. For example, Caldwell-Harris (2012), argues that, among the other
things, atheist are more individualistic than believers. Then, if individualism
is a driver for economic prosperity and economic prosperity is linked both to
patience and individualism, our results are sensible. In Section 4.10 we do
find that our country level measure of patience is actually correlated to the
average level of individualism in the country.
4.7 Alternative statistical models
When we model the answers of respondents from different countries, we need
to take into account the possibility that the answers or the standard errors of
the regressions, for individuals living in the same country, might be correlated.
In Table 4.5 we relied upon a linear probability model with fixed effects. We
chose that model because it gives a simple interpretation of the data but, at the
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same time, has enough sophistication to account for within country correlation
of the answers. In Table 4.7 we explore several alternative specifications for
country heterogeneity. We anticipate the take home message. As we have just
said, our specification shown in Table 4.5 and expressed in Equation (4.2) gives
an optimal approximation of the marginal effects and it accounts for within
country correlations. However, we could only say that after attempting to
model within country correlations by means of alternative models. The results
are shown in Table 4.7 and we are now going to detail how those alternative
models address the problem of the correlation of the answers at the country
level.
In the first two columns of Table 4.7 we report the results of the linear
probability models outlined in Equation (4.1) and Equation (4.2) (without xi)
and presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.5. In column 1 of Table 4.7 we
do not take into account the within countries correlations in our estimates. In
column 2 we fit a fixed effects (or least squares dummy variables) model. In
this way we estimate one time invariant intercept for any country. We observe
a slight change in the estimate with respect to column 1. The general pattern
remains true, patience decreases with age at a faster rate for the poorest
quintile and the marginal effect of age increases as income increases. However,
when we take into account country fixed effects, patience is basically stable, as
age increases, for the richest quintiles of income and decreasing for the other
quintiles. These will be our benchmark estimates, which we have exhaustively
discussed in Section 4.6. Here, we will argue that they are robust and reliable.
In column 3 of Table 4.7 we propose a mixed effects linear regression. In
general, a linear mixed model for observations y = (y1, . . . , yn) has the general
form Y ∼ N (µ,Σ), µ = Xβ + Zb, b ∼ N(0,Σb) where X and Z are matrices
containing values of the explanatory variables. Usually, Σ = σ2In. A typical
example for clustered data might be
Yij ∼ N (µij , σ2) ind.
µij = x
T
ijβ + z
T
ijbj
bj ∼ N (0,Σb) ind.
(4.3)
where xij contains the explanatory data for cluster j, observation i and
zij contains that sub-vector of xij which is allowed to exhibit extra between
cluster variation in its relationship with Y. In the simplest (random intercept)
case, zij = 1. In our case a cluster is a country. A plausible mixed model for
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k clusters with n1, . . . , nk observations per cluster, and a single explanatory
variable x is
yij = β0 + b0j + (β1)xij + ij
(b0j)
T ∼ N (0,Σb) ind.
(4.4)
where X and Z are defined as
X =

1 x11
...
...
1 xnkk
 Z =

Z1 0 0
0
. . . 0
0 0 Zk
 Zj =

1
...
1

In our case, we have more than a single explanatory variable since we
have both age and income so the equation would be more similar to Equa-
tion (4.2). On top of that, we only allowed a random intercept for any country
so we set Zj = (1, .., 1) ∀j. Finally, the estimate of the mixed model are ob-
tained through maximum likelihood and not through ordinary least squares.
We can see that the estimate in column 3 of Table 4.7 are virtually unchanged
from the estimate of column 2. Hence, we believe that adding random inter-
cepts was an unnecessary complication. The other four models belong to the
class of generalised linear models. Before we describe them, we’d like to add
a caveat. The patience question proposes a binary choice. Hence, the reader
might have expected we preferred a generalised linear model to perform our
estimation. As we already pointed out in Section 4.5, we favoured the inter-
pretability of the linear model. On top of that, since we did not have to deal
with probabilities very close to 0 or 1 and since we had a great number of ob-
servations, we chose the linear model as our main specification. However, we
will now describe our estimates for three different generalised linear models, all
of the logit type. In general, for a logit model, the following is true. y1,. . . ,yn
are observations of response variables Y1,. . . ,Yn, assumed to be independently
generated by a distribution of the same exponential family form, with means
µi=E(Yi) linked to explanatory variables X1,. . . ,Xn through
g(µi) = ηi = x
T
i β (4.5)
where, the g(·) function is called the link function and in the case of a
logit it is equal to the logit function
logit(x) = log
x
1− x (4.6)
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In column 7 of Table 4.7 we present the estimate obtained with a logit
model for the patience question
pi = α+ βai + γkIki + δkai ∗ Iki i ∈ I; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} (4.7)
where pi = logit(yi) and yi takes the value of 1 if respondent i chose LL;
Ik are four dummies for the four quintiles of the income distribution (the first is
the baseline), and ai is age (in decades) of the subject. Taking into account the
caveat on the interpretation of interactions in a logit model (Ai and Norton,
2003), we see that the pattern observed for the linear model is replicated. We
would like to point our that we obtained out of sample predictions for the logit
model (not shown) and the pattern observed in Figure 4.2 was replicated for
this model, as well.
In column 6 of Table 4.7 we report the result of a conditional logit
regression approach. This is sometimes improperly referred to as “fixed effect
logit”. The intuition underlying this model is that both individual character-
istics and group characteristics are taken into account for the estimation. The
model allows us to stratify the data, based on the strata to which they belong,
in our case the country. A nice description of the model is given in terms
of underlying latent variable. Let’s suppose that the (unobservable) utility
derived by the choice of LL or SS is defined as:
y∗ir = xirβ + cir r ∈ {0, 1} (4.8)
where r = 0 refers to the choice of SS and r = 1 to LL. The vector
xir contains the values of the variables which influence investor i to make
choice r. The vector cir refers to country preferences regarding the choice of
LL or SS. Estimating a conditional logit model we assume that the air are
independently distributed with a cdf F (c) = exp[− exp(−c)]. We do this in
order to take into account the fact that the propensity to choose LL varies from
a country to another, independently of the x. We are interested in estimating
the probability that a respondent chooses LL
P (yi = 1|xi) = exp(xi1β)
exp(xi1β) + exp(xi0β)
(4.9)
The vector xir contains the same variables we have on the right-hand
side of Equation (4.1). As we compare the estimate from column 7 and 6 in
Table 4.7 we see the same “shrinkage” effect on the coefficients which we ob-
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served from column 1 to 2. Taking into account country specific characteristics
reduces the spread in the probabilities of choosing LL, without eliminating the
effect. In column 4 we fit the generalised linear model version of the mixed
effects model we presented in column 3. This merges the formulation in Equa-
tion (4.5) and the one in Equation (4.4). The left-hand side of the equation
is modeled as in Equation (4.5). The right-hand side of the equation as the
right-hand side of Equation (4.4). In this way we model the relationship be-
tween the response variable and the covariates as a generalised linear model
but we allow for random effects due to country characteristics. The coefficients
shrink but less than the shrinkage observed going from a logit to a conditional
logit. The usual pattern is respected.
Table 4.8: Residuals regression. Dependent variable is the residual of a
Linear Probability Model regression of the answer to the patience question (1
if LL) on country dummies.
Dep Var Res. Country Reg.
Age (decades) −0.025∗∗∗
(0.004)
Second Poorest Quintile 0.020
(0.024)
Middle Quintile 0.0003
(0.023)
Second Richest Quintile 0.007
(0.026)
Richest Quintile −0.013
(0.029)
Age (decades) ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.003
(0.005)
Age (decades) ∗Middle Quintile 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005)
Age (decades) ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.017∗∗∗
(0.006)
Age (decades) ∗Richest Quintile 0.025∗∗∗
(0.006)
Observations 50,754
R2 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.007
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Clustered s.e. at country level.
Finally, we show that the predictions are unchanged when we take
the residuals of a regression of the LL variable on countries dummies and we
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Figure 4.3: Residuals regression predictions (age/income). Predictions
based on OLS regression model in Table 4.8. We regressed the answer to
the patience question (1 if LL) on countries dummies. We then regressed
the residuals from that regression on age, income and the interactions and
obtained out of sample prediction for that model (clustered standard errors at
country level).
regress them on age, income and their interactions (Table 4.8 and Figure 4.3).
We proceeds as follows. First, we perform the following regression:
yi = λjCji i ∈ I; j ∈ J (4.10)
where, yi is the answer to the patience question by individual i (1 if
LL), Cj are 65 dummies which refer to the country (j) of the respondent (i).
We obtain the residuals of the regression performed in Equation (4.10), which
are equal to
ri = yi − yˆi
yˆi = λˆjCji
(4.11)
with λˆj which represent the OLS estimate of the coefficients in Equa-
tion (4.10), and we regress them on age and income
ri = α+ βai + γkIki + δkai ∗ Iki i ∈ I; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} (4.12)
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where everything is defined as in Equation (4.1) apart from ri. Ik
are four dummies for the four quintiles of the income distribution (the first
is the baseline), and ai is age (in decades) of subject i. We first regressed
the answers to the patience question on the country dummies. The residuals
(Equation (4.11)) of this regression (Equation (4.10)) capture the variation
in the patience question not due to country related variables. Hence, the
marginal effects obtained in Equation (4.12) are the marginal effects of age
and income, which are not due to country fixed characteristics but only to
individual characteristics. The results are shown in Table 4.8 and in Figure 4.3.
We cannot interpret the results as the probability of choosing LL, since the
dependent variable does not have that meaning. We can interpret the results
as the marginal effects that age and income have on the part of the probability
of choosing LL, which is not explained by country characteristics. As we can
see, the pattern observed in Figure 4.2 is perfectly replicated in Figure 4.3.
4.8 Robustness checks: sub-sample analysis, age as
a categorical variable, missing answers
We replicate the main analysis (Equation (4.1) plus country fixed effects)
in the four macro areas of the world: Europe, North and South America,
Asia and Oceania, Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharian Africa
(Table 4.9). We see that, on average, patience is positively correlated with
age for the richest category and it is negatively correlated with age for the
poorest category. In particular, patience decreases with age for the poorest
quintile in all areas, apart from Asia and Oceania. For the richest quintile of
income, patience either decreases at a much lower rate (Europe) or it actually
increases with age (Americas, Middle East and Africa). The area of Asia
and Oceania is an exception. We do not find any significant effects for any
interactions of age and income in that area. At least, the coefficient of age and
that of age interacted with the second poorest quintile of income are negative,
while the coefficients of the other three quintiles of income interacted with
age are positive. In general, the effects for the intermediate categories of
income are weaker than in the whole sample. However, as we said, when we
focus on single areas of the world it is almost everywhere true that age means
impatience for the poorest quintile and patience for the richest quintile.
We already pointed our that several studies have reported a U-shaped
relation between age and discounting (Harrison et al., 2002; Read and Read,
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2004; Bruderer Enzler et al., 2014; Falk et al., 2018; Richter and Mata, 2018).
The framework we proposed in Equation (4.1) does not allow us to docu-
ment such a pattern, since we fit age as a linear predictor. Here, we show
that analysing age as a categorical variables does not produce any non-linear
pattern. In Table 4.10 we report the outcome of the following model:
yi = α+ βzazi + γkIki + δzkazi ∗ Iki + ωxi + λjCji
i ∈ I; z ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}; j ∈ J
(4.13)
where yi takes the value of 1 if i respondent chose LL; Ik are four dum-
mies for the four quintiles of the income distribution (the first is the baseline),
and az are five age dummies. The first group (the baseline) is 18 to 24 years,
then 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64 and individuals above 65. Hence,
there are 20 interactions for age and income categories. As before, Cj are 64
dummies for the countries (J is the set of countries) and the vector xi refers to
the individual characteristics. Table 4.10 reports the outcome of the regres-
sions. Given that the effects of age and income depend on so many coefficients,
it is much easier to visualise the relationship between patience, age and income
by observing Figure 4.4. Figure 4.4 reports out of sample prediction for USA
citizens, for a regression where age and income are considered as categorical
variables and country fixed effects are added (hence the model reported in
Equation (4.13) where no other xi individual characteristics are considered).
These are the equivalent predictions of Figure 4.2, where age was fitted as a
continuous variable. We can see that the pattern observed in Figure 4.4 can
be conveniently approximated by linear trends. Patience decreases with age
for any income category and the marginal decrease is weaker, the higher is the
income. The richest quintile of income shows constant patience for any level
of income. This confirms that no U-shaped pattern is present in our data and
we can rely upon the estimates presented in Section 4.6.
Finally, we check if our results are driven by the pattern of missing
answers. It might be the case that the distribution of missing answers among
income and age groups drives our results. Imagine that individuals who do
not know if they want to answer the patience question are those who are more
likely to choose SS, if only they answered the question. If the proportion of not
respondent increases with age for the poorest quintile and it decreases with age
for richer quintiles, this might bias our main result that age means patience
to the rich and impatience to the poor. Hence, we perform the following
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Table 4.10: Age bins regression. Linear Probability Model. Demographic
controls in column (3) are the same of column (3) from Table 4.6
Dep Var: Larger Later (1) (2) (3)
Age 25 to 34 −0.059∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.042∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.025)
Age 35 to 44 −0.097∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗
(0.026) (0.021) (0.027)
Age 45 to 54 −0.088∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.027)
Age 55 to 64 −0.103∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.028)
Age above 65 −0.106∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.027)
Second Poorest Quintile −0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
Middle Quintile −0.011 −0.003 −0.010
(0.024) (0.019) (0.021)
Second Richest Quintile 0.037 0.027 0.027
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Richest Quintile 0.026 0.014 0.006
(0.039) (0.032) (0.037)
Age 25 to 34 ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.054∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.045
(0.024) (0.023) (0.029)
Age 35 to 44 ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.078∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.038
(0.030) (0.026) (0.029)
Age 45 to 54 ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.053∗ 0.032 0.031
(0.029) (0.027) (0.033)
Age 55 to 64 ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.053 0.041 0.032
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033)
Age above 65 ∗Second Poorest Quintile 0.062∗ 0.030 0.030
(0.033) (0.031) (0.035)
Age 25 to 34 ∗Middle Quintile 0.085∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025)
Age 35 to 44 ∗Middle Quintile 0.107∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.026) (0.022) (0.026)
Age 45 to 54 ∗Middle Quintile 0.092∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
Age 55 to 64 ∗Middle Quintile 0.107∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.032)
Age above 65 ∗Middle Quintile 0.120∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.033) (0.030) (0.037)
Age 25 to 34 ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.064∗ 0.046 0.027
(0.036) (0.034) (0.039)
Age 35 to 44 ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.119∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗ 0.045
(0.039) (0.035) (0.039)
Age 45 to 54 ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.095∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.043
(0.039) (0.037) (0.042)
Age 55 to 64 ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.132∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.042)
Age above 65 ∗Second Richest Quintile 0.120∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.062
(0.042) (0.039) (0.043)
Age 25 to 34 ∗Richest Quintile 0.082∗∗ 0.066∗ 0.053
(0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
Age 35 to 44 ∗Richest Quintile 0.157∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.077∗
(0.043) (0.037) (0.042)
Age 45 to 54 ∗Richest Quintile 0.151∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.038) (0.032) (0.035)
Age 55 to 64 ∗Richest Quintile 0.145∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.063
(0.040) (0.034) (0.039)
Age above 65 ∗Richest Quintile 0.197∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.041) (0.048)
Observations 50,754 50,754 38,407
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.054 0.067
Demographic Controls NO NO YES
Country FE NO YES YES
Countries number 65 65 60
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Clustered standard errors at country level.
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Table 4.11: No answer regression. Dep. var. is 1 if the subject did not
answer the Patience question. Logit Model based on a sample of 65 countries.
Dep Var: Not Resp Coefficient Odds Ratio
(1) (2)
Age (decades) 0.135∗∗∗ 1.14
(0.034)
Second Poorest Quintile 0.218 1.24
(0.369)
Middle Quintile 0.087 1.09
(0.437)
Second Richest Quintile 0.415 1.51
(0.462)
Richest Quintile −0.482∗ 0.62
(0.247)
Age (decades) ∗Second Poorest Quintile −0.086 0.92
(0.054)
Age (decades) ∗Middle Quintile −0.076 0.93
(0.062)
Age (decades) ∗Second Richest Quintile −0.142∗∗ 0.87
(0.063)
Age (decades) ∗Richest Quintile −0.017 0.98
(0.045)
Observations 57,682
McFadden Adj. R2 0.182
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Clustered s. e. country level.
Figure 4.5: Probability not answering patience question
(age/income). Estimated probability of not answering the Patience
question per each quintile of income. Predictions based on a logistic
regression model with clustered standard errors at country level.
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regression:
ni = α+ βai + γkIki + δkai ∗ Iki i ∈ I; k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} (4.14)
where ni = logit(mi) and mi takes the value of 1 if respondent i chose
not to answer the patience question or answered “I don’t know”; Ik are four
dummies for the four quintiles of the income distribution (the first is the
baseline), and ai is age (in decades) of the subject. Since we have to deal with
probabilities close to 0, we model it as a logit regression. Table 4.11 reports the
outcome of the regression and Figure 4.5 reports out of sample predictions for
the probability of not answering the patience question. We do not detect any
remarkable pattern in our results. For any income category, older individuals
are more likely to be non-respondents. The probability of not answering the
question are quite small and quite stable across income groups, for any level of
age. Very old individuals in the poorest quintile show the highest probability
of not answering the question and very young individuals from the richest
quintile show the lowest probability of not answering the question. However,
these are not big departures from the other values and we firmly believe they
are not strong enough to drive our main result.
4.9 Age means impatience to the poor and patience
to the rich: a discussion
The first possible explanation for our results is that lower incomes lead to lower
patience with age, while high incomes don’t. Loibl (2017, p. 428) points out
that poverty in older age can lead to serious difficulties: “Difficulties adjusting
to the lower pension income in early retirement, higher health care expenses,
increasing demands to pay towards the cost of care, and the need to modify
the home to meet changing health needs are the reasons for tight financial
situations in older age (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011; van Rooij et al.,
2011).” This suggests that poor people might end up discounting at a higher
rate than the rich when they get older, because they will be more strongly
affected by Fisher’s “pressure of pressing needs”. Along the same lines, Mani
et al. (2013) suggested that poverty leads to lower cognitive functions and to
worse financial choices. If worse financial choices worsen the financial situa-
tion of the individuals and lead to other wrong choices, we observe a never
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ending loop. This account is consistent with our findings, if we hypothesise
that a preference for the “Smaller Sooner” option is the choice associated to
lower cognitive functions. One possibility for the declining pattern of age, for
lower income individuals, could be that persistent poverty reduces cognitive
functions even more with time. Then, being persistently in the lowest quintile
of income, can lead to have an always lower preference for the “Larger Later”
option. Becker and Mulligan (1997) theory is also consistent with this notion:
while people may not be born with different discount rates, those who are well
off will find it worthwhile to invest more in thinking about the future, and will
therefore become more patient because of this investment. So the rich will be-
come more patient because they are rich. But, of course, this greater patience
will lead them to get richer. The very poor, on the other hand, will find no rea-
son to invest in thinking about the future. An alternative proposal about the
relationship between ageing, poverty and discount reverses the causal arrow.
Ramsey (1928), suggested that if discount rates differ among people, those
who are more patient will become better off as they get older, while those who
are less patient will become worse off. The logic is that if people start off with
wealth “randomly distributed” over patience levels, those with lower discount
rates will end life richer than those with higher rates. With age (measured
cross-sectionally) those with the highest income when older would therefore
have lower discount rates than those with the lowest income, while in their
early years those with higher and lower income would not differ appreciably.
These two accounts, for different reasons, suggest that a sample of poor elderly
people will be less patient than a sample of wealthy elderly people, but this
difference may not be observed for younger people.
Our evidence is consistent with the findings of Green et al. (1999) and
Epper et al. (2020). We are able to “fill the gap” in the results of Green
et al. (1999). They did show a wealth effect, with older wealthier people
discounting less than older poorer people. Plus, they found that older wealthy
people discounted at the same rate as younger wealthy people, suggesting that
discounting might not change with age. We found that this is true for the well
off, but it is not true for the worse off. Lower income individuals discount at a
similar rate to higher income individuals when young and the difference arises
only with age. Our results are perfectly consistent with the stereotype of a
young person, poor or otherwise, as someone looking forward to the future and
in most cases not constrained by current wealth but optimistic about future
wealth, as suggested by Fisher. Our results are consistent with Epper et al.
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(2020), as well. Epper et al. (2020) measured discounting at one point in
time, for a sample of Danish citizens, and checked where individuals ranked
in the wealth distribution, over their lifespan. They did find that individuals
with relatively low time discounting were persistently positioned higher in
the wealth distribution, throughout their lives. Their explanation, which is
applicable to our case as well, is that patience affects individuals’ positions
in the wealth distribution through the savings channel. They claimed that
those who are more patient tend to save more, during their life. To justify
this claim, they showed that, for credit constraints individuals, patience did
not predict their position in the wealth distribution. The explanation is that
those individuals are not given free choice whether to borrow money or not.
Hence, impatient individuals who are credit constraint do not rank much lower
in the wealth distribution, than patient individuals who are credit constraint.
In contrast, patience was found to be a strong predictor of wealth position for
those who are not credit constraint. They saw that patience did not predict the
wealth position for subjects who held liquid assets worth less than one month’s
disposable income, the credit constraint individuals. They found a strong
predictive power of patience in the group of Danish citizen with liquid wealth
corresponding to more than one month’s disposable income. Moving from
the lowest to the highest level of patience in this group increased the wealth
rank position by 12 percentiles. In a nutshell, the explanation proposed by
Epper et al. (2020) is that patience leads to higher wealth thanks to savings.
We can only expect this effect to become stronger and stronger with age,
leading the gap in wealth between patient and impatient people to increase
over time. Although we presented data for income and not for wealth, income
is by no doubt a good predictor of wealth. Plus, when considering household
income, individuals should take into account also the cash flows coming from
their investments, which are expected to be bigger the higher is the wealth
available to the individual, to be saved and invested.
4.10 Patience around the world
If we look at the R2 of the models in Table 4.5 we can see that country level
fixed characteristics can explain most of the variation which we can describe,
for our dependent variable. Hence, it is worth looking at how different national
characteristics correlate with patience. We use as an index of national patience
the percentage of respondents choosing “Larger Later” in each country. This
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is reported in Table 4.2 and shown in Figure 4.1. We start by comparing our
measure to the measures of patience of Wang et al. (2016) and Falk et al.
(2018). Table 4.12 shows the correlation of our patience index with these
two alternative indices from the literature and some country characteristics.
Table 4.13 shows the results of linear regressions where we regress our index of
patience on the indices obtained by Falk et al. (2018) and Wang et al. (2016).
They can both explain a lot of the variation in our index, but the Falk et al.
(2018) is more correlated to our measure.
Table 4.12: Patience correlation. Correlation (Pearson) of our index of
Patience (Proportion of respondents in a Country who chose LL) with other
indices and country level variables.
Corr. Patience p-value Countries
Patience Falk et al. (2018) 0.605 0.000 44
Patience Wang et al. (2016) 0.439 0.020 28
GDP per capita 2014 0.528 0.000 65
GDP per capita 2015 0.521 0.000 65
Life Expectancy 2015 0.435 0.000 65
Life Expectancy 2014 0.433 0.000 65
Real Interest Rate 2015 -0.496 0.001 43
Real Interest Rate 2014 -0.444 0.003 44
Private Credit to GDP 2014 0.329 0.009 63
Distance from Equator 0.320 0.009 65
Private Credit to GDP 2015 0.324 0.010 63
Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede) -0.376 0.013 43
Individualism (Hofstede) 0.361 0.017 43
Inflation 2014 -0.271 0.030 64
Future Time Reference Weak 0.270 0.035 61
Inflation 2015 -0.256 0.041 64
Future Orientation Index 0.173 0.174 63
Gross Savings 2015 0.156 0.225 62
Debt to GDP Ratio 2014 0.113 0.376 63
Growth Rate 2015 0.095 0.451 65
Gross Savings 2014 0.082 0.526 62
Growth Rate 2014 -0.068 0.592 65
Debt to GDP Ratio 2015 0.066 0.605 63
Long Term Orientation (Hofstede) -0.010 0.945 53
The correlation betwen our measure of patience and the one proposed
by Falk et al. (2018) is 0.61 and it is highly significant. However, while their
top 10 is made of
countries in the world [...] either located in the neo-European,
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Table 4.13: Patience comparison regression. Dependent Variable is the
Patience index calculated at Country level (percentage of LL replies). Robust
Standard Errors reported.
Dep Var: Patience (1) (2) (3)
Patience Falk et al. (2018) 0.174∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
(0.030) (0.049)
Patience Wang et al. (2016) 0.271∗∗∗ 0.144∗
(0.080) (0.085)
Observations 44 28 23
Adjusted R2 0.366 0.192 0.403
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
English-speaking world, or else in Western Europe, with the Scan-
dinavian countries exhibiting particularly high levels of patience.
we observe some relevant exceptions. Apart from countries from the Western
world (with Scandinavian ones at the very top) we see Bangladesh, Kosovo,
Saudi Arabia and Morocco, popping in our top 10. In general, Latin American
and African countries are less patient and Western countries are more patient.
This is in line with Falk et al. (2018) and Wang et al. (2016). Our measure
is highly correlated with the one developed by Wang et al. (2016), as well.
Correlation is 0.44 and it is significant. We should take into account that the
set of subjects surveyed in Wang et al. (2016) is not perfectly comparable to
our set of subjects6.
Turning our attention to country characteristics, we will look at them
in order of relevance. The two most relevant factor to explain our index are
GDP per capita and life expectancy in the country. Wealthier countries and
countries where life expectancy is higher are more likely to delay the reward.
GDP per capita in both 2014 an 2015 has a correlation higher than 0.5 with
our measure of patience. This is in line with Falk et al. (2018) and in line with
the thesis that development is linked to patience. Life expectancy at birth
shows a correlation higher than 0.4 with our index, and highly significant.
That was expected, since life expectancy should shape our future orientation,
in terms of how sure the future rewards is perceived. The real interest rate
is highly negatively correlated to our measure of patience. It is interesting
6We checked what is the correlation of Wang et al. (2016) measure with our measure
calculated only using answers from young or young students and the correlation was actually
lower.
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to see that the interest rate individuals were experiencing at the time of the
survey, in 2015, is a better predictor of patience (-0.496) than the interest
rate from the previous year (-0.444). Since our question concerns a reward
to be enjoyed in one year, it is discounted more in countries where available
interest rates were higher. Private credit to the private sector is positively
related to patience (more than 0.32 for both 2014 and 2015). This means that
in countries where financial resources provided to the private sector by finan-
cial corporations are higher, have a higher level of patience. This proves that
our index is linked to the financial development of countries. Our measure of
patience increases in the distance from the equator, confirming ideas from Di-
amond (2005); Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and results in Falk et al. (2018).
Countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance are more present biased, in line
with Wang et al. (2016). Individualism is positively related to our index of
patience, in line with Wang et al. (2016) and Falk et al. (2018). The effect
of individualism is consistent with Triandis (1971) in which participants from
the more individualistic culture seemed to be more “willing to defer gratifi-
cation”. It is also in line with the findings by Mahajna et al. (2008), where
the Israeli Jews (presumably from a more individualistic culture) exhibited
higher patience for monetary incentives than Israeli Arabs (presumably from
a more collectivistic culture). Inflation is negatively related to patience. The
correlation is lower than -0.25 and significant for both 2014 and 2015. We can
advance the same explanation we gave for the effect of the real interest rate.
Since we propose an amount of money to be awarded in one year, it loses value
as the expectations of inflation increase. Weak Future Time Reference (Chen,
2013) is positively and significantly, correlated with patience, consistently with
Falk et al. (2018). In those countries where the linguistic distinction between
present and future is not so strong, individuals are more patient and more
likely to delay the reward.
Other variables are not significantly correlated but we can comment
on the direction of correlation. We detect a weak positive relationship of the
Future Orientation Index (Preis et al., 2012) with patience, although it is not
significant. This respects our conjecture that countries which are more future
oriented are more patient as well. The saving rate is positively correlated to
patience (Epper et al., 2020). The growth rate in 2015 is positively correlated
to patience, while the one in 2014 is negatively correlated to patience, hence
we have no conclusive evidence on the degree of patience and the saving rate.
Public debt to GDP ratio is surprisingly positively correlated to our index of
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patience. However, more developed countries, which show a higher level of
patience, tend to have a higher debt to GDP ratio. On top of that, we already
highlighted the fact that the correlation is very weak. Differently from Wang
et al. (2016) and Falk et al. (2018), we do not find any correlation between
Hofstede Long Term Orientation and our index. It is worth remembering that
Falk et al. (2018) compared average value of Hofstede’s cultural dimension for
each country to their index of patience at the country level. Wang et al. (2016)
measured Hofstede’s cultural dimension at the individual level, alongside pref-
erence for intertemporal discounting. Falk et al. (2018) compared average level
of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in each country to the patience index of each
country, as we do. We believe that our measure does not correlate so well with
LTO since LTO is measured looking at items that seem distant from time pref-
erences (see Section 4.4). On top of that, the correlation between LTO and
the measures of patience developed by Wang et al. (2016) or Falk et al. (2018)
is actually stronger in those countries where our index of patience was not
measured. The correlation between Hofstede’s LTO index and our measure of
patience rises from -0.01 on the entire set of countries which we considered, to
0.05 (not significant) on the set of countries which were involved in both our
study and the one by Falk et al. (2018). The correlation between Hofstede’s
LTO index and Falk et al. (2018) measure of patience drops from 0.44, on
the entire set of countries which they consider to 0.27 (significant only at 10%
level) on the set of countries which were involved in both our study and their
study. Hence, the discrepancy is much more attenuated in the set of common
countries.
Although our main concern was focusing on individual differences in
discounting rewards, and in particular the ones related to age and income,
we believe that our unique dataset gave us a very nice opportunity to further
investigate differences at the country level. We added more evidence that
patience is correlated to economic development. On top of that, comparing
our measure to the one derived in Falk et al. (2018), to the one in Wang
et al. (2016) and to the country level indices widely believed to be linked to
patience, strengthens the idea that our design is well calibrated and able to
capture differences in patience.
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4.11 Policy and academic implications
The policy implications of our results are wide and relevant. The patience of
individuals changes based on the interaction of age and income. That affects
decisions like borrowing money, saving for retirement and eventually how much
to save towards a legacy. In particular, we would like to stress the fact that
the older low income individuals are, the more likely they are to be impatient.
That makes them particularly vulnerable, since older individuals are more
likely to face financial troubles because of the increasing life expectancy all
over the world and the increase in health related expenditures over the lifespan
(Loibl, 2017). We suggest that those category should receive greater attention,
when planning welfare interventions. On top of that, higher patience rates
might be induced in those individuals.
The implications of our investigation on which individual character-
istics are prognostic of patience are wider than that, though. Education,
religious beliefs, gender and optimism are all correlated to our measure of
patience. Although we cannot disentangle the direction of causality, we can
for sure insist upon the fact that some behaviours should be encouraged to
foster higher levels of individual patience and that some categories should be
looked after, and might be nudged to make more patient choices, with more
dedication than others. In particular, our work reminds us of the importance
of expectations in shaping economic decisions. Having optimistic views to-
wards the future increases patience. We are not advocating for governments
and institutions misreporting information about the economic outlook of their
countries. However, since we see that positive views about the future increase
patience, we are speaking in favour of all those cases where institutional au-
thorities and political leaders intervened to reassure the population. One of
the best exemplifications of this point is the now famous “Whatever it takes”
speech of the then president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi
(Acharya et al., 2019).
Life satisfaction was found to be a good predictor of patience and this
gives a hint to all policies which are now contemplating life satisfaction among
the indices to take into account (Layard, 2020). Religious beliefs cannot be
shaped by the regulators but they have a huge impact on patience. For exam-
ple, both having no religious affiliation or being protestant increases patience
with respect to being affiliated to any other religion, and in both cases the
estimate of the increase is bigger than the increase induced by economic opti-
mism. In particular, being non religious (atheist or agnostic) has three times
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the impact of positive economic expectations on patience. This contributes to
the debate on the economic effects of religion (Iyer, 2016).
Finally, cultural variability, as captured by country differences, had
the greatest explanatory power for our measure of patience. We were able to
relate it to several indicators of economic development like GDP per capita,
life expectancy, latitude and private credit to GDP. Most importantly, we
developed a measure which correlated very well to the measure developed
by Falk et al. (2018) and the one developed by Wang et al. (2016). Our
measure has the advantage of being much easier to elicit and it overcomes all
the issues due to having different currencies and different economic conditions
from one country to another, and from one individual to another. It directly
address the actual financial situation of the respondent and it is very easy to
understand since it does not involve any demanding mathematical calculations.
We introduced an exceedingly simple measure of intertemporal discounting
which correlates very well with the main economic indicators and other more
sophisticated measures. We suggest it can be easily added to the most relevant
surveys which are routinely submitted to the world population, like the World
Value Survey, the European Social Survey, the European Values Study and all
their national or international equivalents.
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